ALBERT

Description: The role played by the required level of statistical significance in the scientific method should not be seen as analogous to that played by the standard of proof in the legal process.

Description: The Supreme Court ruled in Matrixx that statistical significance is not necessary to show that a drug caused an adverse reaction. Five circuit court decisions holding otherwise preceded this decision. This paper examines the extent to which the Supreme Court’s reasoning differed from those of the circuit courts.

Description: Unlike the evaluation of single items of scientific evidence, the formal study and analysis of the joint evaluation of several distinct items of forensic evidence has to date received some punctual, rather than systematic, attention. Questions about the (i) relationships among a set of (usually unobservable) propositions and a set of (observable) items of scientific evidence, (ii) the joint probative value of a collection of distinct items of evidence as well as (iii) the contribution of each individual item within a given group of pieces of evidence still represent fundamental areas of research. To some degree, this is remarkable since both, forensic science theory and practice, yet many daily inference tasks, require the consideration of multiple items if not masses of evidence. A recurrent and particular complication that arises in such settings is that the application of probability theory, i.e. the reference method for reasoning under uncertainty, becomes increasingly demanding. The present paper takes this as a starting point and discusses graphical probability models, i.e. Bayesian networks, as framework within which the joint evaluation of scientific evidence can be approached in some viable way. Based on a review of existing main contributions in this area, the article here aims at presenting instances of real case studies from the author’s institution in order to point out the usefulness and capacities of Bayesian networks for the probabilistic assessment of the probative value of multiple and interrelated items of evidence. A main emphasis is placed on underlying general patterns of inference, their representation as well as their graphical probabilistic analysis. Attention is also drawn to inferential interactions, such as redundancy, synergy and directional change. These distinguish the joint evaluation of evidence from assessments of isolated items of evidence. Together, these topics present aspects of interest to both, domain experts and recipients of expert information, because they have bearing on how multiple items of evidence are meaningfully and appropriately set into context.

Description: In its first foray into the labyrinth that causation in personal injury has become, the U.K. Supreme Court recently held obiter that statistical evidence alone could not establish causation. But in an earlier toxic tort case, the High Court had relied on epidemiological evidence to identify a cluster of birth defects arising in the vicinity of a contaminated land site. This recent British experience is then discussed within the wider context of the forensic role of ‘naked statistics’.

Description: Scales of conclusion in forensic interpretation play an important role in the interface between scientific work at a forensic laboratory and different bodies of the jurisdictional system of a country. Of particular importance is the use of a unified scale that allows interpretation of different kinds of evidence in one common framework. The logical approach to forensic interpretation comprises the use of the likelihood ratio as a measure of evidentiary strength. While fully understood by forensic scientists, the likelihood ratio may be hard to interpret for a person not trained in natural sciences or mathematics. Translation of likelihood ratios to an ordinal scale including verbal counterparts of the levels is therefore a necessary procedure for communicating evidence values to the police and in the courtroom. In this paper, we present a method to develop an ordinal scale for the value of evidence that can be applied to any type of forensic findings. The method is built on probabilistic reasoning about the interpretation of findings and the number of scale levels chosen is a compromise between a pragmatic limit and mathematically well-defined distances between levels. The application of the unified scale is illustrated by a number of case studies.

Description: In personal injury litigation, claimants may seek their compensation for future losses or expenses as a lump sum that is determined by the product of a multiplicand and a multiplier. The multiplicand represents the annual loss in earnings and other benefits, as assessed at the trial date, while the multiplier discounts future pecuniary values into a single present-day lump sum amount. At present, multipliers in the UK are calculated using actuarial methods and based on assumed mortality and interest rates. However, it is entirely possible that these assumptions are incorrect, and if they are, then all claimants who rely on the same set of actuarial multipliers will be affected. In this article, we investigate how the uncertainty surrounding mortality and interest rate assumptions affects the precision of actuarial multipliers. With the aid of stochastic models, we estimate the possible range of values that an actuarial multiplier can take.

Description: In 2010, a ruling in the England and Wales Appeal Court quashed a conviction in a homicide case wherein the evidence rested heavily on the association of a shoe sole and a crime scene footwear mark. This decision addressed and criticized the use of the Bayesian approach and likelihood ratios for this form of evidence. The court’s comments and the values used by the footwear mark examiner as applied to his Bayesian evaluation and likelihood ratio are discussed. A contrast is drawn to this method versus the traditional footwear mark evaluation used by footwear examiners in the USA and most other countries.

Description: This article analyses and discusses issues that pertain to the choice of relevant databases for assigning values to the components of evaluative likelihood ratio procedures at source level. Although several formal likelihood ratio developments currently exist, both case practitioners and recipients of expert information (such as judiciary) may be reluctant to consider them as a framework for evaluating scientific evidence in context. The recent ruling R v T 1 and ensuing discussions in many forums provide illustrative examples for this. In particular, it is often felt that likelihood ratio-based reasoning amounts to an application that requires extensive quantitative information along with means for dealing with technicalities related to the algebraic formulation of these approaches. With regard to this objection, this article proposes two distinct discussions. In a first part, it is argued that, from a methodological point of view, there are additional levels of qualitative evaluation that are worth considering prior to focusing on particular numerical probability assignments. Analyses will be proposed that intend to show that, under certain assumptions, relative numerical values, as opposed to absolute values, may be sufficient to characterize a likelihood ratio for practical and pragmatic purposes. The feasibility of such qualitative considerations points out that the availability of hard numerical data is not a necessary requirement for implementing a likelihood ratio approach in practice. It is further argued that, even if numerical evaluations can be made, qualitative considerations may be valuable because they can further the understanding of the logical underpinnings of an assessment. In a second part, the article will draw a parallel to R v T by concentrating on a practical footwear mark case received at the authors' institute. This case will serve the purpose of exemplifying the possible usage of data from various sources in casework and help to discuss the difficulty associated with reconciling the depth of theoretical likelihood ratio developments and limitations in the degree to which these developments can actually be applied in practice.