ALBERT

Notizen: This study attempts to measure and analyse the importance of deficit finance in the economic development of the Sudan during the period 1960–9, mainly covered by the Ten-Year Plan of Economic and Social Development, 1961/2 to 1970/1, not implemented beyond 1969. In the light of these findings I shall also review the implications for the success of the present Five-Year Plan, 1970/1 to 1974/5, but since I am basically concerned with the rôle of deficit finance, I shall not attempt to appraise the overall national economic policies and trends, although these significant variables obviously affect each other.

Notizen: One of the major concerns of Nigeria, Gambia, Ghana, and Sierra Leone during the operation of the West African Currency Board was the alleged relationship between the money supply and the balance of payments. It was argued by critics that changes in foreign exchange reserves tended to exert a preponderant influence on the monetary base, the main determinant of the money stock – which, in turn, is a good indicator of the thrust of monetary forces. The aim of this note is to discover the extent to which the monetary authorities have influenced the ‘base’ since the establishment of the Central Bank of Nigeria.

Notizen: The shortage of capital has always been viewed as one of the crucial bottlenecks in the process of economic development, although recently the emphasis seems to have shifted to the shortage of skilled manpower. Whether it is defined to be only physical or also human – i.e. training, education, and health – capital formation still constitutes the cornerstone of the theory of, and plans for, economic development. Almost by definition, underdeveloped countries are short of capital.

Notizen: More than ten years after the turn from non-violence to organised violence by the African opposition in South African the white Nationalist régime remains firmlly entrenched in power. Its security forces have successfully suppressed sabotage campaigns initiated in the early 1960s, unco-ordinated terrorist attacks mounted during the same period, and incipient guerrilla action in South-West Africa in 1966. At the call of the authorities in Salisbury they joined their northern neighbours to defeat armed incursions in Rhodesia during 1967–8, and more recently they have contained sporadic attacks in the Caprivi Strip along the Zambian border. The South African Government appears confident that its forces can continue to thwart any future attempts at domestic insurgency.

Notizen: The language of African scholarship, like Africa itself, is a harp of many strings. It allows for countless variations, even though the central theme may recur. ‘Power’ is undoubtedly one of the most familiar of such themes: the variations played upon it are legion, ranging from the popular to the esoteric, from the classical to the lyrical.Jean Ziegler's tune in his latest work, Le Pouvoir africain (Paris, 1971), clearly fits into the latter category. Even though the settings he has chosen for investigating African power – Burundi (indigenous) and Brazil (imported) – are likely to capture anyone's imagination, the author's manifest enthusiasm for the exotic seems to exceed the limits of the ‘sociological imagination’. Quite aside from the question of whether generalisations about African power are at all feasible on the basis of such limiting cases, Ziegler's handling of his subject matter raises a number of difficulties for the uninitiated reader – not the least of which is his tendency to lump together the form and substance of power in an ethnographic present seemingly fixed once and for all in time and space. Another difficulty stems from his peculiar terminology, at times so elusive as to confuse rather than illuminate the phenomena discussed: what, exactly, is meant by ‘la spécificité irréductible africaine”, or ‘la sociabilite africaine’ is anyone's guess. Ziegler's constant preoccupation with the surface manifestations of power – or, better still, with his own vision of these phenomena – occasionally leads him into a vein reminiscent of the worst examples of journalistic sensationalism, from which he only extricates himself by lapsing into calculated imprecision.

Notizen: The slow growth of railways is undoubtedly one of the most astonishing features of the history of modernization in China. The Chinese government often gave as its reasons for opposition to railway development the fact that improved communications would facilitate foreign military expansion, that railways obstructed the feng-shui, that mandarin and peasant alike were opposed to the railway, and that railways destroyed the livelihood of the common people. But, until recently, these explanations have never been given serious consideration, despite the fact that Ch'ing officials discussed railway-policy in these terms in a major debate in 1866–67. This is partly because historians have found it difficult to accept Chinese objections to railway development at their face-value, and partly because Chinese officials themselves, seeing that foreigners were unimpressed by Chinese arguments against railway construction, offered others which they thought would be more acceptable to the Western mind. This essay, however, tries to analyse Chinese objections as a coherent body of thought that might be said to xpress 'Confucian Patriotism'. It considers in detail the events surround-ing the destruction of the Woosung railway.

