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  • 1
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    Reply to Norton, re: Aldo Leopold and Pragmatism (2011)
    White Horse Press
    Details
    Publication Date: 2011-02-01
    Description: As a conservation policy advocate and practitioner, Leopold was a pragmatist (in the vernacular sense of the word). He was not, however, a member of the school of philosophy known as American Pragmatism, nor was his environmental philosophy informed by any members of that school. Leopold's environmental philosophy was radically non-anthropocentric; he was an intellectual revolutionary and aspired to transform social values and institutions.
    Keywords: Hadley ; conservation ; ecology ; evolution ; non-anthropocentric
    Print ISSN: 0963-2719
    Electronic ISSN: 1752-7015
    Topics: Energy, Environment Protection, Nuclear Power Engineering , Philosophy
    Published by White Horse Press
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Arbitrariness in nature: synergetics and evolutionary laws of prohibition (2000)
    Springer
    Journal for general philosophy of science 31 (2000), S. 57-73 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8587
    Keywords: complex systems ; evolution ; nonlinearity ; pre-determination ; self-organization ; soft management ; structure-attractors ; synergetics
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Philosophy , Nature of Science, Research, Systems of Higher Education, Museum Science
    Notes: Abstract The philosophical consequences of synergetics, the interdisciplinary theory of evolution and self-organization of complex systems, are being drawn in the paper. The idea of discreteness of evolutionary paths is in the focus of attention. Although the future is open, and there are many alternative evolutionary paths for complex systems, not any arbitrary (either conceivable or desirable) evolutionary path is feasible in a given system. There are discrete spectra of possible evolutionary paths which are determined exclusively by inner properties of the corresponding systems. Synergetics allows us to reveal general laws of self-organization and, therefore, certain limits of arbitrariness of nature in choosing possible paths of evolution as well as in constructing of a complex evolutionary whole. A comparative analysis between the modern synergetic notions and a few ideas of the Western philosophy (F. Nietzsche, N. Hartmann, M. Heidegger) and of the Eastern teachings (Taoism, Buddhism) is made.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1008369525041
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
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    Evolutionary Epistemology, Social Epistemology, and the Demic Structure of Science (2000)
    Springer
    Biology and philosophy 15 (2000), S. 443-463 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8404
    Keywords: David Hull ; evolution ; selection
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract One of the principal difficulties in assessing Science as aProcess (Hull 1988) is determining the relationship between the various elements of Hull's theory. In particular, it is hard to understand precisely how conceptual selection is related to Hull's account of the social dynamics of science. This essay aims to clarify the relation between these aspects of his theory by examining his discussion of the``demic structure'' of science. I conclude that the social account cando significant explanatory work independently of the selectionistaccount. Further, I maintain that Hull's treatment of the demicstructure of science points us toward an important set of issues insocial epistemology. If my reading of Science as a Process iscorrect, then most of Hull's critics (e.g., those who focus solelyon his account of conceptual selection) have ignored promisingaspects of his theory.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1006718131883
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  • 4
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    Complexity versus Uncertainty: The Question of Staying Alive (2000)
    Springer
    Biology and philosophy 15 (2000), S. 493-508 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8404
    Keywords: complexity ; entropy balance ; environment independence ; evolution ; information fundamental identity ; uncertainty
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Some real objects show a very particular tendency: that of becomingindependent with regard to the uncertainty of their surroundings. This isachieved by the exchange of three quantities: matter, energy andinformation. A conceptual framework, based on both Non-equilibriumThermodynamic and the Mathematical Theory of Communication is proposedin order to review the concept of change in living individuals. Three mainsituations are discussed in this context: passive independence inconnection with resistant living forms (such as seeds, spores, hibernation,...), active independence in connection with the life span of aliving individual (whether an ant or an ant farm), and the newindependence in connection with the general debate of biological evolution.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1006611022472
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  • 5
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    Functional Complexity in Organisms: Parts as Proxies (2000)
    Springer
    Biology and philosophy 15 (2000), S. 641-668 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8404
    Keywords: complexity ; evolution ; function ; modularity ; parts
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract The functional complexity, or the number of functions, of organisms hasfigured prominently in certain theoretical and empirical work inevolutionary biology. Large-scale trends in functional complexity andcorrelations between functional complexity and other variables, such assize, have been proposed. However, the notion of number of functions hasalso been operationally intractable, in that no method has been developedfor counting functions in an organism in a systematic and reliable way.Thus, studies have had to rely on the largely unsupported assumption thatnumber of functions can be measured indirectly, by using number ofmorphological, physiological, and behavioral “parts” as a proxy. Here, amodel is developed that supports this assumption. Specifically, the modelpredicts that few parts will have many functions overlapping in them, andtherefore the variance in number of functions per part will be low. If so,then number of parts is expected to be well correlated with number offunctions, and we can use part counts as proxies for function counts incomparative studies of organisms, even when part counts are low. Alsodiscussed briefly is a strategy for identifying certain kinds of parts inorganisms in a systematic way.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1006695908715
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  • 6
    Electronic Resource
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    Darwinian Ethics and Error (2000)
    Springer
    Biology and philosophy 15 (2000), S. 713-732 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8404
    Keywords: Darwin ; error theory ; ethics ; evolution ; evolutionary ethics ; Mackie ; naturalistic fallacy ; Ruse
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Suppose that the human tendency to think of certain actions andomissions as morally required – a notion that surely lies at the heart of moral discourse – is a trait that has been naturallyselected for. Many have thought that from this premise we canjustify or vindicate moral concepts. I argue that this is mistaken, and defend Michael Ruse's view that the moreplausible implication is an error theory – the idea thatmorality is an illusion foisted upon us by evolution. Thenaturalistic fallacy is a red herring in this debate,since there is really nothing that counts as a ‘fallacy’ at all. If morality is an illusion, it appears to followthat we should, upon discovering this, abolish moraldiscourse on pain of irrationality. I argue that thisconclusion is too hasty, and that we may be able usefullyto employ a moral discourse, warts and all, withoutbelieving in it.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1006742813396
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  • 7
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    Syntax as an Emergent Characteristic of the Evolution of Semantic Complexity (1999)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 9 (1999), S. 309-346 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: language ; grammar ; syntax ; semantics ; evolution ; emergence ; brain size
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract It is commonly argued that the rules of language, as distinct from its semantic features, are the characteristics which most clearly distinguish language from the communication systems of other species. A number of linguists (e.g., Chomsky 1972, 1980; Pinker 1994) have suggested that the universal features of grammar (UG) are unique human adaptations showing no evolutionary continuities with any other species. However, recent summaries of the substantive features of UG are quite remarkable in the very general nature of the features proposed. While the syntax of any given language can be quite complex, the specific rules vary so much between languages that the truly universal (i.e. innate) aspects of grammar are not complex at all. In fact, these features most closely resemble a set of general descriptions of our richly complex semantic cognition, and not a list of specific rules. General principles of the evolutionary process suggest that syntax is more properly understood as an emergent characteristic of the explosion of semantic complexity that occurred during hominid evolution. It is argued that grammatical rules used in given languages are likely to be simply conventionalized, invented features of language, and not the result of an innate, grammar-specific module. The grammatical and syntactic regularities that are found across languages occur simply because all languages attempt to communicate the same sorts of semantic information.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1008360020568
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  • 8
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    The Evolution of a Scientific Concept (1999)
    Springer
    Journal for general philosophy of science 30 (1999), S. 37-58 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8587
    Keywords: protein ; experimentation ; conceptual variation and selection ; evolution ; Mulder ; Liebig ; Pflüger ; Nägeli
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Philosophy , Nature of Science, Research, Systems of Higher Education, Museum Science
    Notes: Abstract A philosophically comprehended account is given of the genesis and evolution of the concept of protein. Characteristic of this development were not shifts in theory in response to new experimental data, but shifts in the range of questions that the available experimental resources were fit to cope with effectively. Apart from explanatory success with regard to its own range of questions, various other selecting factors acted on a conceptual variant, some stemming from a competing set of research questions, others from an altogether different field of inquiry, and still others from the external environment. These results are best explained on, hence support, an evolutionary model of the progress of experimental investigation, whose outlines are briefly discussed.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1008246507186
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  • 9
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    Fixing Content and Function in Neurobiological Systems: The Neuroethology of Electroreception (1999)
    Springer
    Biology and philosophy 14 (1999), S. 395-430 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8404
    Keywords: adaptationism ; Daniel C. Dennett ; electric fish ; electroreception ; evolution ; evolutionary function ; indeterminism ; mental content ; neuroethology ; sensory modality ; underdetermination
