ALBERT

All Library Books, journals and Electronic Records Telegrafenberg

X
feed icon rss

Your email was sent successfully. Check your inbox.

An error occurred while sending the email. Please try again.

Proceed reservation?

Export
Filter
  • Articles  (8)
  • D43  (8)
  • Springer  (8)
  • Blackwell Publishing Ltd
  • Copernicus
  • Elsevier
  • International Union of Crystallography
  • Periodicals Archive Online (PAO)
  • Taylor & Francis
  • Wiley
  • 2010-2014
  • 1995-1999  (8)
  • 1960-1964
  • 1950-1954
  • 1940-1944
  • 1999  (8)
  • 1954
  • Economics  (8)
  • Geography
  • Natural Sciences in General
Collection
  • Articles  (8)
Source
Keywords
Publisher
  • Springer  (8)
  • Blackwell Publishing Ltd
  • Copernicus
  • Elsevier
  • International Union of Crystallography
    • +
Years
  • 2010-2014
  • 1995-1999  (8)
  • 1960-1964
  • 1950-1954
  • 1940-1944
Year
Topic
  • Economics  (8)
  • Geography
  • Natural Sciences in General
  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Exit, sunk costs and the selection of firms (1999)
    Springer
    Economic theory 13 (1999), S. 643-670 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: Keywords and Phrases: Exit Sunk costs ; Coalition formation. ; JEL Classification Numbers: C79 ; D43 ; L13.
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. This paper aims to identify the cost characteristics of exiting firms whenever firms are playing an infinite horizon supergame with time-invariant cost and demand functions. With more than two firms, the problem of which firms exit is quite similar to a coalition formation one. Solving this coalition formation problem, we obtain that the exiting firms are those with higher average cost functions whenever reentry is costless while, whenever reentry is unprofitable, the exiting firms are those with lower marginal (and possibly average) cost functions. Since reentry costs are typically sunk, our analysis points out that the presence of sunk costs affects not only the size (as it is well known) but also the composition of the industry.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001990050274
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Auctions with endogenous valuations: the snowball effect revisited (1999)
    Springer
    Economic theory 13 (1999), S. 377-391 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: Keywords and Phrases: Sequential auctions ; Endogenous valuations ; Evolution of market structure. ; JEL Classification Numbers: C72 ; D43 ; D44 ; D45.
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. This paper looks at the determination of ownership of capacity when there are two ex-ante symmetric agents bidding for many units of capacity which are sold sequentially. It is shown that convexity of payoffs in the final stage of the game is sufficient to ensure monopolization of capacity, but that increasing returns to scale are not sufficient to ensure monopolization.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001990050260
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Commitment and price competition in a dynamic differentiated-product duopoly (1999)
    Springer
    Journal of economics 69 (1999), S. 41-52 
    Details
    ISSN: 1617-7134
    Keywords: commitment ; Markov-perfect equilibrium ; price competition ; D43 ; C72
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract This paper characterizes linear Markov-perfect equilibrium in a duopolistic environment where firms engage in dynamic price competition. Firms have constant (but potentially different) marginal costs and produce differentiated products. We show that, for the case of linear demand, dynamically stable Markov-perfect equilibrium prices are strictly higher than one-shot Nash equilibrium prices, but lower than fully collusive (monopoly) prices. We provide closed-form solutions for the Markov-perfect equilibrium prices which, in principle, can be estimated given data on firm demand and costs. Our results suggest that static two-stage models of price commitment are on reasonably solid ground in that they might be viewed as a “reduced form” for more complicated dynamic models.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01231210
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Efficient bargaining with underutilization of labor (1999)
    Springer
    Journal of economics 69 (1999), S. 127-139 
    Details
    ISSN: 1617-7134
    Keywords: union ; monopoly ; bargaining ; efficient contract ; employment ; D43 ; J50
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract The standard efficient contract involving a monopolistic firm and a union has always been derived under the assumption that the firm operates efficiently, i.e., it fully uses its labor force. However, nothing constrains the firm to do so and production with underutilization of labor may occur. The implications of ignoring that possibility and the conditions under which underutilization effectively occurs are studied in this paper.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01232417
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Switching costs and implicit contracts (1999)
    Springer
    Journal of economics 69 (1999), S. 159-171 
    Details
    ISSN: 1617-7134
    Keywords: switching costs ; implicit contracts ; reputation ; D43 ; L13 ; L14
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract When firms can discriminate between old and new customers and when multiperiod binding commitments are too costly, the effects of switching costs may be mitigated thanks to implicit contracts offered (competitively) by firms in equilibrium and backed by reputation.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01232419
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Optimal punishments in linear duopoly supergames with product differentiation (1999)
    Springer
    Journal of economics 69 (1999), S. 173-188 
    Details
    ISSN: 1617-7134
    Keywords: penal codes ; security level ; product differentiation ; positivity constraints ; C72 ; D43 ; L13
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract We analyze optimal penal codes in both Bertrand and Cournot supergames with product differentiation. We prove that the relationship between optimal punishments and the security level (individually rational discounted profit stream) depends critically on the degree of supermodularity in the stage game, using a linear duopoly supergame with product differentiation. The security level in the punishment phase is reached only under extreme supermodularity, i.e., when products are perfect substitutes and firms are price setters. Finally, we show that Abreu's rule cannot be implemented under Cournot behavior and strong demand complementarity between products.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01232420
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Exchange rates and bertrand oligopoly (1999)
    Springer
    Journal of economics 70 (1999), S. 281-307 
    Details
    ISSN: 1617-7134
    Keywords: exchange rate ; incomplete pass-through ; Bertrand oligopoly ; F12 ; D43 ; L13
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract The impact of exchange-rate changes on industrial prices seems ambiguous. Incomplete and even “perverse” pass-through has been observed: the import prices in the depreciating country decrease while those in the appreciating country increase. To explain these “counterintuitive” price reactions we consider a situation of international Bertrand competition: two firms, based in different countries, are selling in both countries simultaneously. The profit-maximizing duopolists set the prices for their products in each of the two markets which are segmented on the demand side. We then study the qualitative effect of an exogenous exchange-rate change on the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium. Under the strong assumption of linear demand and cost functions we have “normal” exchange-rate pass-through. However, allowing for more general cost structures in this simple static model enables us to show that the import prices in both countries might move in counterintuitive directions.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01224740
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 8
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Conjectural-variation models and supergames with price competition in a differentiated product oligopoly (1999)
    Springer
    Journal of economics 70 (1999), S. 309-326 
    Details
    ISSN: 1617-7134
    Keywords: Conjectural-variation models ; supergames ; product differentiation ; L11 ; L13 ; D43 ; C73
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract Conjectural-variation models (CV models) are popular in empirical research as they infer the degree of market power from real data. Theorists of industrial organization, however, disapprove of them for lack of theoretical foundation arguing that dynamic reactions are forced into a static model with the strategy space and time horizon only loosely defined. The presented model follows an idea put forward by Cabral (1995) and demonstrates that the CV model can be interpreted as the joint-profit-maximizing steady-state reduced form of a price-setting supergame in a differentiated product market under optimal punishment strategies. For the symmetric two-firm case the CV parameter is shown to cover the full range of possible outcomes — from Bertrand competition to joint unconstrained monopoly — depending on the degree of product differentiation, market growth, bankruptcy risk, and the discount rate. For the asymmetric-cost case numerical calculations are provided.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01224741
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
Close ⊗
This website uses cookies and the analysis tool Matomo. More information can be found here...