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  • Articles  (11)
  • Other Sources
  • evolution  (5)
  • Artificial intelligence  (3)
  • computation  (2)
  • default reasoning  (2)
  • Springer  (11)
  • American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS)
  • American Chemical Society (ACS)
  • Oxford University Press
  • 2015-2019
  • 2005-2009
  • 1990-1994  (11)
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  • 1991  (11)
  • Philosophy  (11)
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  • Articles  (11)
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  • Springer  (11)
  • American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS)
  • American Chemical Society (ACS)
  • Oxford University Press
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  • 2015-2019
  • 2005-2009
  • 1990-1994  (11)
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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Minds and machines 1 (1991), S. 31-42 
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Mental representation ; computation ; formal condition ; symbols ; intentionality ; computationalism ; cognition
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract In response to Michael Morris, I attempt to refute the crucial second premise of the argument, which states that the formality condition cannot be satisfied “non-stipulatively” in computational systems. I defend the view of representation urged in Meaning and Mental Representation against the charge that it makes content stipulative and therefore irrelevant to the explanation of cognition. Some other reservations are expressed.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Minds and machines 1 (1991), S. 393-416 
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Defeasible reasoning ; nonmonotonic reasoning ; default reasoning ; nonmonotonic logic ; logic
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Reasoning almost always occurs in the face of incomplete information. Such reasoning is nonmonotonic in the sense that conclusions drawn may later be withdrawn when additional information is obtained. There is an active literature on the problem of modeling such nonmonotonic reasoning, yet no category of method-let alone a single method-has been broadly accepted as the right approach. This paper introduces a new method, called sweeping presumptions, for modeling nonmonotonic reasoning. The main goal of the paper is to provide an example-driven, nontechnical introduction to the method of sweeping presumptions, and thereby to make it plausible that sweeping presumptions can usefully be applied to the problems of nonmonotonic reasoning. The paper discusses a representative sample of examples that have appeared in the literature on nonmonotonic reasoning, and discusses them from the point of view of sweeping presumptions.
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
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    Springer
    Journal for general philosophy of science 22 (1991), S. 133-141 
    ISSN: 1572-8587
    Keywords: evolution ; teleology ; chance ; purpose ; anthropomorphism
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Philosophy , Nature of Science, Research, Systems of Higher Education, Museum Science
    Notes: Summary Revaluation of the problem of natural teleology seems an important precondition for elucidating our environmental crisis and for formulating an ‘ecological ethics’, because it calls for a recognition of an intrinsic value in nature and organisms. Therefore, it is necessary to show that the concept of natural teleology is not in contradiction with scientific theories, in particular not with the theory of evolution. In this paper I shall argue that there is a fundamental misunderstanding about the concepts of teleology and chance in modern thinking. This as a result of a radical transformation of the Aristotelian concept of teleology by Christian theologians during the Middle Ages. This confusion resulted in the rejection of teleology from evolution and in an exaggeration of the role of chance. However, not a solution for the problem of teleology is given here, but only an attempt to prove that neither the fossil-record, nor the role of chance in evolution can give adequate arguments for the negation of teleology in evolution. That is not to say that, therefore there exists teleology in evolution, but the problem of teleology in nature cannot, be solved by the scientific theory of evolution, but only be elucidated by philosophical analysis. At the end of the paper it is argued that teleology must be rather presupposed in evolution.
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  • 4
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    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Minds and machines 1 (1991), S. 43-54 
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Artificial intelligence ; causality ; cognition ; computation ; explanation ; mind/body problem ; other-minds problem ; robotics ; Searle ; symbol grounding ; Turing Test
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Any attempt to explain the mind by building machines with minds must confront the other-minds problem: How can we tell whether any body other than our own has a mind when the only way to know is by being the other body? In practice we all use some form of Turing Test: If it can do everything a body with a mind can do such that we can't tell them apart, we have no basis for doubting it has a mind. But what is “everything” a body with a mind can do? Turing's original “pen-pal” version of the Turing Test (the TT) only tested linguistic capacity, but Searle has shown that a mindless symbol-manipulator could pass the TT undetected. The Total Turing Test (TTT) calls instead for all of our linguistic and robotic capacities; immune to Searle's argument, it suggests how to ground a symbol manipulating system in the capacity to pick out the objects its symbols refer to. No Turing Test, however, can guarantee that a body has a mind. Worse, nothing in the explanation of its successful performance requires a model to have a mind at all. Minds are hence very different from the unobservables of physics (e.g., superstrings); and Turing Testing, though essential for machine-modeling the mind, can really only yield an explanation of the body.
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  • 5
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    Springer
    Minds and machines 1 (1991), S. 1-30 
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Artificial intelligence ; content ; cognitive science ; mind-body problem ; representation ; semantic ; syntax
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract I argue that there are no mental representations, in the sense of “representation” used in standard computational theories of the mind. I take Cummins' Meaning and Mental Representation as my stalking-horse, and argue that his view, once properly developed, is self-defeating. The argument implicitly undermines Fodor's view of the mind; I draw that conclusion out explicitly. The idea of mental representations can then only be saved by appeal to a Dennett-like instrumentalism; so I argue against that too. Finally, I argue that there is no good metaphysical reason in favour of believing in mental representations and that cognitive science can manage perfectly well without them.
