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  • 1
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Berkeley, Calif. : Berkeley Electronic Press (now: De Gruyter)
    Review of law and economics 1.2006, 3, art3 
    ISSN: 1555-5879
    Quelle: Berkeley Electronic Press Academic Journals
    Thema: Rechtswissenschaft , Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: The paper deals with a bilateral accident situation in which victims have heterogeneous costs of care. With perfect information, efficient care by the injurer raises with the victim's cost. When the injurer cannot observe at all the victim's type, and this fact can be verified by Courts, first-best cannot be implemented with the use of a negligence rule based on the first-best levels of care. Second-best leads the injurer to intermediate care, and the two types of victims to choose the best response to it. We explore in particular detail the more interesting case of imperfect observation of the victim's type, characterizing the optimal solution and examining the different legal alternatives when Courts cannot verify the injurers' statements. Counterintuitively, we show that there is no difference at all between the use by Courts of a rule of complete trust and a rule of complete distrust towards the injurers' statements. We then relate the findings of the model to existing rules and doctrines in Common Law and Civil Law legal systems.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    Standort Signatur Erwartet Verfügbarkeit
    BibTip Andere fanden auch interessant ...
  • 2
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Berkeley, Calif. : Berkeley Electronic Press (now: De Gruyter)
    Review of law and economics 1.2006, 3, art2 
    ISSN: 1555-5879
    Quelle: Berkeley Electronic Press Academic Journals
    Thema: Rechtswissenschaft , Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: This article studies the optimal scope of negligence, considering which of the parties' precautionary measures should be included in the determination of negligence and which instead should be omitted. The analysis shows that the optimal scope of negligence balances the gains derived from improved accident prevention with the administrative costs of the system. This approach also provides insights concerning not only the notions of care and activity level and their respective boundaries, but also the choice between strict liability and negligence.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    Standort Signatur Erwartet Verfügbarkeit
    BibTip Andere fanden auch interessant ...
  • 3
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Berkeley, Calif. : Berkeley Electronic Press (now: De Gruyter)
    Review of law and economics 1.2006, 3, art4 
    ISSN: 1555-5879
    Quelle: Berkeley Electronic Press Academic Journals
    Thema: Rechtswissenschaft , Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: Professors Goldberg vigorously attacks the merits of the "Three Tenors" decision while emphasizing the issue of whether the challenged restraint resides within the boundaries of the firm. Professor Muris responds that the Commission's analysis is correct as a matter of law and fact, and that Professor Goldberg's call for a market power screen for all horizontal restraints ignores the legal costs of rulemaking. I take a third view of the debate. While conceding that per se rule is properly applied to "naked restraints," I show that the Commission's analysis relies on an inappropriately narrow view of the ancillary restraints doctrine in order to justify application of the per se rule. In particular, the Commission's emphasis on the timing of the restraint as well as its hostility towards PolyGram's free rider defense are not supported as a matter of law. In any event, the facts of the Three Tenors do not support the Commission's conclusion that the moratorium agreement was not ancillary to the joint venture.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    Standort Signatur Erwartet Verfügbarkeit
    BibTip Andere fanden auch interessant ...
  • 4
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Berkeley, Calif. : Berkeley Electronic Press (now: De Gruyter)
    Review of law and economics 1.2006, 3, art1 
    ISSN: 1555-5879
    Quelle: Berkeley Electronic Press Academic Journals
    Thema: Rechtswissenschaft , Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: World governance today is characterized by international organizations lacking democratic legitimacy and control by the citizens they claim to represent. They are also criticized for being inefficient. This leads to violent protests and to NGOs having great influence. To address these problems, we propose international governance based on the democratic idea of citizen participation: All citizens of the member countries of international organizations have the potential right to participate in the decision-making of international organizations via initiatives, referendums and recalls. In order to reduce transaction costs, a representative group of citizens is randomly selected who can actually exercise their participation rights.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    Standort Signatur Erwartet Verfügbarkeit
    BibTip Andere fanden auch interessant ...
  • 5
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Berkeley, Calif. : Berkeley Electronic Press (now: De Gruyter)
    Review of law and economics 2.2006, 1, art5 
    ISSN: 1555-5879
    Quelle: Berkeley Electronic Press Academic Journals
    Thema: Rechtswissenschaft , Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: Antitrust authorities often consider parallel pricing and market share stability to be clues of illegal collusion. To analyze whether this inference is correct, I develop a model of price competition with differentiated products in which demand and costs vary over time. In many cases parallel pricing does not distinguish between a competitive and a collusive outcome. However, in some cases perfect parallel pricing is compatible only with a competitive equilibrium, and therefore provides some evidence that firms did not collude. I also show that the competitive equilibrium is characterized by a higher market share stability than a collusive equilibrium.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    Standort Signatur Erwartet Verfügbarkeit
    BibTip Andere fanden auch interessant ...
