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  • Articles  (7,519)
  • 2000-2004  (7,519)
  • 2003  (7,519)
  • Economics  (7,296)
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  • 2000-2004  (7,519)
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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 12 (2003), S. 0 
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We model firms as competing for socially responsible consumers by linking the provision of a public good (environmentally friendly or socially responsible activities) to sales of their private goods. In many cases, too little of the public good is provided, but under certain conditions, competition leads to excessive provision. Further, there is generally a trade-off between more efficient provision of the private and the public good. Our results indicate that the level of private provision of the public good varies inversely with the competitiveness of the private-good market and that the types of public goods provided are biased toward those for which consumers have high participation value.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 12 (2003), S. 0 
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We analyze the interactions between internal and external control mechanisms in a framework in which the board selects the CEO and then decides whether to retain or dismiss him after observing a signal regarding his ability. The novel aspect of our paper is that we consider both the hiring and the firing of the CEO by the board. The type of board is defined by its ability to select a good CEO, so that the quality of the CEO depends on the type of board. Then, the dismissal-retention decision provides information not only on the quality of the CEO but also on the board's type. We show that the board's behavior depends on the pressure from the takeover market and on whether its type is publicly known. When the pressure from the takeover market is high and the type of board is private information, the board prefers not to dismiss the manager even if it has received a very low signal regarding his quality. Hence, our model endogenously derives a collusion between board and CEO in which the board does not fire a bad CEO. This behavior emerges as an attempt to hide the board's inability to accomplish the first task, CEO selection, by distorting the second task, the CEO retention-dismissal decision.
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 12 (2003), S. 0 
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper estimates the importance of indirect network effects in the US video cassette recorder (VCR) market between 1978 and 1986. Estimation reveals the significant role of networks in the format competition between VHS and Beta. The paper also finds that if Sony, the system sponsor of Beta, had aggressively introduced its VCRs at the early stage of competition, Beta would likely have dominated the market in 1985; instead, the format disappeared in 1989. Finally, the paper measures consumer welfare for the value of network effects in VCRs, and assesses the consumer welfare effect of standardization.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 12 (2003), S. 0 
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We consider a repeated interaction between a manufacturing firm and a subcontractor. The relationship between the two parties is characterized (1) by moral hazard, and (2) by the fact that they do not have perfect knowledge about the base cost level of the project, which is carried out by a subcontractor (the parties only have identical a priori beliefs). We consider a two-period model where the players can update their estimate of the base cost level according to incoming information. Exit relationships, where the firm signs one-period contracts with different subcontractors, are compared with voice relationships, where both partners commit to a two-period interaction and (due to information sharing and face-to-face communication between the partners) additional information about the base cost level is generated. It is shown that in such a dynamic framework with common uncertainty the quality of the additional information plays a crucial role in determining the characteristics of the optimal relationship: voice-based strategies governed by long-term contracts are preferable if the precision of the additional information about the base cost level is high. If the precision of the additional signal is low, exit strategies with frequent changes of the subcontractors are optimal for the manufacturer.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 12 (2003), S. 0 
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We examine a model of locational choice in commercial media markets. Commercial media (stations) compete for audiences with their choice of programming variety in order to attract advertising revenues from advertisers. These advertisers (producers) compete in a differentiated product market and rely on advertising to inform consumers about their product. We use the model to show that media have incentives to minimize the extent of differentiation between them. This incentive is an implication of the assumed role of advertising as information and as an ultimate nuisance to the audience. When stations minimally differentiate their programming offerings, producers choose lower levels of advertising. Consequently, lower levels of product information are available to consumers, permitting producers to gain higher margins on product sales. As a result, stations can negotiate higher payments for advertising space.
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  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 12 (2003), S. 0 
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper applies spatial econometrics to hamburger price data to assess the degree of substitutability of products and locations of spatially dispersed franchised chains. First, while intrachain price variation exists, I find that hamburger prices at neighboring outlets of different chains are spatially uncorrelated. I conclude that their products are not close substitutes, which provides an explanation for why price promotions have not raised market share. I do find spatial price correlation, however, among proximate outlets of separate franchisees within the same chain. This finding implies that customers view proximate locations of a chain as substitutes.
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  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 12 (2003), S. 0 
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper studies vertical integration by an essential-good monopolist into complementary markets. Unlike previous studies of complementary products, consumers are allowed to purchase some components of a complementary basket, but not others. Two different pricing strategies by the integrated firm may emerge. In mass-market equilibria, the price of the complement under integration is zero and it is given away with the essential good. Niche-market equilibria have more conventional pricing. This dichotomy is consistent with consumer software pricing. Integration enhances consumer and total surplus, unless it leads to exit by the higher-quality rival, in which case welfare is reduced. Exit is most likely when it is least damaging to consumer welfare. Integration reduces innovation by the rival firm. The effect on innovation by the integrated firm is ambiguous, but numerical computation of an extended model indicates that integration increases the innovation of the integrated firm and enhances welfare.
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  • 8
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 12 (2003), S. 0 
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We examine bargaining in a dynamic context where exchange between two parties affects the potential surplus from future trade. In this setting traders negotiate current contracts anticipating the impact of their agreement on future exchanges. We show that in growing environments these dynamic considerations will often ameliorate bargaining inefficiencies associated with private information and facilitate exchange as both parties cooperate to nurture the relationship. In contrast, we find that in declining environments dynamic considerations will often exacerbate bargaining inefficiencies and hinder trade, as both parties are hesitant to let the relationship mature. These findings have implications for preferences to form long-lived relationships.
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  • 9
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 12 (2003), S. 0 
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We investigate knowledge spillovers and externalities in the disagglomeration and growth of the advertising-agency industry. A simple model of high demand, low wages, and externalities associated with clusters of related industries can explain the dispersion of advertising agency employment across states. Other factors affected the industry growth rate within states. Consistent with Jacobs and Porter but contrary to Marshall, Arrow, and Romer, competition, but not specialization, enhanced growth. In accord with Porter (1990), growth increased with buyer cluster size. Diversity had no effect on growth. Despite improvements in telecommunications and transportation reducing effective distances, location still matters.
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  • 10
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 12 (2003), S. 0 
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We test empirically for network effects and preannouncement effects in the DVD market. We do this by measuring the effect of potential (incompatible) competition on a network undergoing growth. We find that there are network effects. The data are generally consistent with the hypothesis that the preannouncement of DIVX temporarily slowed down the adoption of DVD technology.
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