ISSN:
1572-8404
Keywords:
philosophy of mind
;
ethics
;
animal pain
;
Peter Carruthers
;
consciousness
;
evolution
Source:
Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
Topics:
Biology
,
Philosophy
Notes:
Abstract In a series of works, Peter Carruthers has argued for the denial of the title proposition. Here, I defend that proposition by offering direct support drawn from relevant sciences and by undercutting Carruthers‘ argument. In doing the latter, I distinguish an intrinsic theory of consciousness from Carruthers‘ relational theory of consciousness. This relational theory has two readings, one of which makes essential appeal to evolutionary theory. I argue that neither reading offers a successful view.
Type of Medium:
Electronic Resource
URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1017933132500
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