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  • evolutionary ethics  (14)
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  • Philosophy  (14)
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  • Articles  (14)
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  • Springer  (14)
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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Adaptation and Moral Realism (2000)
    Springer
    Biology and philosophy 15 (2000), S. 699-712 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8404
    Keywords: evolutionary ethics ; moral realism ; naturalism ; teleosemantics
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Conventional wisdom has it that evolution makes a sham of morality, even if morality is an adaptation. I disagree. I argue that our best current adaptationist theory of meaning offers objective truth conditionsfor signaling systems of all sorts. The objectivity is, however, relative to species – specifically to the adaptive history of the signaling system in question. While evolution may not provide the kind of species independent objective standards that (e.g.) Kantians desire, this should be enough for the practical work of justifying our confidence in the objectivity of moral standards. If you believe morality is an adaptation, you should be a moral realist.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1006661726993
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Darwinian Ethics and Error (2000)
    Springer
    Biology and philosophy 15 (2000), S. 713-732 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8404
    Keywords: Darwin ; error theory ; ethics ; evolution ; evolutionary ethics ; Mackie ; naturalistic fallacy ; Ruse
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Suppose that the human tendency to think of certain actions andomissions as morally required – a notion that surely lies at the heart of moral discourse – is a trait that has been naturallyselected for. Many have thought that from this premise we canjustify or vindicate moral concepts. I argue that this is mistaken, and defend Michael Ruse's view that the moreplausible implication is an error theory – the idea thatmorality is an illusion foisted upon us by evolution. Thenaturalistic fallacy is a red herring in this debate,since there is really nothing that counts as a ‘fallacy’ at all. If morality is an illusion, it appears to followthat we should, upon discovering this, abolish moraldiscourse on pain of irrationality. I argue that thisconclusion is too hasty, and that we may be able usefullyto employ a moral discourse, warts and all, withoutbelieving in it.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1006742813396
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Woolcock, Ruse, Again (2000)
    Springer
    Biology and philosophy 15 (2000), S. 733-735 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8404
    Keywords: evolutionary ethics ; Ruse ; Ryan ; Woolcock
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract I summarize recent discussion in this journal and in Woolcock(1999) of the relevance of evolution to the question of thereality of moral rightness and wrongness. I show thata satisfactory version of Ruse-type evolutionaryethics has been adequately defended.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1006711232265
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    A Critique of R.D. Alexander's Views on Group Selection (1999)
    Springer
    Biology and philosophy 14 (1999), S. 431-449 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8404
    Keywords: altruism ; evolutionary ethics ; group selection ; human behavior ; moral systems ; multilevel selection ; R.D. Alexander ; superorganism
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Group selection is increasingly being viewed as an important force in human evolution. This paper examines the views of R.D. Alexander, one of the most influential thinkers about human behavior from an evolutionary perspective, on the subject of group selection. Alexander's general conception of evolution is based on the gene-centered approach of G.C. Williams, but he has also emphasized a potential role for group selection in the evolution of individual genomes and in human evolution. Alexander's views are internally inconsistent and underestimate the importance of group selection. Specific themes that Alexander has developed in his account of human evolution are important but are best understood within the framework of multilevel selection theory. From this perspective, Alexander's views on moral systems are not the radical departure from conventional views that he claims, but remain radical in another way more compatible with conventional views.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1006577511789
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Evolutionary Ethics: An Irresistible Temptation: Some Reflections on Paul Farber‘s The Temptation of Evolutionary Ethics (1997)
    Springer
    Biology and philosophy 12 (1997), S. 369-384 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8404
    Keywords: empathy ; evolutionary ethics ; naturalistic fallacy ; scientific naturalistic ethics
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract In his recent The Temptation of Evolutionary Ethics, Paul Farber has given a negative assessment of the last one hundred years of attempts in Anglo-American philosophy, beginning with Darwin, to develop an evolutionary ethics. Farber identifies some version of the naturalistic fallacy as one of the central sources for the failures of evolutionary ethics. For this reason, and others, Farber urges that though it has its attraction, evolutionary ethics is a temptation to be resisted. In this discussion I identify three major, historically relevant forms of the naturalistic fallacy, the (1) the deductive, (2) genetic, and (3) open question forms and argue that none of them pose an intrinsic problem for evolutionary ethics. I conclude that on this score at least there is no reason to resist temptation.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1006521926083
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  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    How a Kantian Can Accept Evolutionary Metaethics (1997)
    Springer
    Biology and philosophy 12 (1997), S. 303-326 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8404