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Are attributions of content and function determinate, or is there no fact of the matter to be fixed? Daniel Dennett has argued in favor of indeterminacy and concludes that, in practice, content and function cannot be fixed. The discovery of an electrical modality in vertebrates offers one concrete instance where attributions of function and content are supported by a strong scientific consensus. A century ago, electroreception was unimagined, whereas today it is widely believed that many species of bony fish, amphibians, sharks, skates, and rays possess this non-human sensory modality. A look at the history of science related to this discovery reveals a highly interdisciplinary endeavor, encompassing ethology, behavioral analysis, neuroscience, and evolutionary biology. While each area provides important evidence, none is sufficient on its own to fix content and function. Instead, I argue that an interdisciplinary, neuroethological approach is required to carry out such determinations. Further, a detailed consideration of biological research suggests that while content and function claims are empirically underdetermined and uncertain, there is insufficient reason to believe in an additional problem of indeterminism. In particular, Dennett's indeterminism arises from a research methodology -- logical adaptationism -- that generates evidence from only one of the areas of neuroethology. However, logical adaptationism does not reflect adaptationism as it is practiced in contemporary biology. I conclude that Dennett is faced with a dilemma: On the one hand, he can hold to logical adaptationism and the indeterminism that results from it, while giving up the relevance of his arguments to biological practice. On the other, he can embrace a more accurate version of adaptationism -- one which plays a role in a larger neuroethological framework -- but from which no strong indeterminacy claims follow.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1006594531789
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  • 10
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    Evolutionary Change and Epistemology (1999)
    Springer
    Biology and philosophy 14 (1999), S. 561-584 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8404
    Keywords: change ; evolution ; evolutionary epistemology ; selection
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract This paper is concerned with the debate in evolutionary epistemology about the nature of the evolutionary process at work in the development of science: whether it is Darwinian or Lamarckian. It is claimed that if we are to make progress through the many arguments that have grown up around this issue, we must return to an examination of the concepts of change and evolution, and examine the basic kinds of mechanism capable of bringing evolution about. This examination results in two kinds of processes being identified, dubbed ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’, and these are claimed to exhaust all possibilities. These ideas are then applied to a selection of the debates within evolutionary epistemology. It is shown that while arguments about the pattern and rate of evolutionary change are necessarily inconclusive, those concerning the origin of novel variations and the mode of inheritance can be resolved by means of the distinctions made here. It is claimed that the process of selection in the evolution of science can also be clarified. The conclusion is that the main process producing the evolution of science is a direct or Lamarckian one although, if realism is correct, an indirect or Darwinian process plays a vital role.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1006568200814
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  • 11
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    Preadaptation and the Explanation of Human Evolution (1999)
    Springer
    Biology and philosophy 14 (1999), S. 65-82 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8404
    Keywords: adaptation ; explanation ; evolution ; preadaptation ; specialization
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract The concept of preadaptation, though useful, continues to trouble evolutionary scientists. Usually, it is treated as if it were really adaptation, prompting such diverse theorists as Gould and Vrba, and Dennett to suggest its removal from evolutionary theory altogether. In this paper, I argue that the as-if sense is ill-founded, and that the sense of preadaptation as a process may be defended as unequivocal and generally useful in evolutionary explanations, even in such problem areas as human evolution.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1006539827648
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  • 12
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    Modus Darwin (1999)
    Springer
    Biology and philosophy 14 (1999), S. 253-278 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8404
    Keywords: ancestry ; Bayesianism ; creationism ; Darwin ; evolution ; likelihood ; natural selection ; phylogeny ; probability ; Reichenbach
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Modus Darwin is a principle of inference that licenses the conclusion that two species have a common ancestor, based on the observation that they are similar. The present paper investigates the principle's probabilistic foundations.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1006626115852
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  • 13
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    Retelling Experiments: H.B.D. Kettlewell's Studies of Industrial Melanism in Peppered Moths (1999)
    Springer
    Biology and philosophy 14 (1999), S. 39-54 
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    ISSN: 1572-8404
    Keywords: experiment ; evolution ; industrial melanism ; natural selection
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract H. B. D. Kettlewell's field experiments on industrial melanism in the peppered moth, Biston betularia, have become the best known demonstration of natural selection in action. I argue that textbook accounts routinely portray this research as an example of controlled experimentation, even though this is historically misleading. I examine how idealized accounts of Kettlewell's research have been used by professional biologists and biology teachers. I also respond to some criticisms of David Rudge to my earlier discussions of this case study, and I question Rudge's claims about the importance of purely observational studies for the eventual acceptance and popularization of Kettlewell's explanation for the evolution of industrial melanism.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1006576518561
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  • 14
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    Buffon, Darwin, and the Non-Individuality of Species – A Reply to Jean Gayon (1998)
    Springer
    Biology and philosophy 13 (1998), S. 443-470 
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    ISSN: 1572-8404
    Keywords: Buffon ; Darwin ; Gayon ; species ; individuality ; evolution
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Gayon's recent claim that Buffon developed a concept of species as physical individuals is critically examined and rejected. Also critically examined and rejected is Gayon's more central thesis that as a consequence of his analysis of Buffon's species concept, and also of Darwin's species concept, it is clear that modern evolutionary theory does not require species to be physical individuals. While I agree with Gayon's conclusion that modern evolutionary theory does not require species to be physical individuals, I disagree with his reasons and instead provide logical rather than historical reasons for the same conclusion.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1006587726855
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  • 15
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    Evolution Without Change in Gene Frequencies (1998)
    Springer
    Biology and philosophy 13 (1998), S. 255-261 
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    ISSN: 1572-8404
    Keywords: evolution ; speciation ; levels of selection
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Biologists often define evolution as a change in allele frequencies. Consideration of the evolution of the pocket mouse will show that it is possible to have evolution without any change in the allele frequencies in a population (through change in the genotype frequencies). The implications of this for genic selectionism are then discussed. Sober and Lewontin (1982) have constructed an example to demonstrate the “blindness” of genic selectionism in certain cases. Sterelny and Kitcher (1988) offer a defense against these arguments which assumes a conventionalist approach to populations. The example considered here will be shown to offer a more plausible and far-reaching argument against the view that alleles can always be seen as the units of selection.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1006541028421
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  • 16
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    Taxonomy and Philosophy of Names (1998)
    Springer
    Biology and philosophy 13 (1998), S. 233-244 
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    ISSN: 1572-8404
    Keywords: reference ; meaning ; individual ; class ; definition ; clade ; evolution ; phylogeny ; phylogenetic taxonomy ; systematics ; tree-thinking ; cladistics ; intention ; extension
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Although naming biological clades is a major activity in taxonomy, little attention has been paid to what these names actually refer to. In philosophy, definite descriptions have long been considered equivalent to the meaning of names and biological taxonomy is a scientific application of these ideas. One problem with definite descriptions as the meanings of names is that the name will refer to whatever fits the description rather than the intended individual (clade). Recent proposals for explicit phylogenetic definitions of clade names suffer from similar problems and we argue that clade names cannot be defined since they lack intension. Furthermore we stress the importance of “tree-thinking” for phylogenetic reference to work properly.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1006583910214
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  • 17
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    On the Relationship Between Memes and Genes: A Critique of Dennett (1998)
    Springer
    Biology and philosophy 13 (1998), S. 187-204 
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    ISSN: 1572-8404
    Keywords: evolution ; meme ; gene ; morality ; culture ; psychological predisposition
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Dennett (1995) argues that memes or cultural replicators are largely autonomous of genes, and that they are fairly efficacious in determining who we are and what we do. I argue that Dennett's arguments are wrong in several aspects, which we can see by analyzing processes at appropriate levels. Specifically, I argue that it is not true that we as persons are created largely by memes, that our memes are not largely independent of our genes, and that we can use the universality of memes to make inferences about genetic predispositions. Finally, by suggesting an innate psychological mechanism for morality, I argue that morality may be largely the effect of genetic predispositions rather than autonomous.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1006529312488
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  • 18
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    The Tragedy of a priori Selectionism: Dennett and Gould on Adaptationism (1998)
    Springer
    Biology and philosophy 13 (1998), S. 359-391 
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    ISSN: 1572-8404
    Keywords: adaptation ; algorithm ; atavism ; contingency ; deep homology ; Dennett ; development ; disparity ; epicurean selectionism ; evolution ; exaptation ; Gould ; metaphors ; punctuated equilibrium ; selectionism ; spandrels
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract In his recent book on Darwinism, Daniel Dennett has offered up a species of a priori selectionism that he calls algorithmic. He used this view to challenge a number of positions advocated by Stephen J. Gould. I examine his algorithmic conception, review his unqualified enthusiasm for the a priori selectionist position, challenge Dennett's main metaphors (cranes vs. skyhooks and a design space), examine ways in which his position has lead him to misunderstand or misrepresent Gould (spandrels, exaptation, punctuated equilibrium, contingency and disparity), and discuss recent results in developmental biology that suggest that an a priori position does not fill the demands of an evolutionary biology. I conclude by insisting that evolutionary biology is many leveled, complicated, and is carried on an ever shifting and expanding empirical base that when disregarded results in caricature.
