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  • Articles  (2)
  • Bounded rationality
  • 2020-2024
  • 1990-1994  (2)
  • 1950-1954
  • 1994  (2)
  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Journal of evolutionary economics 4 (1994), S. 207-226 
    ISSN: 1432-1386
    Keywords: Economic growth ; Innovation ; Market structure ; Learning ; Bounded rationality ; L20 ; O31 ; O33
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract We formulate a simple multiagent evolutionary scheme as a model of collective learning, i.e. a situation in which firms experiment, interact, and learn from each other. This scheme is then applied to a stylized endogenous growth economy in which firms have to determine how much to invest in R&D, where innovations are the stochastic product of their R&D activity, spillovers occur, but technological advantages are only relative and temporary and innovations actually diffuse, both at the intra and interfirm levels. The model demonstrates both the existence of a unique long-run growth attractor (in the linear case) and distinct growth phases on the road to that attractor. We also compare the long-run growth patterns for a linear and a logistic innovation function, and produce some evidence for a bifurcation in the latter case.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Theory and decision 36 (1994), S. 187-206 
    ISSN: 1573-7187
    Keywords: Bounded rationality ; Bayesian ; prisoner's dilemma
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract In this paper a model of boundedly rational decision making in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma is proposed in which: (1) each player is Bayesianrational; (2) this is common knowledge; (3) players are constrained by limited state spaces (their Bayesian minds) in ‘processing’ (1) and (2). Under these circumstances, we show that cooperative behavior may arise as an individually optimal response, except for the latter part of the game. Indeed, such behaviorwill necessarily obtain in long enough games if belief systems satisfy a natural condition: essentially, that all events consistent with the players' analysis of the game be attributed by them positive (although arbitrarily small) subjective probability.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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