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  • Articles  (2)
  • Bargaining  (1)
  • Bounded rationality  (1)
  • 2020-2024
  • 1990-1994  (2)
  • 1950-1954
  • 1994  (2)
  • Sociology  (2)
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  • Articles  (2)
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  • 2020-2024
  • 1990-1994  (2)
  • 1950-1954
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  • 1994  (2)
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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Bargaining with reasonable aspirations (1994)
    Springer
    Theory and decision 37 (1994), S. 311-321 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-7187
    Keywords: Bargaining ; restricted homogeneity axiom ; relative monotonicity axiom ; n-person games
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract Consider bargaining situations with two persons, where both have a specific idea of what would be an equitable outcome. In case these ideas differ, a procedure is needed which leads to a compromise between the different views. In the present paper the axioms of restricted homogeneity and of relative monotonicity are introduced, each of which, together with other standard conditions, allows one to determine a solution for this class of bargaining problems. An extension of this solution to bargaining problems with more than two persons is formulated.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01079913
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Bayesian boundedly rational agents play the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma (1994)
    Springer
    Theory and decision 36 (1994), S. 187-206 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-7187
    Keywords: Bounded rationality ; Bayesian ; prisoner's dilemma
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract In this paper a model of boundedly rational decision making in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma is proposed in which: (1) each player is Bayesianrational; (2) this is common knowledge; (3) players are constrained by limited state spaces (their Bayesian minds) in ‘processing’ (1) and (2). Under these circumstances, we show that cooperative behavior may arise as an individually optimal response, except for the latter part of the game. Indeed, such behaviorwill necessarily obtain in long enough games if belief systems satisfy a natural condition: essentially, that all events consistent with the players' analysis of the game be attributed by them positive (although arbitrarily small) subjective probability.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01079212
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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