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    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1006508719300
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  • 19
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    “Just-so” stories about “inner cognitive Africa”: some doubts about Sorensen's evolutionary epistemology of thought experiments (1997)
    Springer
    Biology and philosophy 12 (1997), S. 207-224 
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    ISSN: 1572-8404
    Keywords: evolution ; epistemology ; evolutionary epistemology ; naturalized epistemology ; thought experiments ; modality ; utility ; fitness ; adaptation ; reliability ; possible worlds
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Roy Sorensen advances an evolutionary explanation of our capacity for thought experiments which doubles as a naturalized epistemological justification. I argue Sorensen”s explanation fails to satisfy key elements of environmental-selectionist explanations and so fails to carry epistemic force. I then argue that even if Sorensen succeeds in showing the adaptive utility of our capacity, he still fails to establish its reliability and hence epistemic utility. I conclude Sorensen”s account comes to little more than a “just-so story”.
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    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1017986908266
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  • 20
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    Taking the ‘Error’ Out of Ruse‘s Error Theory (1997)
    Springer
    Biology and philosophy 12 (1997), S. 385-397 
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    ISSN: 1572-8404
    Keywords: morality ; evolution ; error theory
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Michael Ruse‘s Darwinian metaethics has come under just criticism from Peter Woolcock (1993). But with modification it remains defensible. Ruse (1986) holds that people ordinarily have a false belief that there are objective moral obligations. He argues that the evolutionary story should be taken as an error theory, i.e., as a theory which explains the belief that there are obligations as arising from non-rational causes, rather than from inference or evidential reasons. Woolcock quite rightly objects that this position entails moral nihilism. However, I argue here that people generally have justified true beliefs about which acts promote their most coherent set of moral values, and hence, by definition, about which acts are right. What the evolutionary story explains is the existence of these values, but it is not an error theory for moral beliefs. Ordinary beliefs correspond to real moral properties, though these are not objective or absolute properties independent of anyone‘s subjective states. On its best footing, therefore, a Darwinian metaethics of the type Ruse offers is not an error theory and does not entail moral nihilism.
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    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1006577007049
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  • 21
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    Animal Consciousness and Ethics in Asia and the Pacific (1997)
    Springer
    Journal of agricultural and environmental ethics 10 (1997), S. 249-267 
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    ISSN: 1573-322X
    Keywords: Animals ; Asia ; consciousness ; Australia ; Hong Kong ; India ; Israel ; Japan ; New Zealand ; The Philippines ; Russia ; Singapore ; Thailand
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Energy, Environment Protection, Nuclear Power Engineering , Agriculture, Forestry, Horticulture, Fishery, Domestic Science, Nutrition , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract The interactions between humans, animals and the environment have shaped human values and ethics, not only the genes that we are made of. The animal rights movement challenges human beings to reconsider interactions between humans and other animals, and maybe connected to the environmental movement that begs us to recognize the fact that there are symbiotic relationships between humans and all other organisms. The first part of this paper looks at types of bioethics, the implications of autonomy and the value of being alive. Then the level of consciousness of these relationships are explored in survey results from Asia and the Pacific, especially in the 1993 International Bioethics Survey conducted in Australia, Hong Kong, India, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, The Philippines, Russia, Singapore and Thailand. Very few mentioned animal consciousness in the survey, but there were more biocentric comments in Australia and Japan; and more comments with the idea of harmony including humans in Thailand. Comparisons between questions and surveys will also be made, in an attempt to describe what people imagine animal consciousness to be, and whether this relates to human ethics of the relationships.
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    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1007774409131
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  • 22
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    Dominance hierarchies and the evolution of human reasoning (1996)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 6 (1996), S. 463-480 
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    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Human reasoning ; evolution ; deontic reasoning ; transitive reasoning ; non-human primates ; neocortical ratio ; dominance hierarchy
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Research from ethology and evolutionary biology indicates the following about the evolution of reasoning capacity. First, solving problems of social competition and cooperation have direct impact on survival rates and reproductive success. Second, the social structure that evolved from this pressure is the dominance hierarchy. Third, primates that live in large groups with complex dominance hierarchies also show greater neocortical development, and concomitantly greater cognitive capacity. These facts suggest that the necessity of reasoning effectively about dominance hierarchies left an indelible mark on primate reasoning architectures, including that of humans. In order to survive in a dominance hierarchy, an individual must be capable of (a) making rank discriminations, (b) recognizing what is forbidden and what is permitted based one's rank, and (c) deciding whether to engage in or refriin from activities that will allow one to move up in rank. The first problem is closely tied to the capacity for transitive reasoning, while the second and third are intimately related to the capacity for deontic reasoning. I argue that the human capacity for these types of reasoning have evolutionary roots that reach deeper into our ancestral past than the emergence of the hominid line, and the operation of these evolutionarily primitive reasoning systems can be seen in the development of human reasoning and domain-specific effects in adult reasoning.
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    Integrating neuroscience, psychology, and evolutionary biology through a teleological conception of function (1996)
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    Minds and machines 6 (1996), S. 481-505 
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    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Neuroscience ; evolutionary psychology ; interfield theory ; evolution ; teleology ; function ; functionalism ; brain mapping ; language processing
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract The idea of integrating evolutionary biology and psychology has great promise, but one that will be compromised if psychological functions are conceived too abstractly and neuroscience is not allowed to play a contructive role. We argue that the proper integration of neuroscience, psychology, and evolutionary biology requires a telelogical as opposed to a merely componential analysis of function. A teleological analysis is required in neuroscience itself; we point to traditional and curent research methods in neuroscience, which make critical use of distinctly teleological functional considerations in brain cartography. Only by invoking teleological criteria can researchers distinguish the fruitful ways of identifying brain components from the myriad of possible ways. One likely reason for reluctance to turn to neuroscience is fear of reduction, but we argue that, in the context of a teleological perspective on function, this concern is misplaced. Adducing such theoretical considerations as top-down and bottom-up constraints on neuroscientific and psychological models, as well as existing cases of productive, multidisciplinary cooperation, we argue that integration of neuroscience into psychology and evolutionary biology is likely to be mutually beneficial. We also show how it can be accommodated methodologically within the framework of an interfield theory.
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    Can biology make ethics objective? (1996)
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    Biology and philosophy 11 (1996), S. 21-31 
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    ISSN: 1572-8404
    Keywords: Morality ; evolution ; justification ; objectivity
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    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract A familiar position regarding the evolution of ethics is that biology can explain the origin of morals but that in doing so it removes the possibility of their having objective justification. This position is set fourth in detail in the writings of Michael Ruse (1986, 1987, 1989, 1990a, 1990b) but it is also taken by many others, notably, Jeffrie Murphy (1982), Andrew Oldenquist (1990), and Allan Gibbard (1990), I argue the contrary view that biology provides a justification of the existence of morals which is objective in the sense of being independent of people's moral views and their particular desires and preferences. Ironically, my argument builds on the very premises which are supposed to undermine the objectivity of morals. But my argument stops short of claiming that biology can give us a basis for justifying some particular system of morals. Drawing on an analogy with social contract theory, I offer a general reason why this more ambitious project cannot be expected to succeed if the argument is pursued along the same lines. Finally, I give reasons why the possibility of objective justification for a particular morality cannot be ruled out in general on evolutionary grounds.
