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  • Wiley-Blackwell  (19,812)
  • Cambridge University Press  (4,231)
  • 2020-2022
  • 1985-1989  (24,043)
  • 1987  (12,413)
  • 1985  (11,630)
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  • 2020-2022
  • 1985-1989  (24,043)
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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press
    Economics and philosophy 3 (1987), S. 1-2 
    ISSN: 0266-2671
    Source: Cambridge Journals Digital Archives
    Topics: Philosophy , Economics
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press
    Economics and philosophy 3 (1987), S. 1-10 
    ISSN: 0266-2671
    Source: Cambridge Journals Digital Archives
    Topics: Philosophy , Economics
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  • 3
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    Electronic Resource
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press
    Economics and philosophy 3 (1987), S. 335-338 
    ISSN: 0266-2671
    Source: Cambridge Journals Digital Archives
    Topics: Philosophy , Economics
    Notes: Since Schweickart asserts that I have not addressed his main argument, let me consider briefly the four claims he advances at the beginning of his second reply.Regarding 1: To argue, as I have, that there would be a strong tendency for market socialism to degenerate into capitalism, it is necessary to spell out carefully what capitalism is. Following Marx, I defined capitalism as a system in which the workers do not control the means of production and the workers sell their labor power as a commodity. As G.A. Cohen has pointed out (Cohen, 1978, pp. 219–23), this definition can be given a rechtsfrei characterization in terms of effective powers over means of production and labor power. Actual legal arrangements are not the issue. In my original paper, I never said that the workers would sell the means of production. Thus 1 is irrelevant. The real questions are: (a) Who effectively controls the means of production? (b) Who effectively gets the profits? If the answer to both of these questions is, “Not the workers,” it follows that the workers are effectively proletarians and the system is a form of capitalism.
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press
    Economics and philosophy 3 (1987), S. 49-66 
    ISSN: 0266-2671
    Source: Cambridge Journals Digital Archives
    Topics: Philosophy , Economics
    Notes: I want in this paper to do two things. First, I want to respond to some studies that argue that people are often not rational: that people regularly and systematically depart from rationality. The conclusion itself does not worry me. I pressed for the same in a recent book (Schick, 1984). But the arguments seem to me wrong, and wrong in an interesting way. There may be something to be learned from seeing how and why they fail.
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press
    Economics and philosophy 3 (1987), S. 1-22 
    ISSN: 0266-2671
    Source: Cambridge Journals Digital Archives
    Topics: Philosophy , Economics
    Notes: In 1970 Amartya Sen exposed an apparent antinomy that has come to be known as the Paradox of the Paretian Libertarian (Sen, 1970b, pp. 152–57). Sen introduced his paradox by establishing a simple but startling theorem. Roughly put, what he proved was that if a mechanism for selecting social choice functions satisfies two standard adequacy conditions, there are possible situations in which it will violate either the very weak libertarian precept that every individual has at least some rights or the seemingly innocuous Paretian principle that an option should be judged unacceptable if there is an available alternative that everyone prefers to it. Many economists and philosophers have proposed solutions to Sen's problem, but there is no general consensus on what solution (if any) is correct. In the present paper I argue that Sen's original theorem fails to establish the existence of any conflict between libertarianism and Paretianism. Furthermore, I contend that Sen has misinterpreted certain other theorems which he has used to defend the existence of a paradoxical conflict between these two doctrines. In general, I try to show that whenever Sen posits a Paretian-libertarian conflict to explain an apparently troubling result in social choice theory, the difficulty can be better dealt with either by claiming that the theorem in question imposes overly strong background constraints on the form of social choice functions or by claiming that it relies on an unacceptable construal of individual rights.
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  • 6
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    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press
    Economics and philosophy 3 (1987), S. 127-130 
    ISSN: 0266-2671
    Source: Cambridge Journals Digital Archives
    Topics: Philosophy , Economics
    Notes: In their article, Geoffrey Brennan and Loren Lomasky (1985, p. 199) present an alternative to market theories of voting behavior. Contrary to market theories which view the voter as acting to maximize the expected self-interest, the alternative view sees voting as fundamentally an act of self-expression: “Voting, like speech, is an expressive activity providing an outlet for one's moral sentiments. We suggest that it is the expressive return to a vote that frequently determines the behavior of individuals in large-number electorates.”
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  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press
    Economics and philosophy 3 (1987), S. 67-95 
    ISSN: 0266-2671
    Source: Cambridge Journals Digital Archives
    Topics: Philosophy , Economics
    Notes: Is rhetoric just a new and trendy way to épater les bourgeois? Unfortunately, I think that the newfound interest of some economists in rhetoric, and particularly Donald McCloskey in his new book and subsequent responses to critics (McCloskey, 1985a, 1985b), gives that impression. After economists have worked so hard for the past five decades to learn their sums, differential calculus, real analysis, and topology, it is a fair bet that one could easily hector them about their woeful ignorance of the conjugation of Latin verbs or Aristotle's Six Elements of Tragedy. Moreover, it has certainly become an academic cliché that economists write as gracefully and felicitously as a hundred monkeys chained to broken typewriters. The fact that economists still trot out Keynes's prose in their defense is itself an index of the inarticulate desperation of an inarticulate profession.
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  • 8
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    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press
    Economics and philosophy 3 (1987), S. 139-142 
    ISSN: 0266-2671
    Source: Cambridge Journals Digital Archives
    Topics: Philosophy , Economics
    Notes: Rosenberg (1986) argues that economists have embraced the methodology of scientific research programs, and the writings of Imre Lakatos (1978), at the same time that philosophers have been abandoning that approach. According to Rosenberg, the methodology of scientific research programs (MSRP) appears to allow some work in economics, which is neither tested nor testable, to be “scientific” nonetheless. That is, MSRP justifies some current practices which look hard to justify on strict falsificationist, or dogmatic positivist, grounds.
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  • 9
    Electronic Resource
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    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press
    Economics and philosophy 3 (1987), S. 131-138 
    ISSN: 0266-2671
    Source: Cambridge Journals Digital Archives
    Topics: Philosophy , Economics
    Notes: How may we best understand the motivational structure that stands behind individuals' acts of voting? In “The Impartial Spectator Goes to Washington” we suggested that expressive concerns swamp narrowly consequential motivations, in contradistinction to normal market transactions in which the priority is reversed. A striking consequence of this fact is that individuals will be led to vote for outcomes that they would reject were they in a position to act decisively. In this regard we found the moral psychology Adam Smith develops in The Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS) (and, to a lesser extent, in The Wealth of Nations) remarkably fecund in suggesting alternatives to what we call the standard theory of electoral behavior.
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  • 10
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    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press
    Economics and philosophy 1 (1985), S. 83-99 
    ISSN: 0266-2671
    Source: Cambridge Journals Digital Archives
    Topics: Philosophy , Economics
    Notes: Discussions of Karl Popper's falsificationist philosophy of science appear regularly in the recent literature on economic methodology. In this literature, there seem to be two fundamental points of agreement about Popper. First, most economists take Popper's falsificationist method of bold conjecture and severe test to be the correct characterization of scientific conduct in the physical sciences. Second, most economists admit that economic theory fails miserably when judged by these same falsificationist standards. As Latsis (1976, p. 8) states, “the development of economic analysis would look a dismal affair through falsificationist spectacles.”
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