Notizen: The bond between nationalists and communists in the Indonesian independence movement was always close. For this reason the failure of the communist rising of 1926–27 was felt in nationalist circles as a blew for the Movement. It is also typical that the communist rising of 1948 did not lead to a ban on the Indonesian Communist Party, the PKI, whereas the anti-communist sweeps of 1951 were not received in outside circles with whole-hearted approval. The co-operation between nationalists and communists rested thus on more than a simple battle for independence. The nationalists, just as much as the communists, attributed a positive significance to the public masses, which were to harbour all the prosperity of the nation. These popular masses were supposed to be bowed down by imperialism and capitalilst exploitation, so that the Indonesian nationalists also made the liberation of the popular masses a point of policy.

Notizen: Among the dominant themes of world history during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have been the imperialism of the west and the nationalism of its colonial subjects. Nowhere were these themes developed more spectacularly than in South Asia; its history quite naturally came to be viewed as a gigantic clash between these two large forces. The subject then was held together by a set of assumptions about the imperialism of the British and the reactions of the Indians against it. That imperialism, so it was thought, had engineered great effects on the territories where it ruled. Those who held the power could make the policy, and they could see that it became the practice. Sometimes that policy might be formulated ineptly or might fall on stony ground or even smash against the hard facts of colonial life. But for good or ill, imperial policy seemed to be the main force affecting colonial conditions. It emerged from an identifiable source, the official mind of Whitehall or the contrivances of pro-consuls; and so the study of policy-making made a framework for investigations into colonial history.

Notizen: The period from the 1880s to the 1930s was one of major change in the political organization of India. Indians joined the British in the highest offices of state; government greatly increased its activity through legislation and through the trebling of taxation; elective institutions and legislatures steadily replaced the discretionary rule of bureaucrats; a nationalist movement of great size and force appeared; the means of communication—through road, rail and press—improved beyond recognition to bring together for the first time the diverse peoples of India.

Notizen: At the beginning of the twentieth century the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal administered the largest province in India. In addition to the Bengali-speaking area, it included parts of Orissa and virtually all of Bihar. Nearly two-thirds of the population were Hindus, and just over one third were Muslims. However, the Hindus predominated mainly in Bihar, Orissa and west Bengal, while the Muslims lived mainly in the east. In Bengal Proper there were, by 1901, more Muslims than Hindus. The province was ruled from Calcutta, the only large city in the region. Until 1912 Calcutta was also the capital of India itself. The city was a great economic, political, administrative and educational centre, and few other towns exercised such an influence over their surrounding districts as Calcutta did over Bengal.

Notizen: A FORMIDABLE consensus of academic opinion exists on the question of the formation of Malaysia. In its most commonly stated form, this consensus is manifested in an explanation which specifies a date—27 May 1961—and sees Malaysia as the outcome of the attempt to solve the ‘Singapore Problem’. The movement towards Malaysia is, with dull regularity, dated from the Tunku's almost casual, certainly very vague, reference to the need for a ‘closer understanding’ between Singapore, British North Borneo (Sabah), Brunei, and Sarawak, and for ‘a plan whereby these territories can be brought closer together in a political and economic association’ which he made in the course of a speech to the Foreign Correspondents’ Association of South-east Asia on 27 May 1961.

Notizen: British financial interests in China, since 1895, had been closely linked with political and strategic considerations. As the political and financial rivalry between the European powers intensified, the link tightened, becoming increasingly essential for mutual preservation. European finance meant railways, mineral rights, arms, and support for the ailing Manchu Dynasty; it was clear to successive British governments that British political supremacy in China could not survive the passing of such important financial concessions into foreign hands. In 1898, with the international scramble for concessions at its peak, the leading representatives of British finance in China co-operated fully with the Foreign Office to gain the bulk of Chinese railway contracts and concessions. Such respectable British enterprises as the British and Chinese Corporation and the Pekin Syndicate received active diplomatic support at Peking and the encouragement of the Foreign Office in London. Short of actually negotiating financial contracts on behalf of private companies British diplomacy could do little more to improve the competitive standing of these leading British firms vis-à-vis their foreign rivals.