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    Natural selection and self-organization (1996)
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    Biology and philosophy 11 (1996), S. 33-65 
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    ISSN: 1572-8404
    Keywords: Background assumptions ; Darwinism ; evolution ; Newtonian dynamics ; nonequilibrium thermodynamics ; nonlinear dynamics ; probability revolution ; selection ; self-organization ; systems dynamics
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    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract The Darwinian concept of natural selection was conceived within a set of Newtonian background assumptions about systems dynamics. Mendelian genetics at first did not sit well with the gradualist assumptions of the Darwinian theory. Eventually, however, Mendelism and Darwinism were fused by reformulating natural selection in statistical terms. This reflected a shift to a more probabilistic set of background assumptions based upon Boltzmannian systems dynamics. Recent developments in molecular genetics and paleontology have put pressure on Darwinism once again. Current work on self-organizing systems may provide a stimulus not only for increased problem solving within the Darwinian tradition, especially with respect to origins of life, developmental genetics, phylogenetic pattern, and energy-flow ecology, but for deeper understanding of the very phenomenon of natural selection itself. Since self-organizational phenomena depend deeply on stochastic processes, self-organizational systems dynamics advance the probability revolution. In our view, natural selection is an emergent phenomenon of physical and chemical selection. These developments suggest that natural selection may be grounded in physical law more deeply than is allowed by advocates of the autonomy of biology, while still making it possible to deny, with autonomists, that evolutionary explanations can be modeled in terms of a deductive relationship between laws and cases. We explore the relationship between, chance, self-organization, and selection as sources of order in biological systems in order to make these points.
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    Explanatory pluralism in evolutionary biology (1996)
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    Biology and philosophy 11 (1996), S. 193-214 
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    ISSN: 1572-8404
    Keywords: Adaptationism ; avatars ; competition ; explanation ; evolution ; macroevolution ; optimality ; reductionism ; species selection ; species sorting
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    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract The ontological dependence of one domain on another is compatible with the explanatory autonomy of the less basic domain. That autonomy results from the fact that the relationship between two domains can be very complex. In this paper I distinguish two different types of complexity, two ways the relationship between domains can fail to be transparent, both of which are relevant to evolutionary biology. Sometimes high level explanations preserve a certain type of causal or counterfactual information which would be lost at the lower level; I argue that this is central to the proper understanding of the adaptationist program. Sometimes high level kinds are multiply realised by lower level kinds: I argue that this is central to the understanding of macroevolution.
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    The individuality of the species: A Darwinian theory? — from Buffon to Ghiselin, and back to Darwin (1996)
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    Biology and philosophy 11 (1996), S. 215-244 
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    ISSN: 1572-8404
    Keywords: Classes ; classification ; evolution ; Buffon ; Darwin ; Ghiselin ; individuality ; ordering ; concept of species
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    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Since the 1970s, there has been a tremendous amount of literature on Ghiselin's proposal that “species are individuals”. After recalling the origins and stakes of this thesis in contemporary evolutionary theory, I show that it can also be found in the writings of the French naturalist Buffon in the 18th Century. Although Buffon did not have the conception that one species could be derived from another, there is an interesting similarity between the modern argument and that of Buffon regarding the “individuality of species’. The analogy is strong enough to force us to recognize that genuine evolutionary (or Darwinian) questions might be of secondary importance in the discussion. In consequence, the third section of the paper proposes an alternative schema for the “logical structure” of the Darwinian concept of species. Darwin distinguished the problem of the designation of a concrete species, and the problem of its signification of species within his theory of descent? The resulting notion of species involves a logical structure based on the fusion of the logical operations of classification and ordering. The difficulty — and interest — is that this interpretation of species does not entail any precise operational definition of species; it can only tell us what the ultimate signification of classification is within the theory of descent with modification through natural selection.
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    The extended replicator (1996)
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    Biology and philosophy 11 (1996), S. 377-403 
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    Keywords: development ; developmental systems ; gene ; genetic information ; evolution ; information ; inheritance ; interactor ; Lamarck ; Meme ; replicator ; selection ; unit of selection ; vehicle ; Weismann
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract This paper evaluates and criticises the developmental systems conception of evolution and develops instead an extension of the “gene's eye” conception of evolution. We argue (i) Dawkin's attempt to segregate developmental and evolutionary issues about genes is unsatisfactory. On plausible views of development it is arbitrary to single out genes as the units of selection. (ii) The genotype does not carry information about the phenotype in any way that distinguishes the role of the genes in development from that other factors. (iii) There is no simple and general causal criterion which distinguishes the role of genes in development and evolution. (iv) There is, however, an important sense in which genes but not every other developmental factor represent the phenotype. (v) The idea that genes represent features of the phenotype forces us to recognise that genes are not the only, or almost the only, replicators. Many mechanisms of replication are involved in both development and evolution. (vi) A conception of evolutionary history which recognises both genetic and non-genetic replicators, lineages of replicators and interactors has advantages over both the radical rejection of the replicator/interactor distinction and the conservative restriction of replication to genetic replication.
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    Changing conceptions of species (1996)
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    Biology and philosophy 11 (1996), S. 405-420 
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    Keywords: species ; evolution ; natural selection ; gradualism ; punctuated equilibria ; variation ; Lamarck ; Darwin
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Species are thought by many to be important units of evolution. In this paper, I argue against that view. My argument is based on an examination of the role of species in the synthetic theory of evolution. I argue that if one adopts a gradualist view of evolution, one cannot make sense of the claim that species are “units” in the minimal sense needed to claim that they are units of evolution, namely, that they exist as discrete entities over time. My second argument is directed against an appeal to Eldredge and Gould's theory of punctuated equilibria to support the claim that species are units of evolution. If one adopts their view, it may be possible to identify discrete temporal entities that can plausibly be termed ‘species’, but there is no reason to claim that those entities are “units of evolution”. Thus, on two plausible interpretations of the role of natural selection in the process of evolution, species are of no special importance. I then consider some of the reasons why species have been thought to be important evolutionary units by many contemporary evolutionary biologists. Finally, I discuss briefly the implications of this conclusion for evolutionary biology.
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    Naturalism, evidence and creationism: The case of Phillip Johnson (1996)
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    Biology and philosophy 11 (1996), S. 543-559 
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    Keywords: Creationism ; evidence ; evolution ; naturalism ; Phillip Johnson ; scientific methodology
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    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Phillip Johnson claims that Creationism is a better explanation of the existence and characteristics of biological species than is evolutionary theory. He argues that the only reason biologists do not recognize that Creationist's negative arguments against Darwinism have proven this is that they are wedded to a biased ideological philosophy —Naturalism — which dogmatically denies the possibility of an intervening creative god. However, Johnson fails to distinguish Ontological Naturalism from Methodological Naturalism. Science makes use of the latter and I show how it is not dogmatic but follows from sound requirements for empirical evidential testing. Furthermore, Johnson has no serious alternative type of positive evidence to offer for Creationism, and purely negative argumentation, despite his attempt to legitimate it, will not suffice.
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    Some Nonhuman Animals Can Have Pains in a Morally Relevant Sense (1996)
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    Biology and philosophy 12 (1996), S. 51-71 
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    Keywords: philosophy of mind ; ethics ; animal pain ; Peter Carruthers ; consciousness ; evolution
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    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract In a series of works, Peter Carruthers has argued for the denial of the title proposition. Here, I defend that proposition by offering direct support drawn from relevant sciences and by undercutting Carruthers‘ argument. In doing the latter, I distinguish an intrinsic theory of consciousness from Carruthers‘ relational theory of consciousness. This relational theory has two readings, one of which makes essential appeal to evolutionary theory. I argue that neither reading offers a successful view.
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    How is a species kept together? (1995)
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    Biology and philosophy 10 (1995), S. 181-196 
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    Keywords: Biological species concept ; gene flow ; gene circulation ; Ernst Mayr ; stalemates ; typology ; evolution
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    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Over the decades, there has been substantial empirical evidence showing that the unity of species cannot be maintained by gene flow. The biological species concept is inconclusive on this point. The suggestion is made that the unity of species is maintained rather by selection constantly spreading new alleles throughout the species, or bygene circulation. There is a lack in conceptual distinction between gene flow and gene circulation which lies at the heart of the problem. The concept of gene circulation also sheds some new light on the problem of typology and on such a broad concept as evolution. A new species definition is proposed.
