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  • Articles  (2)
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  • Connectionism  (2)
  • Springer  (2)
  • American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS)
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  • Oxford University Press
  • 2015-2019
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  • Philosophy  (2)
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  • Articles  (2)
  • Other Sources
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  • Springer  (2)
  • American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS)
  • American Chemical Society (ACS)
  • Oxford University Press
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  • 2015-2019
  • 2005-2009
  • 1990-1994  (2)
  • 1980-1984
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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Minds and machines 1 (1991), S. 167-184 
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Connectionism ; eliminativism ; propositional attitudes ; representation ; symbols
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Ramsey, Stich and Garon's recent paper ‘Connectionism, Eliminativism, and the Future of Folk Psychology’ claims a certain style of connectionism to be the final nail in the coffin of folk psychology. I argue that their paper fails to show this, and that the style of connectionism they illustrate can in fact supplement, rather than compete with, the claims of a theory of cognition based in folk psychology's ontology. Ramsey, Stich and Garon's argument relies on the lack of easily identifiable symbols inside the connectionist network they discuss, and they suggest that the existence of a system which behaves in a cognitively interesting way, but which cannot be explained by appeal to internal symbol processing, falsifies central assumptions of folk psychology. My claim is that this argument is flawed, and that the theorist need not discard folk psychology in order to accept that the network illustrated exhibits cognitively interesting behaviour, even if it is conceded that symbols cannot be readily identified within the network.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Minds and machines 1 (1991), S. 321-341 
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Cognitive architecture ; computationalism ; Connectionism ; implementation ; inference to the best explanation ; Language of Thought
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988) have argued that the cognitive architecture is not Connectionist. Their argument takes the following form: (1) the cognitive architecture is Classical; (2) Classicalism and Connectionism are incompatible; (3) therefore the cognitive architecture is not Connectionist. In this essay I argue that Fodor and Pylyshyn's defenses of (1) and (2) are inadequate. Their argument for (1), based on their claim that Classicalism best explains the systematicity of cognitive capacities, is an invalid instance of inference to the best explanation. And their argument for (2) turns out to be question-begging. The upshot is that, while Fodor and Pylyshyn have presented Connectionists with the important empirical challenge of explaining systematicity, they have failed to provide sufficient reason for inferring that the cognitive architecture is Classical and not Connectionist.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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