ISSN:
1573-2878
Keywords:
Economics
;
political cycles
;
discrete dynamic systems
;
dynamic programming
;
optimal control
;
Poincaré mapping
;
Stieltjes matrix
;
optimization in Hilbert space
;
infinite horizon
;
turnpike theorem
Source:
Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
Topics:
Mathematics
Notes:
Abstract Under the hypothesis of a myopic electorate, vote-loss-minimizing behavior by the party in power, subject to a dynamic inflation-unemployment relation, is shown to generate an attractive, stable electoral policy cycle. The model presented is derived, with some improvements, from the analogous models of MacRae and Nordhaus. Furthermore, an attempt is made to specify the mathematical aspects of the problem by the Poincaré mapping.
Type of Medium:
Electronic Resource
URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00934770
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