Notizen: Until very recently, scholars of nineteenth-century India have tended to dismiss the role of urban government and politics as trivial or inconsequential. Most have reached their conclusions by studying the formation of policy in London or Delhi, using the private papers of high officials or reports prepared by the Government of India. A standard authority on British policy of this period states that local self-government ‘proved to be a tree which never took firm root. Local self-government never gained major significance in the political history of modern India.’ Local self-government failed, according to another scholar, because ‘... a rigid system of supervision was created, which ran from the smallest municipality up to the Secretary of State for India.’ In his opinion, this control and shortage of funds can be held responsible for the lack of development in ‘... the scope of public services, which were confined to the bare essentials.’ A dreary picture of petty quarreling in municipal government and stagnation in urban services prevails, alleviated only by the appearance of Lord Curzon as Viceroy in 1899 and his efforts to instill some ‘dynamic influence’ into local government. Although the policy of local self-government satisfied neither official aims nor nationalist aspirations, its importance for local politics and administration is now undergoing a major reassessment.

Notizen: A Substantial body of literature argues persuasively that Indian towns were often founded by local political-military rulers to serve as fortress-headquarters. In order to enhance their personal prestige, improve the efficiency of their administration, and provide market facilities for their small kingdoms, the rulers later invited merchants, artisans, administrators, and professionals to the fortress capitals. These invited, non-landed groups then formed courts, markets, and temple establishments which were dependent on the ruler for protection in an often violent atmosphere. The headquarters towns have been seen as the geographical locus and political nexus, or hinge, at which village levels of polity were linked with regional or state levels of government in a predominantly agrarian society. The most explicit and sophisticated presentation of this ‘hinge’ view is in Richard Fox's ‘Rajput “Clans” and Rurban Settlements in Northern India.'

Notizen: Let me say at the outset that although I am an admirer of Weber, yet in my view the relation between kinds of religious ethic and economic (and political) activity is more open than Weber made it out to be. It is also my view that it is time we went beyond Weber because we have exhausted his ideas, and because we now have more and better evidence than he had.

Notizen: During the first decade of the twentieth century, foreign residents in China observed a noticeable change in the temper of the Chinese people. It was more than a change in mood, but a wave of activities, a dynamic force aimed at the recovery of China's sovereign rights. The movement was so intense that Japanese diplomats in Peking called it the ‘rights recovery fever’. Sir Ernest Satow, British minister in China, remarked that the movement was a manifestation of ‘the consciousness of national solidarity, which is entirely a new phenomenon in China’.

Notizen: Since 1949–53, when the Nigerian élite was first consulted by the British in a constitutional review, the peoples of Nigeria have engaged in a continual regional, communal, and class struggle for a share in the economic benefits resulting from decolonisation and independence, and the accompanying modernisation. The two coups d'état of 1966 and the civil war of 1967–70 were the most virulent of these struggles. This article analyses economic factors contributing to the Nigeria–Biafra conflict and the interrelated coups. Except for a brief discussion of the colonial economic legacy, the emphasis is upon the decade or two prior to the war.

Notizen: Until the late 1950s it was conventional wisdom in East Africa that the major problem of manpower development was one of attracting and retaining sufficient numbers of workers into the European-controlled labour force. Strategies, however, differed radically between plantation agriculture and industry. In Kenya the Government published two reports in 1955 on wages which well illustrate the contrast, and provide valuable insight into the interests involved in the formation of employment policies in a colonial economy.

Notizen: Soviet relations with the countries of black Africa have been of considerable interest to many western scholars. They have examined extensively the history of these relations, their shifting doctrinal bases, and the many formidable problems Soviet policy-makers have encountered in the pursuit of their stated objectives.1 A frequently overlooked aspect is the scholarly research of a group of Africanists whose activities appear to be inextricably linked with overall Soviet efforts in Africa.

Notizen: Almost every student of the ideologies of the developing nations is familiar with the thesis regarding African socialism. It is held that village society was traditionally communal, and that consequently the introduction of socialist régimes in the newly established African states might not be expected to pose major difficulties. For many years it has become almost commonplace to comment on this hypothesis in a casual manner, to argue for and against it on the basis of one's own normative commitments, or simply to describe it as a political fact. Rarely has any systematic attempt been made to examine it analytically.

