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  • Articles  (3)
  • common belief  (2)
  • Bounded rationality  (1)
  • 2020-2024
  • 1990-1994  (3)
  • 1994  (3)
  • Sociology  (3)
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  • Articles  (3)
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  • 2020-2024
  • 1990-1994  (3)
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  • 1994  (3)
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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Theory and decision 37 (1994), S. 75-106 
    ISSN: 1573-7187
    Keywords: common belief ; common knowledge ; Kripke structures ; neighbourhood structures ; partitional model ; modal propositional logic ; epistemic logic
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract The paper surveys the currently available axiomatizations of common belief (CB) and common knowledge (CK) by means of modal propositional logics. (Throughout, knowledge — whether individual or common — is defined as true belief.) Section 1 introduces the formal method of axiomatization followed by epistemic logicians, especially the syntax-semantics distinction, and the notion of a soundness and completeness theorem. Section 2 explains the syntactical concepts, while briefly discussing their motivations. Two standard semantic constructions, Kripke structures and neighbourhood structures, are introduced in Sections 3 and 4, respectively. It is recalled that Aumann's partitional model of CK is a particular case of a definition in terms of Kripke structures. The paper also restates the well-known fact that Kripke structures can be regarded as particular cases of neighbourhood structures. Section 3 reviews the soundness and completeness theorems proved w.r.t. the former structures by Fagin, Halpern, Moses and Vardi, as well as related results by Lismont. Section 4 reviews the corresponding theorems derived w.r.t. the latter structures by Lismont and Mongin. A general conclusion of the paper is that the axiomatization of CB does not require as strong systems of individual belief as was originally thought — onlymonotonicity has thusfar proved indispensable. Section 5 explains another consequence of general relevance: despite the “infinitary” nature of CB, the axiom systems of this paper admit of effective decision procedures, i.e., they aredecidable in the logician's sense.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Theory and decision 36 (1994), S. 187-206 
    ISSN: 1573-7187
    Keywords: Bounded rationality ; Bayesian ; prisoner's dilemma
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract In this paper a model of boundedly rational decision making in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma is proposed in which: (1) each player is Bayesianrational; (2) this is common knowledge; (3) players are constrained by limited state spaces (their Bayesian minds) in ‘processing’ (1) and (2). Under these circumstances, we show that cooperative behavior may arise as an individually optimal response, except for the latter part of the game. Indeed, such behaviorwill necessarily obtain in long enough games if belief systems satisfy a natural condition: essentially, that all events consistent with the players' analysis of the game be attributed by them positive (although arbitrarily small) subjective probability.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Theory and decision 37 (1994), S. 49-73 
    ISSN: 1573-7187
    Keywords: solution concepts in game theory ; Nash equilibrium ; rationalizability ; strong rationalizability ; common belief ; modal logic ; Kripke structures
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract It is proposed that solution concepts for games should be evaluated in a way that is analogous to the way a logic is evaluated by a model theory for the language. A solution concept defines a set of strategy profiles, as a logic defines a set of theorems. A model theoretic analysis for a game defines a class of models, which are abstract representations of particular plays of the game. Given an appropriate definition of a model, one can show that various solution concepts are characterized by intuitively natural classes of models in the same sense that the set of theorems of a logic is characterized by a class of models of the language. Sketches of characterization results of this kind are given for rationalizability, Nash equilibrium, and for a refinement of rationalizability —strong rationalizability — that has some features of an equilibrium concept. It is shown that strong rationalizability is equivalent to Nash equilibrium in perfect information games. Extensions of the model theoretic framework that represent belief revision and that permit the characterization of other solution concepts are explored informally.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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