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  • Articles  (1,075)
  • Blackwell Publishing Ltd  (1,075)
  • American Physical Society (APS)
  • 1995-1999  (1,075)
  • 1990-1994
  • 1995  (1,075)
  • Economics  (1,075)
  • Sociology  (84)
  • 11
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Why Are Royalty Rates Higher in Service-type Franchises? (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Royalty payments from a franchisee to a franchisor serve as incentive for the franchisor to provide appropriate levels of quality and brand, name investment. However, since they also distort the service provided by the franchisee, we should expect relatively lower royalty rates in franchises that are primarily service-oriented. Casual examination of royalty rates across product-oriented and service-oriented franchises shows that the opposite is true, with service-type franchises enjoying higher royalty rates. We resolve this apparent puzzle. The basic argument we put forth is that in product-type franchises, a franchisor can charge a wholesale price on goods transferred to the franchisee, thus using an alternative instrument that also serves as an incentive for the franchisor. Moreover, in general, a franchisor will use both wholesale price and royalty to minimize distortions in retail price and service at the retail level. We then test the predictions of our model on different industries and find confirmation for the same.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00007.x
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  • 12
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Incentive Contracting Under Limited Liability (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We examine the nature of incentive schemes between the principal and the risk-neutral agent in the presence of the agent's limited liability and ex ante action choice. We consider alternative schemes when a simple rental contract is infeasible due to the limited liability of the agent and study the effectiveness of a performance bonus scheme in achieving the first-best outcome. We also discuss some implications of such schemes in real practices.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00477.x
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  • 13
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Input Market Competition and the Make-or-Buy Decision (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Recent theories of vertical integration based on incomplete contracts assume perfect competition on at least one side of the market. As a result, the make-or-buy choice has no redistributive effect and will reflect efficiency considerations only. This paper introduces imperfect competition into an otherwise standard model of a vertical relationship with noncontractable specific investments. We assume that there are a finite number of potential input suppliers with private information about their costs. We first show that a monopoly buyer of such inputs will often prefer to own the seller's assets even though it would be more efficient for the seller's assets not to be so owned. We then show that an increase in the number of potential partners on either side of the market reduces this inclination towards vertical integration. With perfect competition on either side of the market, the make-buy decision will reflect only efficiency considerations.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00491.x
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  • 14
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Why Retailers Sell Private Labels (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper interprets private label marketing as a retailer instrument for overcoming the double-marginalization problem inherent in the distribution of well-known manufacturer brands. Retailers with some degree of market power carry private label substitutes for popular national brands in order to capture more profit from the vertical structures they share with brand manufacturers. The net effect of private label marketing is to improve the performance of distribution channels. After presenting a formal model and deriving analytical results, the paper gathers some empirical evidence that supports these results.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00509.x
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  • 15
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Introduction (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00001.x
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  • 16
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Horizontal integration for bargaining Power: Evidence from the Cable Television Industry (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper studies the hypothesis that large firms have more bargaining power with suppliers than do small firms, using data from the cable television industry. Employing techniques from the “new empirical lo,” the effect of owner size on marginal costs is inferred from the effect of owner size on observable product market choices. In the cable industry, the downstream firms decide how many subscriptions of cable to sell and how many channels to offer in the cable package. lf large firms have lower costs than small firms, then large firms should be willing to supply more than small firms, at all prices. The effects of bargaining power are identified separately from the effects of scale economies by exploiting the structure of the cable industry. Scale economies, in the cable industry, are likely to stem from regional size, while bargaining power is likely to stem from national size. By controlling for regional size, estimates of the effect of owner national size on the willingness to supply cable subscriptions and to offer channels indicate that large downstream firms offer significantly more subscriptions and channels at all prices than do small downstream firms. These results provide some of the first systematic, industry-specific, evidence consistent with the bargaining-power hypothesis.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00375.x
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  • 17
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Usage Heterogeneity and Extended Warranties (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: The role of product warranty in segmentation of consumer durable product markets is highlighted. I demonstrate that consumer moral hazard and heterogeneity in product usage create variation in the valuation of product warranties by the different segments in the market. In this context, the firm, by offering a self-selecting menu of base warranty and extended warranties, satisfies the warranty demands of the various segments of the population. The consumer choice behavior prediction of the theory with regard to extended warranty is empirically validated with data from a survey of new car buyers.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00033.x
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  • 18
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Marketing Channels and the Durable Goods Monopolist: Renting versus Selling Reconsidered (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Research on durable goods has shown that because of a time inconsistency problem, a monopolist manufacturer prefers to rent rather than sell its product. We reexamine the relative profitability of renting versus selling from a marketing perspective. In particular, using a simple linear demand formulation, we assume a durable goods monopolist has to use downstream intermediaries to market its product. In contrast to the case of an integrated monopolist, we find that when the monopolist has to rely on intermediaries, then it prefers to go through an intermediary that sells rather than one that rents its product. Similarly, the intermediary that sells the product is more profitable than the intermediary that rents the product. However, if the monopolist can commit to a set of prices, then the intermediary that rents is more profitable than the intermediary that sells.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00069.x
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  • 19
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Empirical Analysis of a Dynamic Duopoly Model of Competition (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Empirically validating and testing the specification of game theoretic models has received limited attention in the marketing literature. The authors provide an econometric framework for estimating the parameters of response functions when the observed data in the market place are the Nash equilibrium outcomes of an underlying dynamic duopoly game specification. Specifically, the estimation procedure accounts for the joint endogeneity of market shares and marketing efforts of market rivals using a system of simultaneous equations that included the market response function and the Nash equilibrium conditions. A formal statistical test is used to detect model misspecification. The empirical analysis is carried out using data from four product markets: pharmaceutical, soft drink, beer, and detergent. Comparisons are provided with conventional estimation of the response function parameters in which the equilibrium conditions are ignored in the estimation. Managerial implications of the empirical results are discussed.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00109.x
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  • 20
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Organizational Diseconomies of scale (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Private information creates a cost of operating a hierarchy, which becomes larger as the hierarchical distance between the information source and the decision maker increases. When information about a firm's capabilities is dispersed among the individuals in the firm, production is inefficient even though everyone behaves rationally. Because hierarchies need rents in order to function, a firm with a long hierarchy may not be viable in a competitive industry.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00399.x
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