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    A (not-so-radical) solution to the species problem (1995)
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    Biology and philosophy 10 (1995), S. 339-356 
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    Keywords: Species ; lineage ; individual ; class ; evolution ; organism ; population
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    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract What are species? One popular answer is that species are individuals. Here I develop another approach to thinking about species, an approach based on the notion of a lineage. A lineage is a sequence of reproducing entities, individuated in terms of its components. I argue that one can conceive of species as groups of lineages, either organism lineages or population lineages. Conceiving of species as groups of lineages resolves the problems that the individual conception of species is supposed to resolve. It has added the virtue of focusing attention on the characteristic of species that is most relevant to understanding their role in evolutionary processes, namely, the lineage structure of species.
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    Viability explanation (1995)
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    Biology and philosophy 10 (1995), S. 435-457 
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    Keywords: Functional explanation ; morphology ; ethology ; evolution
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    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract This article deals with a type of functional explanation, viability explanation, that has been overlooked in recent philosophy of science. Viability explanations relate traits of organisms and their environments in terms of what an individual needs to survive and reproduce. I show that viability explanations are neither causal nor historical and that, therefore, they should be accounted for as a distinct type of explanation.
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    Are the different hypotheses on the emergence of life as different as they seem? (1995)
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    Biology and philosophy 10 (1995), S. 389-417 
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    ISSN: 1572-8404
    Keywords: Catalysis ; chance ; determinism ; emergence of life ; evolution ; non-equilibrium thermodynamics ; panspermia ; protometabolism ; reduction ; RNA world ; self-organization
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract This paper calls attention to a philosophical presupposition, coined here “the continuity thesis” which underlies and unites the different, often conflicting, hypotheses in the origin of life field. This presupposition, a necessary condition for any scientific investigation of the origin of life problem, has two components. First, it contends that there is no unbridgeable gap between inorganic matter and life. Second, it regards the emergence of life as a highly probable process. Examining several current origin-of-life theories. I indicate the implicit or explicit role played by the “continuity thesis” in each of them. In addition, I identify the rivals of the “thesis” within the scientific community — “the almost miracle camp.” Though adopting the anti-vitalistic aspect of the “continuity thesis”, this camp regards the emergence of life as involving highly improbable events. Since it seems that the chemistry of the prebiotic stages and of molecular self-organization processes rules out the possibility that life is the result of a “happy accident,” I claim that the “almost miracle” view implies in fact, a creationist position.
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    Bioaltruism reconsidered (1994)
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    Biology and philosophy 9 (1994), S. 75-84 
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    Keywords: Altruism ; ethics ; ethology ; evolution ; sociobiology
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    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Altruistic behavior is often regarded as sociobiology's most central theoretical problem, but is it? Altruism in biology, bioaltruism, has many meanings, which can be grouped into two categories. The first I will callcommon bioaltruism. It is primarily of ethological relevance. The second,evolutionary bioaltruism, is a special category in evolutionary respects in that it may indeed pose a problem for evolutionary theory. These categories are logically independent. Moreover, both of them are logically different from altruism in its everyday psychological or moral sense. Sociobiological examples of bioaltruistic behavior concern bioaltruism in the first sense only, so the theoretical problem ‘altruism’ is supposed to pose, is indeed nothing but a theoretical problem and the bioaltruism that actually occurs has no evolutionary relevance. Nevertheless, evolutionary theory is relevant to our understanding of the possibility of common bioaltruism, and that possibility — even though bioaltruism is conceptually different from ethical altruism — is relevant for ethicists: it sheds light on what we can ask people to do or not to do.
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    Ernst Mayr, naturalist: His contributions to systematics and evolution (1994)
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    Biology and philosophy 9 (1994), S. 267-327 
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    Keywords: biogeography ; Ernst Mayr ; evolution ; naturalist ; nomenclature ; systematics
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    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Ernst Mayr's scientific career continues strongly 70 years after he published his first scientific paper in 1923. He is primarily a naturalist and ornithologist which has influenced his basic approach in science and later in philosophy and history of science. Mayr studied at the Natural History Museum in Berlin with Professor E. Stresemann, a leader in the most progressive school of avian systematics of the time. The contracts gained through Stresemann were central to Mayr's participation in a three year expedition to New Guinea and The Solomons, and the offer of a position in the Department of Ornithology, American Museum of Natural History, beginning in 1931. At the AMNH, Mayr was able to blend the best of the academic traditions of Europe with those of North America in developing a unified research program in biodiversity embracing systematics, biogeography and nomenclature. His tasks at the AMNH were to curate and study the huge collections amassed by the Whitney South Sea Expedition plus the just purchased Rothschild collection of birds. These studies provided Mayr with the empirical foundation essential for his 1942Systematics and the Origin of Species and his subsequent theoretical work in evolutionary biology as well as all his later work in the philosophy and history of science. Without a detailed understanding of Mayr's empirical systematic and biogeographic work, one cannot possibly comprehend fully his immense contributions to evolutionary biology and his later analyses in the philosophy and history of science.
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    Intentionality, social play, and definition (1994)
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    Biology and philosophy 9 (1994), S. 63-74 
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    Keywords: Ethology ; cognitive ethology ; play ; intentionality ; evolution ; definition
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    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Social play is naturally characterized in intentional terms. An evolutionary account of social play could help scientists to understand the evolution of cognition and intentionality. Alexander Rosenberg (1990) has argued that if play is characterized intentionally or functionally, it is not a behavioral phenotype suitable for evolutionary explanation. If he is right, his arguments would threaten many projects in cognitive ethology. We argue that Rosenberg's arguments are unsound and that intentionally and functionally characterized phenotypes are a proper domain for ethological investigation.
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    The competition controversy in community ecology (1993)
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    Biology and philosophy 8 (1993), S. 359-384 
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    Keywords: Ecology ; evolution ; competition ; theory testing ; modeling
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    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract There is a long history of controversy in ecology over the role of competition in determining patterns of distribution and abundance, and over the significance of the mathematical modeling of competitive interactions. This paper examines the controversy. Three kinds of considerations have been involved at one time or another during the history of this debate. There has been dispute about the kinds of regularities ecologists can expect to find, about the significance of evolutionary considerations for ecological inquiry, and about the empirical credentials of theoretical studies of competition. Each of these elements is examined with an eye toward gaining philosophical clarification of the issues involved. In the process, certain shortcomings of contemporary philosophical theories are revealed. In particular, I argue that plausibility arguments based on background considerations are an important part of the model building tradition, but that current accounts of the structure and evaluation of scientific theories do little to illuminate this side of theoretical ecology.
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    Life and teleology (1992)
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    Journal for general philosophy of science 23 (1992), S. 85-103 
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    ISSN: 1572-8587
    Keywords: life ; teleology ; evolution ; reality ; representation ; experience
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Philosophy , Nature of Science, Research, Systems of Higher Education, Museum Science
    Notes: Summary A comprehensive definition of the phenomenon called “life” led to the addition of many dimensions to the natural sciences, and especially the conscious mental dimension. Historical attention is paid not only to those employing the natural philosophical paradigms, but also to evolutionary theories and to the Kantian teleological philosophy. The belief that science can solve the riddle of life is a category of purposal thinking. A revised version of critical teleology is essential for comprehension of life.
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    Mental content and evolutionary explanation (1992)
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    Biology and philosophy 7 (1992), S. 1-12 
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    Keywords: Cognitive ethology ; mental content ; mental representations ; evolution
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Cognitive ethology is the comparative study of animal cognition from an evolutionary perspective. As a sub-discipline of biology it shares interest in questions concerning the immediate causes and development of behavior. As a part of ethology it is also concerned with questions about the function and evolution of behavior. I examine some recent work in cognitive ethology, and I argue that the notions of mental content and representation are important to enable researchers to answer questions and state generalizations about the function and volution of behavior.