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  • 6
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    Minds and machines 1 (1991), S. 437-458 
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Defeasible reasoning ; default reasoning ; nonmonotonic reasoning ; epistemology ; closed world assumption
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract This article argues that: (i) Defeasible reasoning is the use of distinctive procedures for belief revision when new evidence or new authoritative judgment is interpolated into a system of beliefs about an application domain. (ii) These procedures can be explicated and implemented using standard higher-order logic combined with epistemic assumptions about the system of beliefs. The procedures mentioned in (i) depend on the explication in (ii), which is largely described in terms of a Prolog program, EVID, which implements a system for interactive, defeasible reasoning when combined with an application knowledge base. It is shown that defeasible reasoning depends on a meta-level Closed World Assumption applied to the relationship between supporting evidence and a defeasible conclusion based on this evidence. Thesis (i) is then further defended by showing that the EVID explication of defeasible reasoning has sufficient representational power to cover a wide variety of practical applications of defeasible reasoning, especially in the context of decision making.
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  • 7
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    Minds and machines 1 (1991), S. 259-277 
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Artificial intelligence ; ethics ; intelligence ; anthropocentrism
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Intuitive conceptions guide practice, but practice reciprocally reshapes intuition. The intuitive conception of intelligence in AI was originally highly anthropocentric. However, the internal dynamics of AI research have resulted in a divergence from anthropocentric concerns. In particular, the increasing emphasis on commonsense knowledge and peripheral intelligence (perception and movement) in effect constitutes an incipient reorientation of intuitions about the nature of intelligence in a non-anthropocentric direction. I argue that this conceptual shift undermines Joseph Weizenbaum's claim that the project of artificial intelligence is inherently dehumanizing.
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  • 8
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    Biology and philosophy 6 (1991), S. 255-274 
    ISSN: 1572-8404
    Keywords: Classification ; diagrams ; evolution ; history ; natural history ; natural system ; ornithology ; phylogeny ; representation ; systematics ; taxonomy
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract ‘The Natural System’ is the abstract notion of the order in living diversity. The richness and complexity of this notion is revealed by the diversity of representations of the Natural System drawn by ornithologists in the Nineteenth Century. These representations varied in overall form from stars, to circles, to maps, to evolutionary trees and cross-sections through trees. They differed in their depiction of affinity, analogy, continuity, directionality, symmetry, reticulation and branching, evolution, and morphological convergence and divergence. Some representations were two-dimensional, and some were three-dimensional; n-dimensional representations were discussed but never illustrated. The study of diagrammatic representations of the Natural System is made difficult by the frequent failure of authors to discuss them in their texts, and by the consequent problem of distinguishing features which carried meaning from arbitrary features and printing conventions which did not. Many of the systematics controversies of the last thirty years have their roots in the conceptual problems which surrounded the Natural System in the late 1800s, problems which were left unresolved when interest in higher-level systematics declined at the turn of this century.
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  • 9
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    Biology and philosophy 6 (1991), S. 303-324 
    ISSN: 1572-8404
    Keywords: Complexity ; entropy ; evolution ; evolutionary trends ; Herbert Spencer ; progress
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract The consensus among evolutionists seems to be (and has been for at least a century) that the morphological complexity of organisms increases in evolution, although almost no empirical evidence for such a trend exists. Most studies of complexity have been theoretical, and the few empirical studies have not, with the exception of certain recent ones, been especially rigorous; reviews are presented of both the theoretical and empirical literature. The paucity of evidence raises the question of what sustains the consensus, and a number of suggestions are offered, including the possibility that certain cultural and/or perceptual biases are at work. In addition, a shift in emphasis from theoretical to empirical inquiry is recommended for the study of complexity, and guidelines for future empirical studies are proposed.
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  • 10
    Electronic Resource
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    Biology and philosophy 6 (1991), S. 433-437 
    ISSN: 1572-8404
    Keywords: Ethics ; evolution ; evolutionary ethics ; M. Ruse ; naturalistic fallacy ; supervenience
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Out of a concern to respect the naturalistic fallacy, Ruse (1986) argues for the possibility of causal, but not justificatory, explanations of morality in terms of evolutionary processes. In a discussion of Ruse's work, Rottschaefer and Martinsen (1990) claim that he erroneously limits the explanatory scope of evolutionary concepts, because he fails to see that one can have objective moral properties without committing either of two forms of the naturalistic fallacy, if one holds that moral properties supervene on non-moral properties. In this short paper I argue that Rottschaefer and Martinsen's solution fails. If one takes moral properties to supervene on non-moral properties, then either one ends up committing one of the two forms of the naturalistic fallacy or else one is left postulating unbelievable brute metaphysical facts.
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