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  • Artikel  (13)
  • D43  (13)
  • Springer  (13)
  • Blackwell Publishing Ltd
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  • International Union of Crystallography
  • Periodicals Archive Online (PAO)
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  • 2010-2014
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  • 1999  (8)
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  • Wirtschaftswissenschaften  (13)
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  • Artikel  (13)
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  • Springer  (13)
  • Blackwell Publishing Ltd
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  • 2010-2014
  • 1995-1999  (13)
  • 1960-1964
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  • Wirtschaftswissenschaften  (13)
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  • 1
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Exit, sunk costs and the selection of firms (1999)
    Springer
    Economic theory 13 (1999), S. 643-670 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Schlagwort(e): Keywords and Phrases: Exit Sunk costs ; Coalition formation. ; JEL Classification Numbers: C79 ; D43 ; L13.
    Quelle: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: Summary. This paper aims to identify the cost characteristics of exiting firms whenever firms are playing an infinite horizon supergame with time-invariant cost and demand functions. With more than two firms, the problem of which firms exit is quite similar to a coalition formation one. Solving this coalition formation problem, we obtain that the exiting firms are those with higher average cost functions whenever reentry is costless while, whenever reentry is unprofitable, the exiting firms are those with lower marginal (and possibly average) cost functions. Since reentry costs are typically sunk, our analysis points out that the presence of sunk costs affects not only the size (as it is well known) but also the composition of the industry.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001990050274
    Standort Signatur Erwartet Verfügbarkeit
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  • 2
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Bertrand versus Cournot revisited (1997)
    Springer
    Economic theory 10 (1997), S. 497-507 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Schlagwort(e): JEL Classification Numbers: B13 ; C72 ; D43 ; L13.
    Quelle: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: Summary. Bertrand criticized Cournot's analysis of the competitive process, arguing that firms should be seen as playing a strategy of setting price below competitors' prices (henceforth, the Bertrand strategy) instead of a strategy of accepting the price needed to sell an optimal quantity (the Cournot strategy). We characterize Nash equilibria in a generalized model in which firms choose among Cournot and Bertrand strategies. Best responses always exist in this model. For the duopoly case, we show that iterated best responses converge under mild assumptions on initial states either to Cournot equilibrium or to an equilibrium in which only one firm plays the Bertrand strategy with price equal to marginal cost and that firm has zero sales.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001990050169
    Standort Signatur Erwartet Verfügbarkeit
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  • 3
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Auctions with endogenous valuations: the snowball effect revisited (1999)
    Springer
    Economic theory 13 (1999), S. 377-391 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Schlagwort(e): Keywords and Phrases: Sequential auctions ; Endogenous valuations ; Evolution of market structure. ; JEL Classification Numbers: C72 ; D43 ; D44 ; D45.
    Quelle: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: Summary. This paper looks at the determination of ownership of capacity when there are two ex-ante symmetric agents bidding for many units of capacity which are sold sequentially. It is shown that convexity of payoffs in the final stage of the game is sufficient to ensure monopolization of capacity, but that increasing returns to scale are not sufficient to ensure monopolization.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001990050260
    Standort Signatur Erwartet Verfügbarkeit
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  • 4
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    R&D incentives in compatible networks (1997)
    Springer
    Journal of economics 65 (1997), S. 55-78 
    Details
    ISSN: 1617-7134
    Schlagwort(e): network externalities ; innovation ; L10 ; O31 ; D43
    Quelle: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: Abstract Network externalities describe the phenomenon that a good becomes more valuable to each user the more other consumers use the same or a compatible troduct. Whereas most of the recent literature on network effects has focused on the adoption of products, this paper shows that network externalities can have important feedback effects on the incentives to carry out R&D and develop new products. Even if the products are compatible, network effects can lead to strategic overinvestment or underinvestment. The firms' R&D decisions are compared with the socially optimal ones.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01239059
    Standort Signatur Erwartet Verfügbarkeit
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  • 5
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Exchange rates and perfect competition (1997)
    Springer
    Journal of economics 65 (1997), S. 151-161 
    Details
    ISSN: 1617-7134
    Schlagwort(e): exchange rates ; incomplete pass-through ; perfect competition ; D43 ; F12 ; F31 ; L13
