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  • Articles  (4)
  • D72  (4)
  • 2010-2014
  • 1990-1994  (4)
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  • 1950-1954
  • 1994  (4)
  • Economics  (4)
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  • Articles  (4)
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  • 2010-2014
  • 1990-1994  (4)
  • 1985-1989
  • 1950-1954
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  • 1994  (4)
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  • Economics  (4)
  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Economic and legal institutionalism: What can they learn from each other? (1994)
    Springer
    Constitutional political economy 5 (1994), S. 99-115 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-9966
    Keywords: D72 ; K100
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract The main argument of this paper is that both constitutional political economy and institutional legal theory can benefit from adopting certain central notions from each other. On the one hand, the legal notion of validity can help to clarify certain obscurities concerning the mode of existence of institutions in constitutional political economy. On the other hand, the economic notion of voluntary choice can serve as a point of departure for institutional legal theory in developing substantive criteria for the evaluation of legal systems without appealing to natural law ideas.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02393258
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Political credibility and economic growth in less developed countries (1994)
    Springer
    Constitutional political economy 5 (1994), S. 23-43 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-9966
    Keywords: D72 ; D78 ; N46 ; O40
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract While the mainstream of economic development theory focuses on the efficiency of policy measures, the role of the credibility of these measures is rarely analyzed. In this paper we argue that in less developed countries the problem of establishing the credibility of policy measures is at least as important as the problem of choosing the efficient policy solution. We claim that many of the difficulties less developed countries face can be understood in terms of lack of effective control on the discretionary power of governments, which ultimately leads to policies that are not credible. The private sector anticipates large swings in policies and reacts by withholding its resources. Symptoms of these credibility problems in less developed countries include the size of the informal sector, capital flight, and the reluctance of investors to commit capital. All of these reactions contribute to the slow economic growth in these countries. This paper concludes that establishing strategies for the control of state discretionary power is a crucial precondition for overcoming these problems and generating long term economic growth.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02393254
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Constitutional secession clauses (1994)
    Springer
    Constitutional political economy 5 (1994), S. 45-60 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-9966
    Keywords: D72
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract Taking the view that constitutions are devices whereby people coordinate to specific equilibria in circumstances that allow multiple equilibria, we show that a constitutional secession clause can serve as such a device and, therefore, that such a clause is more than an empty promise or an ineffectual threat. Employing a simple three-person recursive game, we establish that under certain conditions, this game possesses two equilibria—one in which a disadvantaged federal unit secedes and is not punished by the other units in the federation, and a second equilibrium in which this unit does not secede but is punished if it chooses to do so.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02393255
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Manipulating uncertainty (1994)
    Springer
    Constitutional political economy 5 (1994), S. 255-271 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-9966
    Keywords: D71 ; D72
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract Uncertainty about the distributional incidence of policy reforms may, if it impinges selectively on particular subsets of voters, alter the direction of the majority vote. This possibility should be a matter of special concern when subject to potential manipulation by a purposeful agent such as a Leviathan-like bureaucracy. This paper discusses a constitutional defense against such prospect.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02393260
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