Publication Date:
1981-03-27
Description:
Cooperation in organisms, whether bacteria or primates, has been a difficulty for evolutionary theory since Darwin. On the assumption that interactions between pairs of individuals occur on a probabilistic basis, a model is developed based on the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy in the context of the Prisoner's Dilemma game. Deductions from the model, and the results of a computer tournament show how cooperation based on reciprocity can get started in an asocial world, can thrive while interacting with a wide range of other strategies, and can resist invasion once fully established. Potential applications include specific aspects of territoriality, mating, and disease.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Notes: 〈/span〉Axelrod, R -- Hamilton, W D -- New York, N.Y. -- Science. 1981 Mar 27;211(4489):1390-6.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Record origin:〈/span〉 〈a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/7466396" target="_blank"〉PubMed〈/a〉
Keywords:
Animals
;
*Biological Evolution
;
*Cooperative Behavior
;
*Game Theory
;
Humans
;
Mathematics
;
Models, Biological
;
Selection, Genetic
Print ISSN:
0036-8075
Electronic ISSN:
1095-9203
Topics:
Biology
,
Chemistry and Pharmacology
,
Computer Science
,
Medicine
,
Natural Sciences in General
,
Physics
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