Notizen: The greatest achievement of Arabism in the Sudan has been the unquestioned acceptance by the whole world that this is an Arab state, in spite of the fact that only about 40 per cent of the population is Arab. Indeed, the predominance of the Arab Sudanese in the country's culture, politics, administration, commerce, and industry makes it de facto an Arab state. The ascendancy and assertiveness of the Arabs caused the North–South conflict to be almost intractable, while their economic and political domination led even the Northern Muslims to begin to assert themselves, although they had traditionally looked with favour upon assimilation into Arab culture.

Notizen: A COMMON premise in the study of central–local relations in new states is the belief that governments attempt to extend their authority into most areas of socio–economic and political life. By exerting influence within a variety of distinct spheres of activity throughout the national territory, central authorities are supposed to create connections between national institutions and potential arenas for the exercise of central power. These ‘structures’, such as local administration, political parties, schools, and programmes as diverse as agricultural extension and family planning, are intended to be the orgartisational skeleton of the new state. Their success in relating central authority to specific localities, political movements, and development problems is supposed to indicate the degree of institutionalisation of a regime and its level of development.1 Observers of this process examine the ‘penetration’ of public policy into local areas, the expansion of the influence of central authority on traditional political and administrative arrangements, and the gradual incorporation of the ‘periphery’ into the process of decision-making at the ‘centre’. While differing in form and content across national boundaries, the ‘crisis of penetration’ is understood to be a common experience in the political development of new states.2

Notizen: ‘In the national interest we have decided to take 51% of the shares of the Standard Bank and Barclays Bank.’

Notizen: THE objective of this article is to contribute to our understanding of the unemployment problem in Kenya through an analysis of trends in employment in both large- and small-scale agriculture. First, the major movements that have been occurring within agriculture are described, and the importance of investment in education is emphasised to explain movements out of this sector. Secondly, the effects of past government programmes on the employment capacity of small-scale agriculture are related to still outstanding problems of regional disparities resulting from differential access to knowledge, finance, and material inputs. Lastly, employment trends in large-scale agriculture are compared and related to the adoption of new technology and changing farm structures.

Notizen: Many social scientists have examined the intricacies of modernisation, political modernisation, and political development, but they have not clearly distinguished between these concepts. Their research emphasis has been on the instruments of change, such as political parties, ideologies, and charismatic leaders, and they have insufficiently delved into the issue of what actually changes during the processes of modernisation and political development. In addition, a number of analyses are unintentionally culturally biased as many western values are viewed as ‘positive’, and the ultimate ends of historical evolution which are presented seemingly suffer from ethnocentric wish-fulfilment.

Notizen: Unlike many other African countries, Liberia is endowed with an impressive capacity for rapid economic development. Not only are her natural resources rich enough to finance this, but in relation to her population they are, indeed, capable of ensuring unimpeded growth in her output per capita.1 This article deals with Liberia's development during the last two decades. It shows the marked and rapid growth in the product of her economy, and how this has yielded a subtle and gradual improvement in the life of her people.

Notizen: The development of African studies in our time has unearthed what is regarded as a storehouse of esoteric lore, a happy hunting ground for ethnologists, anthropologists, and linguists, a paradise for the mythopoeic and archetypal critic. But as literature? Indeed, some ‘civilised’ people still feel a strange unease that the black man should have a literature at all. Yet African oral and written materials, even a decade or two ago regarded primarily as of ethnological and anthropological interest, are today being investigated as authentic literature, part of the international mainstream. Black literature has arrived.

Notizen: In the past several years there has been a proliferation of studies on coup d'états in Africa and the political role of African military structures. Armies have been analysed in terms of their social and ethnic composition, training, ideology, and socialising influences. Intense debate has focused around the overt and covert reasons for their intervention in the political arena. Simple and complex typologies of civil–military relations and of military coups have been constructed; statistical data – both hard and soft – has been marshalled and subjected to factor and regression analysis, in order to validate general or middle-range theories of military intervention. And once in power, the officer corps' performance has been examined in order to generate insights into its propensity to serve as a modernising or developmental agent.

Notizen: In the literature of the social sciences, increased political participation is often regarded as one of the symptoms of a ‘modernising’ polity,1 but there have been few attempts to examine the detailed implications in any African rural society. This short article attempts to show that the national leaders in Sierra Leone feared the implications of mass participation in politics. Basically conservative and opposed to the idea of upsetting the status quo, they were satisfied in so far as they retained the support of their people in the struggle for independence, and if thereafter they were able to command enough votes at election times. They were afraid of the changes which countrywide political ‘involvement’ might imply, since these would have threatened their own privileged position.