    Quelle: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: Abstract The purpose of this note is to demonstrate that the commonly held belief that incomplete and perverse pass-through are incompatible with perfect competition is wrong! To this end, we consider two types of firms both operating in two countries. The demand sides of the markets of the two countries are separated and each type of firm produces its good in one of these countries. We study the effect of an exchange-rate change on the competitive equilibrium prices in each country. When producing for the foreign market causes the same costs as producing for the home market then the “law of one price” holds and an exchange-rate change is completely offset by price changes. Furthermore, when cost functions neither exhibit economies nor diseconomies of scope between producing for the home and producing for the foreign market then prices move in the “right” directions in response to an exchange-rate change. However, with general cost structures, even in this simple perfectly competitive model, “perverse” directions of price changes can result from an exchange-rate change.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01226932
    Standort Signatur Erwartet Verfügbarkeit
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  • 6
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Debt as a collusive device in an oligopoly supergame (1997)
    Springer
    Journal of economics 66 (1997), S. 249-269 
    Details
    ISSN: 1617-7134
    Schlagwort(e): repeated oligopoly game ; financial structure ; D43 ; G33
    Quelle: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: Abstract This paper explores the impact of debt holdings on the output decisions of firms in an oligopoly supergame with stochastic demand fluctuations. It is demonstrated that when perfect collusion is not feasible then there exist circumstances in which increased debt holdings may facilitate tacit collusion. This occurs because higher debt levels act as a credible commitment device which lowers the payoffs accruing to a firm when it defects from the tacitly collusive equilibrium. It is further shown that in these circumstances firms may have an incentive to hold debt for strategic purposes which promote collusion.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01226828
    Standort Signatur Erwartet Verfügbarkeit
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  • 7
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    A dynamic Stackelberg model with production-adjustment costs (1997)
    Springer
    Journal of economics 66 (1997), S. 271-282 
    Details
    ISSN: 1617-7134
    Schlagwort(e): Stackelberg model ; dynamic oligopoly ; stability ; C62 ; C73 ; D43
    Quelle: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: Abstract We investigate the (dynamic) stability of a stackelberg oligopoly model of a market of a homogeneous good, with output competition, one Stackelberg leader and a number of identical followers. We assume that each firm incurs quadratic production-adjustment costs if it changes its output. We present a simple necessary and sufficient condition for stability of the model. Using the condition, we compare the stability of this model with the stability of two related Cournot models in which all firms present are followers. It turns out that the Stackelberg model is “more stable” than these two Cournot models.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01226829
    Standort Signatur Erwartet Verfügbarkeit
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  • 8
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Commitment and price competition in a dynamic differentiated-product duopoly (1999)
    Springer
    Journal of economics 69 (1999), S. 41-52 
    Details
    ISSN: 1617-7134
    Schlagwort(e): commitment ; Markov-perfect equilibrium ; price competition ; D43 ; C72
    Quelle: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: Abstract This paper characterizes linear Markov-perfect equilibrium in a duopolistic environment where firms engage in dynamic price competition. Firms have constant (but potentially different) marginal costs and produce differentiated products. We show that, for the case of linear demand, dynamically stable Markov-perfect equilibrium prices are strictly higher than one-shot Nash equilibrium prices, but lower than fully collusive (monopoly) prices. We provide closed-form solutions for the Markov-perfect equilibrium prices which, in principle, can be estimated given data on firm demand and costs. Our results suggest that static two-stage models of price commitment are on reasonably solid ground in that they might be viewed as a “reduced form” for more complicated dynamic models.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01231210
    Standort Signatur Erwartet Verfügbarkeit
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  • 9
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Efficient bargaining with underutilization of labor (1999)
    Springer
    Journal of economics 69 (1999), S. 127-139 
    Details
    ISSN: 1617-7134
    Schlagwort(e): union ; monopoly ; bargaining ; efficient contract ; employment ; D43 ; J50
    Quelle: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: Abstract The standard efficient contract involving a monopolistic firm and a union has always been derived under the assumption that the firm operates efficiently, i.e., it fully uses its labor force. However, nothing constrains the firm to do so and production with underutilization of labor may occur. The implications of ignoring that possibility and the conditions under which underutilization effectively occurs are studied in this paper.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01232417
    Standort Signatur Erwartet Verfügbarkeit
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  • 10
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Switching costs and implicit contracts (1999)
    Springer
    Journal of economics 69 (1999), S. 159-171 
    Details
    ISSN: 1617-7134
    Schlagwort(e): switching costs ; implicit contracts ; reputation ; D43 ; L13 ; L14
    Quelle: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: Abstract When firms can discriminate between old and new customers and when multiperiod binding commitments are too costly, the effects of switching costs may be mitigated thanks to implicit contracts offered (competitively) by firms in equilibrium and backed by reputation.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01232419
    Standort Signatur Erwartet Verfügbarkeit
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