Publication Date:
2014-10-17
Description:
Neo-Fregeans need their stipulation of Hume's Principle — $NxFx=NxGx \leftrightarrow \exists R (Fx \,1\hbox {-}1_R\, Gx)$ — to do two things. First, it must implicitly define the term-forming operator ‘ Nx ... x ...’, and second it must guarantee that Hume's Principle as a whole is true. I distinguish two senses in which the neo-Fregeans might ‘stipulate’ Hume's Principle, and argue that while one sort of stipulation fixes a meaning for ‘ Nx ... x ...’ and the other guarantees the truth of Hume's Principle, neither does both.
Print ISSN:
0031-8019
Electronic ISSN:
1744-6406
Topics:
Mathematics
,
Philosophy
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