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  • Articles  (8)
  • Computation  (6)
  • Piaget  (2)
  • 2015-2019
  • 1990-1994  (8)
  • 1915-1919
  • 1994  (8)
  • Philosophy  (8)
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  • Articles  (8)
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  • 2015-2019
  • 1990-1994  (8)
  • 1915-1919
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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Symbols, neurons, soap-bubbles and the neural computation underlying cognition (1994)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 4 (1994), S. 439-449 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Computation ; dynamics ; symbolic-dynamics ; cognition ; neural-networks
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract A wide range of systems appear to perform computation: what common features do they share? I consider three examples, a digital computer, a neural network and an analogue route finding system based on soap-bubbles. The common feature of these systems is that they have autonomous dynamics — their states will change over time without additional external influence. We can take advantage of these dynamics if we understand them well enough to map a problem we want to solve onto them. Programming consists of arranging the starting state of a system so that the effects of the system's dynamics on some of its variables corresponds to the effects of the equations which describe the problem to be solved on their variables. The measured dynamics of a system, and hence the computation it may be performing, depend on the variables of the system we choose to attend to. Although we cannot determine which are the appropriate variables to measure in a system whose computation basis is unknown to us I go on to discuss how grammatical classifications of computational tasks and symbolic machine reconstruction techniques may allow us to rule out some measurements of a system from contributing to computation of particular tasks. Finally I suggest that these arguments and techniques imply that symbolic descriptions of the computation underlying cognition should be stochastic and that symbols in these descriptions may not be atomic but may have contents in alternative descriptions.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00974169
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Selbstreferentialität und Korrespondenz. Wie konstruktiv ist unsere Erkenntnis? (1994)
    Springer
    Journal for general philosophy of science 25 (1994), S. 135-156 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8587
    Keywords: Erkenntnistheorie ; Radikaler Konstruktivismus ; Evolutionäre Erkenntnistheorie ; Piaget ; genetische Erkenntnistheorie ; Selbstorganisation ; Selbstreferentialität ; erkenntnistheoretischer Realismus
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Philosophy , Nature of Science, Research, Systems of Higher Education, Museum Science
    Notes: Summary Self-Reference and Correspondence. How Constructive is Our Knowledge? Basing on scientific results Radical Constructivism and Evolutionary Epistemology claim to be able to answer the question concerning the epistemological status of our knowledge — but they arrive at opposite conditions regarding the constructive or realistic character of our worldview. A critical discussion of these two positions reveals that they don't satisfy their own demands. The limits of an exclusively scientifically based epistemology are getting obvious when we bring up the genetic epistemology of Jean Piaget who ties the knowledge of the world down to acting in the world, which brings the actor back into epistemology and transcends the realm of science. This discloses at the same time the insufficiency of a bipolar questioning that turns constructivism and realism into an unsuperable antogonism. In a concluding reflection the necessity of a sociological enlargement of the analysis of the process of knowledge is being established.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00769282
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    “Words lie in our way” (1994)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 4 (1994), S. 421-437 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Computation ; computationalism ; calculus ; analog computation ; digital computation ; continuous representation ; Chinese Room argument ; symbol grounding ; continuous formal system ; simulacrum ; intentionality ; connectionism
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract The central claim of computationalism is generally taken to be that the brain is a computer, and that any computer implementing the appropriate program would ipso facto have a mind. In this paper I argue for the following propositions: (1) The central claim of computationalism is not about computers, a concept too imprecise for a scientific claim of this sort, but is about physical calculi (instantiated discrete formal systems). (2) In matters of formality, interpretability, and so forth, analog computation and digital computation are not essentially different, and so arguments such as Searle's hold or not as well for one as for the other. (3) Whether or not a biological system (such as the brain) is computational is a scientific matter of fact. (4) A substantive scientific question for cognitive science is whether cognition is better modeled by discrete representations or by continuous representations. (5) Cognitive science and AI need a theoretical construct that is the continuous analog of a calculus. The discussion of these propositions will illuminate several terminology traps, in which it's all too easy to become ensnared.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00974168
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    On implementing a computation (1994)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 4 (1994), S. 391-402 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Computation ; implementation ; artificial intelligence ; cognition ; Turing machines
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract To clarify the notion of computation and its role in cognitive science, we need an account of implementation, the nexus between abstract computations and physical systems. I provide such an account, based on the idea that a physical system implements a computation if the causal structure of the system mirrors the formal structure of the computation. The account is developed for the class of combinatorial-state automata, but is sufficiently general to cover all other discrete computational formalisms. The implementation relation is non-vacuous, so that criticisms by Searle and others fail. This account of computation can be extended to justify the foundational role of computation in artificial intelligence and cognitive science.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00974166
