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  • Articles  (4)
  • Other Sources
  • computation  (2)
  • default reasoning  (2)
  • Springer  (4)
  • American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS)
  • American Chemical Society (ACS)
  • Oxford University Press
  • 2015-2019
  • 2005-2009
  • 1990-1994  (4)
  • 1980-1984
  • 2016
  • 1991  (4)
  • Philosophy  (4)
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  • Articles  (4)
  • Other Sources
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  • Springer  (4)
  • American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS)
  • American Chemical Society (ACS)
  • Oxford University Press
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  • 2015-2019
  • 2005-2009
  • 1990-1994  (4)
  • 1980-1984
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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Form, interpretation, and the uniqueness of content: Response to Morris (1991)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 1 (1991), S. 31-42 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Mental representation ; computation ; formal condition ; symbols ; intentionality ; computationalism ; cognition
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract In response to Michael Morris, I attempt to refute the crucial second premise of the argument, which states that the formality condition cannot be satisfied “non-stipulatively” in computational systems. I defend the view of representation urged in Meaning and Mental Representation against the charge that it makes content stipulative and therefore irrelevant to the explanation of cognition. Some other reservations are expressed.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00360577
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    On nonmonotonic reasoning with the method of sweeping presumptions (1991)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 1 (1991), S. 393-416 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Defeasible reasoning ; nonmonotonic reasoning ; default reasoning ; nonmonotonic logic ; logic
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Reasoning almost always occurs in the face of incomplete information. Such reasoning is nonmonotonic in the sense that conclusions drawn may later be withdrawn when additional information is obtained. There is an active literature on the problem of modeling such nonmonotonic reasoning, yet no category of method-let alone a single method-has been broadly accepted as the right approach. This paper introduces a new method, called sweeping presumptions, for modeling nonmonotonic reasoning. The main goal of the paper is to provide an example-driven, nontechnical introduction to the method of sweeping presumptions, and thereby to make it plausible that sweeping presumptions can usefully be applied to the problems of nonmonotonic reasoning. The paper discusses a representative sample of examples that have appeared in the literature on nonmonotonic reasoning, and discusses them from the point of view of sweeping presumptions.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00352917
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Other bodies, other minds: A machine incarnation of an old philosophical problem (1991)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 1 (1991), S. 43-54 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Artificial intelligence ; causality ; cognition ; computation ; explanation ; mind/body problem ; other-minds problem ; robotics ; Searle ; symbol grounding ; Turing Test
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Any attempt to explain the mind by building machines with minds must confront the other-minds problem: How can we tell whether any body other than our own has a mind when the only way to know is by being the other body? In practice we all use some form of Turing Test: If it can do everything a body with a mind can do such that we can't tell them apart, we have no basis for doubting it has a mind. But what is “everything” a body with a mind can do? Turing's original “pen-pal” version of the Turing Test (the TT) only tested linguistic capacity, but Searle has shown that a mindless symbol-manipulator could pass the TT undetected. The Total Turing Test (TTT) calls instead for all of our linguistic and robotic capacities; immune to Searle's argument, it suggests how to ground a symbol manipulating system in the capacity to pick out the objects its symbols refer to. No Turing Test, however, can guarantee that a body has a mind. Worse, nothing in the explanation of its successful performance requires a model to have a mind at all. Minds are hence very different from the unobservables of physics (e.g., superstrings); and Turing Testing, though essential for machine-modeling the mind, can really only yield an explanation of the body.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00360578
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The epistemic basis of defeasible reasoning (1991)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 1 (1991), S. 437-458 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Defeasible reasoning ; default reasoning ; nonmonotonic reasoning ; epistemology ; closed world assumption
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract This article argues that: (i) Defeasible reasoning is the use of distinctive procedures for belief revision when new evidence or new authoritative judgment is interpolated into a system of beliefs about an application domain. (ii) These procedures can be explicated and implemented using standard higher-order logic combined with epistemic assumptions about the system of beliefs. The procedures mentioned in (i) depend on the explication in (ii), which is largely described in terms of a Prolog program, EVID, which implements a system for interactive, defeasible reasoning when combined with an application knowledge base. It is shown that defeasible reasoning depends on a meta-level Closed World Assumption applied to the relationship between supporting evidence and a defeasible conclusion based on this evidence. Thesis (i) is then further defended by showing that the EVID explication of defeasible reasoning has sufficient representational power to cover a wide variety of practical applications of defeasible reasoning, especially in the context of decision making.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00352919
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