ISSN:
1572-8641
Keywords:
Animal intelligence
;
artificial intelligence
;
causation
;
consciousness
;
Chinese Room Experiment
;
Descartes
;
intentionality
;
other-minds problem
;
Searle
;
subjectivity
;
symbol grounding
;
Turing
;
Turing's Test
Source:
Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
Topics:
Computer Science
,
Philosophy
Notes:
Abstract Harnad's proposed “robotic upgrade” of Turing's Test (TT), from a test of linguistic capacity alone to a Total Turing Test (TTT) of linguisticand sensorimotor capacity, conflicts with his claim that no behavioral test provides even probable warrant for attributions of thought because there is “no evidence” of consciousness besides “private experience”. Intuitive, scientific, and philosophical considerations Harnad offers in favor of his proposed upgrade are unconvincing. I agree with Harnad that distinguishing real from “as if” thought on the basis of (presence or lack of) consciousness (thus rejecting Turing (behavioral) testing as sufficient warrant for mental attribution)has the skeptical consequence Harnad accepts — “there is in factno evidence for me that anyone else but me has a mind”. I disagree with hisacceptance of it! It would be better to give up the neo-Cartesian “faith” in private conscious experience underlying Harnad's allegiance to Searle's controversial Chinese Room “Experiment” than give up all claim to know others think. It would be better to allow that (passing) Turing's Test evidences — evenstrongly evidences — thought.
Type of Medium:
Electronic Resource
URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00975533
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