Notizen: Recent articles by André Simmons and K. M. Barbour have analysed the various advantages of, and strategies for, regional economic integration in West Africa.1 This note focuses on the technical obstacles of full integration, and then on sub-regional economic co-operation as a more practical alternative.How can one agree upon an accepted distribution of the benefits from regional economic integration? How could this be implemented among the West African countries ? These are the most difficult and contentious problems associated with forming and operating any customs union and free trade area among the developing countries. If an acceptable distribution of benefits does not come about, then ‘the operation of existing groupings may easily be rendered ineffective or, in extreme cases, they may collapse. The experience of the last few years demonstrates that this is not a remote possibility.’2

Notizen: One characteristic which all countries presently hold in common — whatever their level of income — is the tendency for a growing proportion of the population to be employed in the ‘service sector’ of their economies rather than in ‘secondary’ or industrial activities. The purpose of this short article is to suggest that a consideration of certain features of the expanding employment in services in low-income countries may help to evaluate two commonly identified situations. First, in regard to manufacturing activities there has been a persistent tendency towards increasing capital intensity, despite the frequent assertion that resort should be made to more labour intensive technology in order to ‘spread’ jobs more widely. Secondly, the pace of urbanisation has continued to accelerate, despite widespread concern over high rates of urban unemployment and under-employment that seem a consequence of excessive migration to the cities.

Notizen: It is a comparatively recent development that places housing not only as one of the main targets in the national plan, but also as a vital means of achieving other social and economic objectives.1 Admirable though this may be, a number of difficulties can arise in practice, particularly with regard to the question of new housing where many dwellings may be on unsuitable sites and require relocation or extensive redevelopment. The point is that remedial measures are likely to have only short-term effects, unless several underlying – and often conflicting – variables are taken into account. Four such variables have assumed importance in the planning for future housing needs in the Greater Manzini Area of Swaziland, and it is the purpose of this article to illustrate how policies relating to industrial location, urban growth, and housing, interact with the tenurial system in force.

Notizen: If one wishes to understand something about the political mobilization of Chinese communist society, then it is necessary to concentrate primarily on the aims behind that political mobilization. The ways in which the Chinese try to direct matters so that those aims may be attained, determine the content and character of the mobilization. An analysis which is mainly concerned with such dimensions of the phenomenon ‘political mobilization’ as intensity, globality, tempo, structuring, organization, etc., is not suited to the Chinese situation, simply because these dimensions are to a large extent determined by, and can be explained by, the meaning and content of the underlying values and aims.

Notizen: A Formidable consensus of academic opinion exists on the question of the formation of Malaysia. In its most commonly stated form, this consensus is manifested in an explanation which specifies a date—27 May 1961—and sees Malaysia as the outcome of the attempt to solve the ‘Singapore Problem’. The movement towards Malaysia is, with dull regularity, dated from the Tunku's almost casual, certainly very vague, reference to the need for a ‘closer understanding’ between Singapore, British North Borneo (Sabah), Brunei, and Sarawak, and for ‘a plan whereby these territories can be brought closer together in a political and economic association’ which he made in the course of a speech to the Foreign Correspondents’ Association of South-east Asia on 27 May 1961. The Tunku's initiative arose, it is almost invariably argued, from the fear of future events in Singapore. Since the Republicwould in all probability be granted a separate independence by 1963,the British would no longer be in a position to control the island's internal security, defence and foreign relations. The Federation would be deprived of the Internal Security Council through which it had had (in conjunction with the British) direct control over Singapore's internal Malaya viewpoint if an amenable Singapore government could be guaranteed. By May 1961, however, the opposite appeared imminent. There were indications that the PAP was rapidly losing ground. In the Hong Lim by-election held in late April, its candidate was severely trounced. This, combined with the knowledge that no government had in the past managed to win more than one term of office, and full aware-ness of the seemingly perpetual leftward movement of Singapore politics, ness of the seemingly perpetual leftward movement of Singapore politics, created the impression in Kuala Lumpur that unless something was done, the Republic would become a second Cuba threatening the security of the Federation. The Tunku was convinced, so the argument goes, that the Federation had to ensure control over Singapore's internal security. A reversal of his previous stand on merger was, therefore, necessary. This explanation may be referred to as the security theory on the formation of Malaysia. It has a corollary: having decided that the incorporation of Singapore was necessary, the Tunku had to find a racial counter-balance to the island's Chinese population; the Borneo territories had to be included because it was essential that Singapore be territories had to be included because it was essential that Singapore be brought into the Federation of Malaya. Malaysia was thus the logicalsolution to the Singapore Problem. Among those who have propounded the security theory are Willard Hanna, Arnold Brackman, Gordon Means, George Me. T. Kahin, James Gould, Milton Osborne, Tan Koh Chiang, J. M. Gullick, Emily Sadka, Sir Richard Allen and Justus Van der Kroef.

