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  • Articles  (2,201)
  • Blackwell Publishing Ltd  (2,201)
  • American Physical Society (APS)
  • 1995-1999  (1,075)
  • 1990-1994  (1,126)
  • 1995  (1,075)
  • 1994  (1,126)
  • Economics  (2,201)
  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Nonlinear Pricing and Oligopoly (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We consider the general problem of price discrimination with nonlinear pricing in an oligopoly setting where firms are spatially differentiated. We characterize the nature of optimal pricing schedules, which in turn depends importantly upon the type of private information the customer possesses–either horizontal uncertainty regarding brand preference or vertical uncertainty regarding quality preference. We show that as competition increases, the resulting quality distortions decrease, as well as price and quality dispersions. Additionally, we indicate conditions under which price discrimination may raise social welfare by increasing consumer surplus through encouraging greater entry.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00529.x
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Shareholder Activism, “Voluntary” Restructuring, and Internal Labor Markets (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We model an internal labor market in which employee behavior and compensation are affected by the firm's financial position and the threat of hostile takeover or other exercise of shareholder “voice.” We show how good past performance can result in excessively generous promotion and pay decisions. While the threat of shareholder activism will remove this “slack,” activists optimally face a positive cost barrier, which in turn varies across firms. The cost barrier is higher when cooperation or “helping” between employees is more important, and is lower when employees receive efficiency wages due to an inability to “pay” for their jobs. Since the importance of helping is associated with pay compression and “flat” pay ladders, such firms should also exhibit a greater degree of management entrenchment.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00591.x
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Stable R&D Cooperation with Spillovers (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: The literature on the incentives for R & D cooperation with spillovers typically deals only with the factors affecting cooperative profits. This paper focuses on the incentives to cheat and the stability of such cooperative agreements in a repeated game framework. It is shown that the stability of cooperation is influenced by the nature and magnitude of spillovers, relative to the nature and degree of product market competition. While cooperative profits are higher with large positive (exogenous, unintended) know-how spillovers, such as in fundamental research, our anslysis shows that it may be easier to sustain cooperation in areas with lower spillovers, such as applied research, because of the smaller incenfives to cheat on the initial agreement, at least when firms produce substitutes. Alternatively, the possibility of technology sharing (i.e., intended or endogenous spillovers), besides R&D coordination, not only increases cooperative profits but also reduces the incentives to defect from a cooperative equilibrium.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00651.x
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Managerial Incentives Based on Acquisition of Information (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: In a moral hazard setting, we model the fact that the agent may get private signals about the final outcome of his effort before the public realization of this outcome. Actions affect both the distribution of the outcome and the quality of the agent's private information. We compare simple contracts, based on output only, with revelation contracts, based on output and messages about signals. Revelation contracts give the agent some discretionary power during the course of the relationship; they are optimal if and only if lowering effort does not increase the quality of private information in the sense of Blackwell (1953). In the context of managerial compensation schemes, the revelation contracts we analyze can be viewed as allowing the agent to exercise an option on the final profits before the realization of these profits. The theory thus provides an alternative justification of the widespread use of stock options in managerial compensation schemes, as opposed to compensation schemes that rely only on salary, bonus, and (restricted) stock plans.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00427.x
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Economic Analysis and Management Strategy: A Survey Continued (1994)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 3 (1994), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: I present an integrated survey of management strategy, which examines organizational design, competitive strategy, and public policy considerations. In addition, 1 offer suggestions on how economic analysis can be applied in unifying and developing management strategy as a field of study.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1994.00355.x
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  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Choice of Treatment Intensities by a Nonprofit Hospital Under Prospective Pricing (1994)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 3 (1994), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Under prospective pricing, payers for health care essentially use price regulation of hospitals as a way of indirectly regulating the provision of treatment intensity. This paper presents a theory of how a nonprofit hospital selects treatment intensities for its products given the payer's choice of prices and then determines how the payer should select prices in light of this theory. The main result is that, in equilibrium, the ratio of price to marginal cost will vary across products inversely with the elasticity of demand with respect to treatment intensity. This means that, generally, the hospital will earn positive (negative) accounting profit on products with low-(high-) intensity elasticities of demand.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1994.00007.x
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  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Designing Optional No-Fault Insurance Policies for Health Care Systems (1994)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 3 (1994), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Legislation to create optional no-fault insurance (ONFL) programs has recently been enacted in Florida and Virginia. ONFI programs provide compensation to patients when certain medical complications arise, provided the patient agrees not to sue the doctor for additional damages. The optimal design of ONFI programs is explored in this paper, focusing on the incentive effects of ONFI programs. The question of whether ONFI programs should be funded entirely by participating doctors, or whether social subsidies are optimal, is examined.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1994.00113.x
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  • 8
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Introduction (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00133.x
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  • 9
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Executive Forum Restructuring the Wireless Industry and the Information Skyway (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00139.x
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  • 10
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Tacit Collusion Under regulation in the Pricing of Interstate Long-Distance Telephone Services (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Analysis of seven wholesale and retail markets for long-distance telephone services since the AT & T divestiture indicates that service provider concentration declined in the later 1980s and then stabilized in the 2990–1993 period. In addition to this stability in market shares, a number of other conditions established since 1990 have been conducive to the development of market sharing rather than significant price competition. The most important of these conditions has been the tarifing process of the Federal Communications Commission by which MCI and Sprint replicate ATGT's price announcements. As market shares stabilized and became more equal, and as regulation formalized the price-setting process, the price-cost margins of the three large carriers increased and became more nearly identical. These results are consistent not with price competition but rather with emerging tacit collusion among AT&T, MCI, and Sprint.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00147.x
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