  • 6
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Berkeley, Calif. : Berkeley Electronic Press (now: De Gruyter)
    Review of law and economics 2.2006, 2, art2 
    ISSN: 1555-5879
    Quelle: Berkeley Electronic Press Academic Journals
    Thema: Rechtswissenschaft , Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: Monetary sanctions are less effective when agents cannot afford to pay them in full. We present a simple model of a society with two types of risk averse agents, differing in terms of productivity in the legal labor market. We consider transfers from the most productive to the least productive agents, and discuss the conditions under which redistribution can reduce crime.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    Standort Signatur Erwartet Verfügbarkeit
    BibTip Andere fanden auch interessant ...
  • 7
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Berkeley, Calif. : Berkeley Electronic Press (now: De Gruyter)
    Review of law and economics 2.2006, 1, art1 
    ISSN: 1555-5879
    Quelle: Berkeley Electronic Press Academic Journals
    Thema: Rechtswissenschaft , Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: Buying market share occurs when firms price below the profit-maximizing price in order to gain market share, even though recoupment of lost profit is impossible. Although perceived by rivals as predatory pricing, buying-market-share pricing does not generally damage competition even when it forces efficient rivals to exit, and current predatory pricing policy yields desirable antitrust enforcement outcomes. However, buying market share can harm competition when share-based entry barriers exist and product differentiation is sufficiently weak. With weak product differentiation and share-based entry barriers, even prices set above average costs can have anticompetitive consequences.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    Standort Signatur Erwartet Verfügbarkeit
    BibTip Andere fanden auch interessant ...
  • 8
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Berkeley, Calif. : Berkeley Electronic Press (now: De Gruyter)
    Review of law and economics 2.2006, 1, art3 
    ISSN: 1555-5879
    Quelle: Berkeley Electronic Press Academic Journals
    Thema: Rechtswissenschaft , Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: This paper extends the law enforcement model to include court congestion. Society suffers harm from court congestion since delay affects the credibility and the reliability of the criminal justice system. The core result of the paper is that the probability of apprehension and the probability of conviction should be considered separately by the enforcement authority. Because the level of congestion is affected by the probability of apprehension only, the use of fines and conviction should be exhausted before resorting to the costlier (in terms of court congestion costs) instrument of apprehension.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    Standort Signatur Erwartet Verfügbarkeit
    BibTip Andere fanden auch interessant ...
  • 9
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Berkeley, Calif. : Berkeley Electronic Press (now: De Gruyter)
    Review of law and economics 2.2006, 3, art2 
    ISSN: 1555-5879
    Quelle: Berkeley Electronic Press Academic Journals
    Thema: Rechtswissenschaft , Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: We demonstrate that contingent attorney fees can play a strategic role in a model of nuisance suits. Specifically, the use of contingency fees makes the plaintiff's threat to go to trial credible. In contrast to previous economic analyses, we show that contingency fees do encourage nuisance suits.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    Standort Signatur Erwartet Verfügbarkeit
    BibTip Andere fanden auch interessant ...
  • 10
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Berkeley, Calif. : Berkeley Electronic Press (now: De Gruyter)
    Review of law and economics 2.2006, 1, art4 
    ISSN: 1555-5879
    Quelle: Berkeley Electronic Press Academic Journals
    Thema: Rechtswissenschaft , Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: Merger analysis is a field in which economic theory is systematically applied, day-in, day-out. Economics structures the definition of the relevant market, and then economics drives the evaluation of the likely competitive effect of the merger. Exactly which models are used by Federal Trade Commission staff would be of great interest to the stake-holder community, as would any details on how the models are applied. This paper provides those details with an in-depth study of the FTC merger review process focused on single market horizontal mergers evaluated between 1993 and 2003. Five different market models are identified with a homogeneous goods analysis (two choices) useful in about one-third of the cases and a differentiated goods analysis (three choices) relevant for the others. Unilateral effects analysis was used in slightly more than half of the cases and coordinated interaction theories in just less than half. Evidence contained in hot documents, validated customer concerns and event analyses appears to play an important role in confirming the implications of Guidelines-based theoretical models of a merger's competitive effect.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    Standort Signatur Erwartet Verfügbarkeit
    BibTip Andere fanden auch interessant ...
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