    Keywords: altruism ; cognitivism ; ethics ; evolutionary ethics ; human sociobiology ; Kant ; Kantian ; metaethics ; morality ; non-cognitivism
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Contrary to widely held assumptions, an evolutionary metaethics need not be non-cognitivist. I define evolutionary metaethics as the claim that certain phenotypic traits expressing certain genes are both necessary and sufficient for explanation of all other phenotypic traits we consider morally significant. A review of the influential cognitivist Immanuel Kant‘s metaethics shows that much of his ethical theory is independent of the anti-naturalist metaphysics of transcendental idealism which itself is incompatible with evolutionary metaethics. By matching those independent aspects to an evolutionary metaethics a cognitivist Kantian evolutionary metaethical theory is a possibility for researchers to consider.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1006521907071
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  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    What Rationality Adds to Animal Morality (1997)
    Springer
    Biology and philosophy 12 (1997), S. 341-356 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8404
    Keywords: care ethics ; evolutionary ethics ; sociobiology
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Philosophical tradition demands rational reflection as a condition for genuine moral acts. But the grounds for that requirement are untenable, and when the requirement is dropped morality comes into clearer view as a naturally developing phenomenon that is not confined to human beings and does not require higher-level rational reflective processes. Rational consideration of rules and duties can enhance and extend moral behavior, but rationality is not necessary for morality and (contrary to the Kantian tradition represented by Thomas Nagel) morality cannot transcend its biological roots. Recognizing this helps forge a complementary rather than competitive relation between feminist care-based ethics and rationalistic duty-based ethics.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1006559328418
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  • 8
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Moral Darwinism: Ethical evidence for the descent of man (1995)
    Springer
    Biology and philosophy 10 (1995), S. 287-307 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8404
    Keywords: Charles Darwin ; Confirmation ; Descent of Man ; evidence ; evolutionary ethics ; human evolution ; Moral Darwinism
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Could an ethical theory ever play a substantial evidential role in a scientific argument for an empirical hypothesis? InThe Descent of Man, Darwin includes an extended discussion of the nature of human morality, and the ethical theory which he sketches is not simply developed as an interesting ramification of his theory of evolution, but is used as a key part of his evidence for human descent from animal ancestors. Darwin must rebut the argument that, because of our moral nature, humans are essentially different in kind from other animals and so had to have had a different origin. I trace his causal story of how the moral sense could develop out of social instincts by evolutionary mechanisms of group selection, and show that the form of Utilitarianism he proposes involves a radical reduction of the standard of value to the concept of biological fitness. I argue that this causal analysis, although a weakness from a normative standpoint, is a strength when judged for its intended purpose as part of an evidential argument to confirm the hypothesis of human descent.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00852470
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  • 9
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Evolutionary naturalistic justifications of morality: A matter of faith and works (1991)
    Springer
    Biology and philosophy 6 (1991), S. 341-349 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8404
    Keywords: Altruism ; evolutionary ethics ; naturalistic justification
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Robert Richards has presented a detailed defense of evolutionary ethics, a revised version of Darwin's views and a major modification of E. O. Wilson's. He contends that humans have evolved to seek the community welfare by acting altruistically. And since the community welfare is the highest moral good, humans ought to act altruistically. Richards asks us to take his empirical premises on faith and aims to show how they can justify an ethical conclusion. He identifies two necessary conditions for a naturalistic justification of morality (NJ): its premises (1) must be empirical and (2) concerned with morally relevant causal factors. I argue that these two conditions are insufficient. An NJ must also appeal to teleogical or teleonomic laws which identify proper effects and reliable causes of these effects. So I supplement biological faith with an NJ that I believe has a better chance of working since faith without works is dead.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00132236
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  • 10
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Really taking Darwin and the naturalistic fallacy seriously: An objection to Rottschaefer and Martinsen (1991)
    Springer
    Biology and philosophy 6 (1991), S. 433-437 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8404
    Keywords: Ethics ; evolution ; evolutionary ethics ; M. Ruse ; naturalistic fallacy ; supervenience
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Out of a concern to respect the naturalistic fallacy, Ruse (1986) argues for the possibility of causal, but not justificatory, explanations of morality in terms of evolutionary processes. In a discussion of Ruse's work, Rottschaefer and Martinsen (1990) claim that he erroneously limits the explanatory scope of evolutionary concepts, because he fails to see that one can have objective moral properties without committing either of two forms of the naturalistic fallacy, if one holds that moral properties supervene on non-moral properties. In this short paper I argue that Rottschaefer and Martinsen's solution fails. If one takes moral properties to supervene on non-moral properties, then either one ends up committing one of the two forms of the naturalistic fallacy or else one is left postulating unbelievable brute metaphysical facts.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00128712