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Why everything doesn't realize every computation (1994)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 4 (1994), S. 403-420 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Computation ; philosophy of computation ; embeddedness ; foundations of cognitive science ; formality ; multiple realization
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Some have suggested that there is no fact to the matter as to whether or not a particular physical system relaizes a particular computational description. This suggestion has been taken to imply that computational states are not “real”, and cannot, for example, provide a foundation for the cognitive sciences. In particular, Putnam has argued that every ordinary open physical system realizes every abstract finite automaton, implying that the fact that a particular computational characterization applies to a physical system does not tell oneanything about the nature of that system. Putnam's argument is scrutinized, and found inadequate because, among other things, it employs a notion of causation that is too weak. I argue that if one's view of computation involves embeddedness (inputs and outputs) and full causality, one can avoid the universal realizability results. Therefore, the fact that a particular system realizes a particular automaton is not a vacuous one, and is often explanatory. Furthermore, I claim that computation would not necessarily be an explanatorily vacuous notion even if it were universally realizable.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00974167
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  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Computation as an intrinsic property (1994)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 4 (1994), S. 451-467 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Computation ; causal mechanism ; mind ; pattern matching ; structure fitting
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract In an effort to uncover fundamental differences between computers and brains, this paper identifies computation with a particular kind of physical process, in contrast to interpreting the behaviors of physical systems as one or more abstract computations. That is, whether or not a system is computing depends on how those aspects of the system we consider to be informational physically cause change rather than on our capacity to describe its behaviors in computational terms. A physical framework based on the notion of “causal mechanism” is used to distinguish different kinds of information processing in a physically-principled way; each information processing type is associated with a particular causal mechanism. The causal mechanism associated with computation is pattern matching, which isphysically defined as the fitting of physical structures such that they cause a “simple” change. It is argued that information processing in the brain is based on a causal mechanism different than pattern matching so defined, implying that brains do not compute, at least not in the physical sense that digital computers do. This causal difference may also mean that computers cannot have mental states.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00974170
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  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    computation, among other things, is beneath us (1994)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 4 (1994), S. 469-488 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Computation ; Turing Machines ; Computer(s) ; infinitary reasoning ; Artificial Intelligence ; Cognitive Science ; automata
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract What's computation? The received answer is that computation is a computer at work, and a computer at work is that which can be modelled as a Turing machine at work. Unfortunately, as John Searle has recently argued, and as others have agreed, the received answer appears to imply that AI and Cog Sci are a royal waste of time. The argument here is alarmingly simple: AI and Cog Sci (of the “Strong” sort, anyway) are committed to the view that cognition is computation (or brains are computers); butall processes are computations (orall physical things are computers); so AI and Cog Sci are positively silly. I refute this argument herein, in part by defining the locutions ‘x is a computer’ and ‘c is a computation’ in a way that blocks Searle's argument but exploits the hard-to-deny link between What's Computation? and the theory of computation. However, I also provide, at the end of this essay, an argument which, it seems to me, implies not that AI and Cog Sci are silly, but that they're based on a form of computation that is well “beneath” human persons.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00974171
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  • 8
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Regulatory constructivism: On the relation between evolutionary epistemology and Piaget's genetic epistemology (1994)
    Springer
    Biology and philosophy 9 (1994), S. 197-244 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8404
    Keywords: Piaget ; genetic epistemology ; evolutionary epistemology ; regulation ; self-organisation ; naturalism
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract It is argued that fundamental to Piaget's life works is a biologically based naturalism in which the living world is a nested complex of self-regulating, self-organising (constructing) adaptive systems. A structuralist-rationalist overlay on this core position is distinguished and it is shown how it may be excised without significant loss of content or insight. A new and richer conception of the nature of Piaget's genetic epistemology emerges, one which enjoys rich interrelationships with evolutionary epistemology. These are explored and it is shown how a regulatory systems evolutionary epistemology may be embedded within genetic epistemology.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00857932
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