Notizen: For many Hindu residents of the great cities of northern India in the mid-nineteenth century, the most powerful figures in the community were members of the wealthy families of indigenous bankers and traders which controlled credit and dispensed patronage for the religious life of their localities. Just as in the smallest bazaar great power lay in the hands of the petty moneylender, so in the cities which remained clusters of bazaars and residential blocs, the banking and trading oligarchies determined the limits of commercial activity with their credit notes, and helped to supply the community through their secondary trades in cloth, grain and sugar.

Notizen: The slow growth of railways is undoubtedly one of the most astonishing features of the history of modernization in China. The Chinese government often gave as its reasons for opposition to railway development the fact that improved communications would facilitate foreign military expansion, that railways obstructed the feng-shui, that mandarin and peasant alike were opposed to the railway, and that railways destroyed the livelihood of the common people. But, until recently, these explanations have never been given serious consideration, despite the fact that Ch'ing officials discussed railway-policy in these terms in a major debate in 1866–67. This is partly because historians have found it difficult to accept Chinese objections to railway development at their face-value, and partly because Chinese officials themselves, seeing that foreigners were unimpressed by Chinese arguments against railway construction, offered others which they thought would be more acceptable to the Western mind.

Notizen: Few documents in recent history have provoked such controversy as the so-called ‘Tanaka Memorial’. ‘Document’ is perhaps a misnomer, for the original (assuming that there was one) has never been seen by anyone willing to admit its existence. The memorial is said to be a 13,000-word secret petition presented by Prime Minister Baron Tanaka Giichi to Emperor Hirohito on 25 July 1927 outlining a program of economic penetration into Manchuria, China, and Mongolia that would prepare for Japan's subjection of Asia and Europe. Exposed by the Chinese in 1929, the document gained global notoriety during the 1930s. Over vehement Japanese objections and disclaimers, it was translated and circulated in Europe and the United States. Grandiose designs expressed in a language that might have aroused incredulity or mirth in calmer times sounded uncomfortably authentic in the context of Japanese behavior in East Asia and the Pacific between 1931 and 1945.

Notizen: The orthodox approach to a criticism of early Indonesian novels has always been to see the novel as an expression of the clash between adat and modernism, between the old conservative traditions upheld by the elders of the village community and the new Weltanschauung of the members of the younger generation. The latter have been exposed to Western traditions of thought, and their desires and ambitions refuse to be contained by the traditional patterns of a society to which they feel close but whose narrowness they regard as crippling to their own personal development. This conceptualization of the problems of Indonesian society between the wars has gone almost unchallenged; nearly all discussion of its literature has been framed within its reference. Professor A. Johns's article in Quadrant is perhaps the most recent formulation of this approach. The intellectual, educated elements of society which Johns sees summed up in the figures of Kartini, the champion of women's rights, and Goenawan Mohammed, a contemporary literary figure, seek to develop ideas and attitudes which have no currency in traditional society. Their attempts to modernize society arouse opposition, but it is not this which pains them so much as their being misunderstood and their unwillingness to break with the society of their fathers to which they feel a close attachment.

Notizen: In the first decades of the nineteenth-century Western missionary activity, like the opium trade, was prohibited by the Chinese government. The Protestant missionaries, however, could not equal the independent opium traders in their evasion of the Chinese authorities. As well, they had to contend with the opposition of the British East India Company, which theoretically monopolized Anglo-Chinese commerce at Portuguese Macao.

Notizen: Nationalism postulates the existence of a people and declares its right to take over an old state organization or establish a new one. A nationalist movement attempts to do this in the name of the people so postulated. Usually, the leaders of such movements come from the centre, or more precisely, the large urban areas of the envisaged state.