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    What is hierarchical selection? (1992)
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    Biology and philosophy 7 (1992), S. 27-33 
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    Keywords: Additivity ; ANOVA ; evolution ; hierarchical selection
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    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract It has been proposed that natural selection occurs on a hierarchy of levels, of which the organismic level is neither the top nor the bottom. This hypothesis leads to the following practical problem: in general, how does one tell if a given phenomenon is a result of selection on level X or level Y. How does one tell what the units of selection actually are? It is convenient to assume that a unit of selection may be defined as a type of entity for which there exists, among all entities on the same “level” as that entity, an additive component of variance for some specific component F of fitness which does not appear as an additive component of variance in any decomposition of this F among entities at any lower level. But such a definition implicitly assumes that if f(x, y) depends nonadditively on its arguments, there must be interaction between the quantities which x and y represent. This assumption is incorrect. And one cannot avoid this error by speaking of “transformability to additivity” instead of merely “additivity”. A general mathematical formulation of the concepts of interaction and non-interaction is proposed, followed by a correspondingly modified approach to the definition of a unit of selection. The practical difficulty of verifying the presence of hierarchical selection is discussed.
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    An ecological approach to biosystem thermodynamics (1992)
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    Biology and philosophy 7 (1992), S. 35-60 
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    Keywords: Action principles ; ecosystem structure ; evolution ; information ; natural selection ; non-equilibrium thermodynamics ; teleology
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    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract The general attributes of ecosystems are examined and a naturally occurring “reference ecosystem” is established, comparable with the “isolated” system of classical thermodynamics. Such an autonomous system with a stable, periodic input of energy is shown to assume certain structural characteristics that have an identifiable thermodynamic basis. Individual species tend to assume a state of “least dissipation”; this is most clearly evident in the dominant species (the species with the best integration of energy acquisition and conservation). It is concluded that ecosystem structure results from the antagonistic interaction of two nearly equal forces. These forces have their origin in the Principle of Most Action (“least dissipation” or “least entropy production”) and the universal Principle of Least Action. “Most action” is contingent on the equipartitioning of the energy available, through uniform interaction of similar individuals. The trend to “Least action” is contingent on increased dissipation attained through increasing diversity and increasing complexity. These principles exhibit a basic asymmetry. Given the operation of these opposing principles over evolutionary time, it is argued that ecosystems originated in the vicinity of thermodynamic equilibrium through the resonant amplification of reversible fluctuations. On account of the basic asymmetry the system was able to evolve away from thermodynamic equilibrium provided that it remained within the vicinity of “ergodynamic equilibrium” (equilibrium maintained by internal work, where the opposing forces are equal and opposite). At the highest level of generalization there appear to be three principles operating: i) maximum association of free-energy and materials; ii) energy conservation (deceleration of the energy flow) through symmetric interaction and increased homogeneity; and iii) the principle of least action which induces acceleration of the energy flow through asymmetrical interaction. The opposition and asymmetry of the two forces give rise to natural selection and evolution.
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    On the relationship between evolutionary and psychological definitions of altruism and selfishness (1992)
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    Biology and philosophy 7 (1992), S. 61-68 
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    Keywords: Altruism ; evolution ; group selection ; selfishness
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract I examine the relationship between evolutionary definitions of altruism that are based on fitness effects and psychological definitions that are based on the motives of the actor. I show that evolutionary altruism can be motivated by proximate mechanisms that are psychologically either altruistic or selfish. I also show that evolutionary definitions do rely upon motives as a metaphor in which the outcome of natural selection is compared to the decisions of a psychologically selfish (or altruistic) individual. Ignoring the precise nature of both psychological and evolutionary definitions has obscured many important issues, including the biological roots of psychological altruism.
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    Evolution, altruism, and the prisoner's dilemma (1992)
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    Biology and philosophy 7 (1992), S. 161-175 
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    Keywords: Altruism ; evolution ; Prisoner's Dilemma ; sociobiology
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    Notes: Abstract I first argue against Peter Singer's exciting thesis that the Prisoner's Dilemma explains why there could be an evolutionary advantage in making reciprocal exchanges that are ultimately motivated by genuine altruism over making such exchanges on the basis of enlightened long-term self-interest. I then show that an alternative to Singer's thesis — one that is also meant to corroborate the view that natural selection favors genuine altruism, recently defended by Gregory Kavka, fails as well. Finally, I show that even granting Singer's and Kavka's claim about the selective advantage of altruism proper, it is doubtful whether that type of claim can be used in a particular sort of sociobiological argument against psychological egoism.
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    The evolution of altruism: Correlation, cost, and benefit (1992)
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    Biology and philosophy 7 (1992), S. 177-187 
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    Keywords: Altruism ; evolution ; game theory ; group selection ; kin selection ; prisoner's dilemma
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    Notes: Abstract A simple and general criterion is derived for the evolution of altruism when individuals interact in pairs. It is argued that the treatment of this problem in kin selection theory and in game theory are special cases of this general criterion.
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    Phylogenetic definitions and taxonomic philosophy (1992)
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    Biology and philosophy 7 (1992), S. 295-313 
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    Keywords: Clade ; class ; composite whole ; definition ; defining property ; essentialism ; evolution ; individual ; intension ; name ; ostensive definition ; phylogeny ; population ; set ; species ; taxon ; taxonomy
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
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    Notes: Abstract An examination of the post-Darwinian history of biological taxonomy reveals an implicit assumption that the definitions of taxon names consist of lists of organismal traits. That assumption represents a failure to grant the concept of evolution a central role in taxonomy, and it causes conflicts between traditional methods of defining taxon names and evolutionary concepts of taxa. Phylogenetic definitions of taxon names (de Queiroz and Gauthier 1990) grant the concept of common ancestry a central role in the definitions of taxon names and thus constitute an important step in the development of phylogenetic taxonomy. By treating phylogenetic relationships rather than organismal traits as necessary and sufficient properties, phylogenetic definitions remove conflicts between the definitions of taxon names and evolutionary concepts of taxa. The general method of definition represented by phylogenetic definitions of clade names can be applied to the names of other kinds of composite wholes, including populations and biological species. That the names of individuals (composite wholes) can be defined in terms of necessary and sufficient properties provides the foundation for a synthesis of seemingly incompatible positions held by contemporary individualists and essentialists concerning the nature of taxa and the definitions of taxon names.
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    Evolution: Teleology or chance? (1991)
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    Journal for general philosophy of science 22 (1991), S. 133-141 
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    ISSN: 1572-8587
    Keywords: evolution ; teleology ; chance ; purpose ; anthropomorphism
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Philosophy , Nature of Science, Research, Systems of Higher Education, Museum Science
    Notes: Summary Revaluation of the problem of natural teleology seems an important precondition for elucidating our environmental crisis and for formulating an ‘ecological ethics’, because it calls for a recognition of an intrinsic value in nature and organisms. Therefore, it is necessary to show that the concept of natural teleology is not in contradiction with scientific theories, in particular not with the theory of evolution. In this paper I shall argue that there is a fundamental misunderstanding about the concepts of teleology and chance in modern thinking. This as a result of a radical transformation of the Aristotelian concept of teleology by Christian theologians during the Middle Ages. This confusion resulted in the rejection of teleology from evolution and in an exaggeration of the role of chance. However, not a solution for the problem of teleology is given here, but only an attempt to prove that neither the fossil-record, nor the role of chance in evolution can give adequate arguments for the negation of teleology in evolution. That is not to say that, therefore there exists teleology in evolution, but the problem of teleology in nature cannot, be solved by the scientific theory of evolution, but only be elucidated by philosophical analysis. At the end of the paper it is argued that teleology must be rather presupposed in evolution.
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    Representations of the Natural System in the Nineteenth century (1991)
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    Biology and philosophy 6 (1991), S. 255-274 
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    Keywords: Classification ; diagrams ; evolution ; history ; natural history ; natural system ; ornithology ; phylogeny ; representation ; systematics ; taxonomy
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract ‘The Natural System’ is the abstract notion of the order in living diversity. The richness and complexity of this notion is revealed by the diversity of representations of the Natural System drawn by ornithologists in the Nineteenth Century. These representations varied in overall form from stars, to circles, to maps, to evolutionary trees and cross-sections through trees. They differed in their depiction of affinity, analogy, continuity, directionality, symmetry, reticulation and branching, evolution, and morphological convergence and divergence. Some representations were two-dimensional, and some were three-dimensional; n-dimensional representations were discussed but never illustrated. The study of diagrammatic representations of the Natural System is made difficult by the frequent failure of authors to discuss them in their texts, and by the consequent problem of distinguishing features which carried meaning from arbitrary features and printing conventions which did not. Many of the systematics controversies of the last thirty years have their roots in the conceptual problems which surrounded the Natural System in the late 1800s, problems which were left unresolved when interest in higher-level systematics declined at the turn of this century.
