ISSN:
1467-6435
Source:
Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
Topics:
Sociology
,
Economics
Notes:
Some federal structures are and have been stable for relatively long periods; others, though apparently stable, are chronically subject to important strains, while others still are either unstable or have ceased to exist as federal entities. In the paper, I develop a limited model of federalism, built on the number and properties of public goods, which appears to account for some of the observable stability features of federal structure. Essentially, the model assumes that when individuals in one jurisdiction do not only passively receive spillovers from other jurisdictions, but react and adjust to them, possibilities of conflict exist which can only be resolved by the creation of the appropriate machinery. It is shown how a change in the number of public goods can affect the outcome.
Type of Medium:
Electronic Resource
URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6435.1970.tb01050.x
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