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  • 11
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The insufficience of supervenient explanations of moral actions: Really taking Darwin and the naturalistic fallacy seriously (1991)
    Springer
    Biology and philosophy 6 (1991), S. 439-445 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8404
    Keywords: Ethics ; evolution ; evolutionary ethics ; M. Ruse ; naturalistic fallacy ; supervenience ; supervenience explanations
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract In a recent paper in this journal (Rottschaefer and Martinsen 1990) we have proposed a view of Darwinian evolutionary metaethics that we believe improves upon Michael Ruse's (e.g., Ruse 1986) proposals by claiming that there are evolutionary based objective moral values and that a Darwinian naturalistic account of the moral good in terms of human fitness can be given that avoids the naturalistic fallacy in both its definitional and derivational forms while providing genuine, even if limited, justifications for substantive ethical claims. Jonathan Barrett (this issue) has objected to our proposal contending that we cannot hold for the reality of supervenient moral properties without either falling foul of the naturalistic fallacy or suffering the consequences of postulating inexplicable moral properties. In reply, we show that Barrett's explicit arguments that we commit either the definitional or derivational form of the naturalistic fallacy fail and that his naturalistic intuitions that supervenience explanations of moral properties by nonmoral properties force us into what we call the explanatory form of the naturalistic fallacy also fail. Positively, his objections help us to clarify the nature of the naturalistic fallacy within an evolutionary based naturalistic ethics and to point out the proper role of both supervenience explanations and moral explanations in such an ethics.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00128713
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  • 12
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Really taking Darwin seriously: An alternative to Michael Ruse's Darwinian metaethics (1990)
    Springer
    Biology and philosophy 5 (1990), S. 149-173 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8404
    Keywords: Darwinian ethics ; ethics ; evolution ; evolutionary ethics ; M. Ruse ; naturalistic fallacy ; sociobiology
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Michael Ruse has proposed in his recent book Taking Darwin Seriously and elsewhere a new Darwinian ethics distinct from traditional evolutionary ethics, one that avoids the latter's inadequate accounts of the nature of morality and its failed attempts to provide a naturalistic justification of morality. Ruse argues for a sociobiologically based account of moral sentiments, and an evolutionary based casual explanation of their function, rejecting the possibility of ultimate ethical justification. We find that Ruse's proposal distorts, overextends and weakens both Darwinism and naturalism. So we propose an alternative Darwinian metaethics that both remedies the problems in Ruse's proposal and shows how a Darwinian naturalistic account of the moral good in terms of human fitness avoids the naturalistic fallacy and can provide genuine, even if limited, justifications for substantive ethical claims. Thus, we propose to really take Darwin seriously.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00127485
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  • 13
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Dutch objections to evolutionary ethics (1989)
    Springer
    Biology and philosophy 4 (1989), S. 331-343 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8404
    Keywords: Altruism ; C. Darwin ; evolution ; evolutionary ethics ; naturalistic fallacy ; Sociobiology
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02426631
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  • 14
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The biological roots of morality (1987)
    Springer
    Biology and philosophy 2 (1987), S. 235-252 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8404
    Keywords: Sociobiology ; evolutionary ethics ; ethical behavior ; norms of morality ; animal ethics
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract The question whether ethical behavior is biologically determined may refer either to thecapacity for ethics (e.i., the proclivity to judge human actions as either right or wrong), or to the moralnorms accepted by human beings for guiding their actions. My theses are: (1) that the capacity for ethics is a necessary attribute of human nature; and (2) that moral norms are products of cultural evolution, not of biological evolution. Humans exhibits ethical behavior by nature because their biological makeup determines the presence of the three necessary, and jointly sufficient, conditions for ethical behavior: (i) the ability to anticipate the consequences of one's own actions; (ii) the ability to make value judgements; and (iii) the ability to choose between alternative courses of action. Ethical behavior came about in evolution not because it is adaptive in itself, but as a necessary consequece of man's eminent intellectual abilities, which are an attribute directly promoted by natural selection. Since Darwin's time there have been evolutionists proposing that the norms of morality are derived from biological evolution. Sociobiologists represent the most recent and most subtle version of that proposal. The sociobiologists' argument is that human ethical norms are sociocultural correlates of behaviors fostered by biological evolution. I argue that such proposals are misguided and do not escape the naturalistic fallacy. The isomorphism between the behaviors promoted by natural selection and those sanctioned by moral norms exist only with respect to the consequences of the behaviors; the underlying causations are completely disparate.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00128831
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