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    Complexity and evolution: What everybody knows (1991)
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    Biology and philosophy 6 (1991), S. 303-324 
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    Keywords: Complexity ; entropy ; evolution ; evolutionary trends ; Herbert Spencer ; progress
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    Notes: Abstract The consensus among evolutionists seems to be (and has been for at least a century) that the morphological complexity of organisms increases in evolution, although almost no empirical evidence for such a trend exists. Most studies of complexity have been theoretical, and the few empirical studies have not, with the exception of certain recent ones, been especially rigorous; reviews are presented of both the theoretical and empirical literature. The paucity of evidence raises the question of what sustains the consensus, and a number of suggestions are offered, including the possibility that certain cultural and/or perceptual biases are at work. In addition, a shift in emphasis from theoretical to empirical inquiry is recommended for the study of complexity, and guidelines for future empirical studies are proposed.
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    Really taking Darwin and the naturalistic fallacy seriously: An objection to Rottschaefer and Martinsen (1991)
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    Biology and philosophy 6 (1991), S. 433-437 
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    Keywords: Ethics ; evolution ; evolutionary ethics ; M. Ruse ; naturalistic fallacy ; supervenience
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    Notes: Abstract Out of a concern to respect the naturalistic fallacy, Ruse (1986) argues for the possibility of causal, but not justificatory, explanations of morality in terms of evolutionary processes. In a discussion of Ruse's work, Rottschaefer and Martinsen (1990) claim that he erroneously limits the explanatory scope of evolutionary concepts, because he fails to see that one can have objective moral properties without committing either of two forms of the naturalistic fallacy, if one holds that moral properties supervene on non-moral properties. In this short paper I argue that Rottschaefer and Martinsen's solution fails. If one takes moral properties to supervene on non-moral properties, then either one ends up committing one of the two forms of the naturalistic fallacy or else one is left postulating unbelievable brute metaphysical facts.
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    The insufficience of supervenient explanations of moral actions: Really taking Darwin and the naturalistic fallacy seriously (1991)
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    Biology and philosophy 6 (1991), S. 439-445 
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    Keywords: Ethics ; evolution ; evolutionary ethics ; M. Ruse ; naturalistic fallacy ; supervenience ; supervenience explanations
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
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    Notes: Abstract In a recent paper in this journal (Rottschaefer and Martinsen 1990) we have proposed a view of Darwinian evolutionary metaethics that we believe improves upon Michael Ruse's (e.g., Ruse 1986) proposals by claiming that there are evolutionary based objective moral values and that a Darwinian naturalistic account of the moral good in terms of human fitness can be given that avoids the naturalistic fallacy in both its definitional and derivational forms while providing genuine, even if limited, justifications for substantive ethical claims. Jonathan Barrett (this issue) has objected to our proposal contending that we cannot hold for the reality of supervenient moral properties without either falling foul of the naturalistic fallacy or suffering the consequences of postulating inexplicable moral properties. In reply, we show that Barrett's explicit arguments that we commit either the definitional or derivational form of the naturalistic fallacy fail and that his naturalistic intuitions that supervenience explanations of moral properties by nonmoral properties force us into what we call the explanatory form of the naturalistic fallacy also fail. Positively, his objections help us to clarify the nature of the naturalistic fallacy within an evolutionary based naturalistic ethics and to point out the proper role of both supervenience explanations and moral explanations in such an ethics.
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    Basic rules of change (1990)
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    Journal for general philosophy of science 21 (1990), S. 231-257 
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    ISSN: 1572-8587
    Keywords: basic rules ; change ; discipline-neutral ; evolution ; analogy
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Philosophy , Nature of Science, Research, Systems of Higher Education, Museum Science
    Notes: Summary A small step is made in the direction of defining some general basic rules which can serve as a framework for research in several fields of the social sciences. The method of working with analogies asks for a more accurate approach. Starting from the concept of evolution in the form of a basic rule another basic rule is formulated. This rule shows what are the most important factors in long term developments and what types of development one can expect.
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    Modeling in the museum: On the role of remnant models in the work of Joseph Grinnell (1990)
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    Biology and philosophy 5 (1990), S. 3-36 
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    Keywords: Material models ; semantic view of theories ; natural history ; ecology ; evolution ; museums ; Joseph Grinnell
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Accounts of the relation between theories and models in biology concentrate on mathematical models. In this paper I consider the dual role of models as representations of natural systems and as a material basis for theorizing. In order to explicate the dual role, I develop the concept of a remnant model, a material entity made from parts of the natural system(s) under study. I present a case study of an important but neglected naturalist, Joseph Grinnell, to illustrate the extent to which mundane practices in a museum setting constitute theorizing. I speculate that historical and sociological analyses of institutions can play a specific role in the philosophical analysis of model-building strategies.
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    Really taking Darwin seriously: An alternative to Michael Ruse's Darwinian metaethics (1990)
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    Biology and philosophy 5 (1990), S. 149-173 
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    Keywords: Darwinian ethics ; ethics ; evolution ; evolutionary ethics ; M. Ruse ; naturalistic fallacy ; sociobiology
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Michael Ruse has proposed in his recent book Taking Darwin Seriously and elsewhere a new Darwinian ethics distinct from traditional evolutionary ethics, one that avoids the latter's inadequate accounts of the nature of morality and its failed attempts to provide a naturalistic justification of morality. Ruse argues for a sociobiologically based account of moral sentiments, and an evolutionary based casual explanation of their function, rejecting the possibility of ultimate ethical justification. We find that Ruse's proposal distorts, overextends and weakens both Darwinism and naturalism. So we propose an alternative Darwinian metaethics that both remedies the problems in Ruse's proposal and shows how a Darwinian naturalistic account of the moral good in terms of human fitness avoids the naturalistic fallacy and can provide genuine, even if limited, justifications for substantive ethical claims. Thus, we propose to really take Darwin seriously.
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    Evolved ethics re-examined: The theory of Robert J. Richards (1990)
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    Biology and philosophy 5 (1990), S. 451-457 
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    Keywords: Auschwitz ; biology ; ethics ; evolution ; moral theory ; naturalistic fallacy ; Richards
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    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Conclusion Richards's theory, then, fails on three counts. By illegitimately importing a premise from outside of the theory of evolution in order to construct a valid argument, Richards has failed to achieve his objective of deriving a moral theory exclusively from biological facts. By sliding from a causal use of “ought” to a moral one, Richards commits the fallacy of ambiguity. And by insisting that action from the motive of altruism is moral while claiming that an ethical theory which justifies Hitler's camps must be judged false, Richards has falsified his own ethical theory.
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    Philosophy of biology under attack: Stent vs. Rosenberg (1989)
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    Biology and philosophy 4 (1989), S. 345-351 
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    Keywords: Philosophy of biology ; teleology ; evolution
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    Dutch objections to evolutionary ethics (1989)
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    Biology and philosophy 4 (1989), S. 331-343 
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    Keywords: Altruism ; C. Darwin ; evolution ; evolutionary ethics ; naturalistic fallacy ; Sociobiology
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    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
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    Entropy and information in evolving biological systems (1989)
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    Biology and philosophy 4 (1989), S. 407-432 
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    Keywords: evolution ; entropy ; information ; hierarchy ; ecology ; phylogeny ; natural selection
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    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Integrating concepts of maintenance and of origins is essential to explaining biological diversity. The unified theory of evolution attempts to find a common theme linking production rules inherent in biological systems, explaining the origin of biological order as a manifestation of the flow of energy and the flow of information on various spatial and temporal scales, with the recognition that natural selection is an evolutionarily relevant process. Biological systems persist in space and time by transfor ming energy from one state to another in a manner that generates structures which allows the system to continue to persist. Two classes of energetic transformations allow this; heat-generating transformations, resulting in a net loss of energy from the system, and conservative transformations, changing unusable energy into states that can be stored and used subsequently. All conservative transformations in biological systems are coupled with heat-generating transformations; hence, inherent biological production, or genealogical proesses, is positively entropic. There is a self-organizing phenomenology common to genealogical phenomena, which imparts an arrow of time to biological systems. Natural selection, which by itself is time-reversible, contributes to the organization of the self-organized genealogical trajectories. The interplay of genealogical (diversity-promoting) and selective (diversity-limiting) processes produces biological order to which the primary contribution is genealogical history. Dynamic changes occuring on times scales shorter than speciation rates are microevolutionary; those occuring on time scales longer than speciation rates are macroevolutionary. Macroevolutionary processes are neither redicible to, nor autonomous from, microevolutionary processes.
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    Biodiversity and biotechnology (1988)
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    Journal of agricultural and environmental ethics 1 (1988), S. 175-192 
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    ISSN: 1573-322X
    Keywords: Biodiversity ; biotechnology ; ecology ; ecosystem ; environment ; ethics ; evolution ; genetics ; health ; medicine
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Energy, Environment Protection, Nuclear Power Engineering , Agriculture, Forestry, Horticulture, Fishery, Domestic Science, Nutrition , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract The maintenance of biodiversity is urged from many quarters and on grounds ranging from aesthetic considerations to its usefulness, particularly for biotechnology. But regardless of the grounds for preserving biodiversity, writers are generally in agreement that it should be preserved. But, in examining the various references “biodiversity,” such as species diversity, genetic diversity, and habitat diversity, it is apparent that we cannot aim to preserve biodiversityas such, since there are a number of conflicts in any such undertaking. In preserving one aspect of biodiversity, we damage another aspect. Five arguments which attempt to ground our moral concern for biodiversity are reviewed and critiqued, not only for their consistency but also for their power to move us to action. The final section of the paper shows how conflicts in the values of personal and environmental health can impair ethical action and especially policy formation.
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    “Clever beasts who invented knowing”: Nietzsche's evolutionary biology of knowledge (1987)
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    Biology and philosophy 2 (1987), S. 65-91 
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    Keywords: Nietzsche ; Darwin ; evolution ; epistemology ; sociobiology
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    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Nietzsche was a philosopher, not a biologist, Nevertheless his philosophical thought was deeply influenced by ideas emerging from the evolutionary biology of the nineteenth century. His relationship to the Darwinism of his time is difficult to disentangle. It is argued that he was in a sense an unwitting Darwinist. It follows that his philosophical thought is of considerable interest to those concerned to develop an evolutionary biology of mankind. His approach can be likened to that of an extraterrestrial sociobiologist studying “clever beasts... in some out of the way corner of the universe ...” It is shown how be uses this viewpoint to account for the origin of the central psychobiology of humankind: for dualistic philosophies, such as that of Descartes (which Ryle famously called ‘the official doctrine’), for human notions of ‘truth’ and ‘falsehood’, ‘being’ and ‘becoming’, and for other fundamental concepts of Western philosophy and science. All these, he argues, are no more and no less than the necessary adaptations of a zoological species, Homo sapiens, in its ‘struggle for life’ in a Darwinian world. It is concluded that Nietzsche was the first philosopher to accept and use in their full depth the philosophical implications of nineteeth-century evolutionism, implications which are still resisted to this day. It is also argued that this interpretation of Nietzsche's aphoristic writings provides them with an organic consistency.
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    No norms and no nature — The moral relevance of evolutionary biology (1987)
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    Biology and philosophy 2 (1987), S. 253-270 
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    Keywords: Ethics ; evolution ; sociobiology
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Many think that evolutionary biology has relevance to ethics, but how far that relevance extends is a matter of debate. It is easy to show that “pop” sociobiological approaches to ethics all commit some type of naturalistic fallacy. More sophisticated attempts, like Donald Campbell's, or, more recently, Robert Richards', are not so easily refuted, but I will show that they too reason fallaciously from facts to values. What remains is the possibility of an evolutionary search for human nature. Unfortunately, evolutionary theory itself seems to imply that the quest for human nature will not be very promising. As far as there is such a thing as human nature, we will have to know it before we can meaningfully talk about its evolution. Anthropological data suggest that we differ widely in our normative judgments. And even where we seem to agree, there is good reason to doubt that we really do so.
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    Confirmation of ecological and evolutionary models (1987)
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    Biology and philosophy 2 (1987), S. 277-293 
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    Keywords: Confirmation ; testing ; evolution ; models
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    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract In this paper I distinguish various ways in which empirical claims about evolutionary and ecological models can be supported by data. I describe three basic factors bearing on confirmation of empirical claims: fit of the model to data; independent testing of various aspects of the model, and variety of evident. A brief description of the kinds of confirmation is followed by examples of each kind, drawn from a range of evolutionary and ecological theories. I conclude that the greater complexity and precision of my approach, as compared to, for instance, a Popperian approach, can facilitate detailed analysis and comparison of empirical claims.
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    Evolutionary epistemology as science (1987)
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    Biology and philosophy 2 (1987), S. 295-313 
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    Keywords: Evolutionary epistemology ; evolution ; cognition ; hierarchy theory
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    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract What credentials does evolutionary epistemology have as science? A judgement based on past performance, both in terms of advancing an empirical programme and further ng theory construction, is not much. This paper briefly outlines some of the research areas, both theoretical and empirical, that can be developed and that might secure for evolutionary epistemology a future in evolutionary biology.
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    Units and passages: A view for evolutionary biology and ecology (1987)
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    Biology and philosophy 2 (1987), S. 415-434 
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    Keywords: Units ; lineages ; evolution ; ecology ; hierarchy ; pluralism ; causality ; ontology ; species ; phylogeny
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    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Many authors, including paleobiologists, cladists and so on, adopt a nested hierarchical viewpoint to examine the relationships among different levels of biological organization. Furthermore, species are often considered to be unique entities in functioning evolutionary processes and one of the individuals forming a nested hierarchy. I have attempted to show that such a hierarchical view is inadequate in evolutionary biology. We should define units depending on what we are trying to explain. Units that play an important role in evolution and ecology do not necessarily form a nested hierarchy. Also the relationships among genealogies at different levels are not simply nested. I have attempted to distinguish the different characteristics of passages when they are used for different purposes of explanation. In my analysis, species and monophyletic taxa cannot be uniquely defined as single units that function in ecological and evolutionary processes. The view discussed in this paper may provide a more general basis for testing competing theories in evolution, and provide new insights for future empirical studies.
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    Entropy in evolution (1986)
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    Biology and philosophy 1 (1986), S. 5-24 
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    Keywords: Entropy ; evolution ; information ; thermodynamics
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Daniel R. Brooks and E. O. Wiley have proposed a theory of evolution in which fitness is merely a rate determining factor. Evolution is driven by non-equilibrium processes which increase the entropy and information content of species together. Evolution can occur without environmental selection, since increased complexity and organization result from the likely “capture” at the species level of random variations produced at the chemical level. Speciation can occur as the result of variation within the species which decreases the probability of sharing genetic information. Critics of the Brooks-Wiley theory argue that they have abused terminology from information theory and t thermodynamics. In this paper I review the essentials of the theory, and give an account of hierarchical physical information systems within which the theory can be interpreted. I then show how the major conceptual objections can be answered.
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    Charles Darwin's theory of evolution: A review of our present understanding (1986)
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    Biology and philosophy 1 (1986), S. 133-168 
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    Keywords: Darwin ; divergence ; evolution ; origin ; pangenesis ; selection ; species ; theory ; transmutation ; variation
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract The paper characterizes Darwin's theory, providing a synthesis of recent historical investigations in this area. Darwin's reading of Malthus led him to appreciate the importance of population pressures, and subsequently of natural selection, with the help of the “wedge” metaphor. But, in itself, natural selection did not furnish an adequate account of the origin of species, for which a principle of divergence was needed. Initially, Darwin attributed this to geographical isolation, but later, following his work on barnacles which underscored the significance of variation, and arising from his work on “botanical arithmetic,” he supposed that diversity allowed more “places” to be occupied in a given region. So isolation was not regarded as essential. Large regions with intense competition, and with ample variation spread by blending, would facilitate speciation. The notion of “place” was different from “niche,” and it is questioned whether Darwin's views on ecology were as modern as is commonly supposed. Two notions of “struggle” are found in Darwin's theory; and three notions of “variation.” Criticisms of his theory led him to emphasize the importance of “variation” over a range of forms. Hence the theory was “populational” rather than “typological.” The theory required a “Lamarckian” notion of inheritable changes initiated by the environment as a source of variation. Also, Darwin deployed a “use/habit” theory; and the notion of sexual selection. Selection normally acted at the level of the individual, though “kin selection” was possible. “Group selection” was hinted at for man. Darwin's thinking (and also the exposition of his theory) was generally guided by the domestic-organism analogy, which satisfied his methodological requirement of a vera causa principle.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00142899
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