Publication Date:
2012-04-17
Description:
Among naturalist philosophers, both defenders and opponents of moral relativism argue that prescriptive moral theories (or normative theories) should be constrained by empirical findings about human psychology. Empiricists have asked if people are or can be moral relativists, and what effect being a moral relativist can have on an individual’s moral functioning. This research is underutilized in philosophers’ normative theories of relativism; at the same time, the empirical work, while useful, is conceptually disjointed. Our goal is to integrate philosophical and empirical work on constraints on normative relativism. First, we present a working definition of moral relativism. Second, we outline naturalist versions of normative relativism, and third, we highlight the empirical constraints in this reasoning. Fourth, we discuss recent studies in moral psychology that are relevant for the philosophy of moral relativism. We assess here what conclusions for moral relativism can and cannot be drawn from experimental studies. Finally, we suggest how moral philosophers and moral psychologists can collaborate on the topic of moral relativism in the future. Content Type Journal Article Pages 95-113 DOI 10.1007/s10539-011-9270-6 Authors Katinka J. P. Quintelier, Department of Philosophy and Moral Sciences and Research Unit ‘The Moral Brain’, Ghent University, Blandijnberg 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium Daniel M. T. Fessler, Department of Anthropology and Center for Behavior, Evolution & Culture, University of California, Los Angeles, 375 Portola Plaza, 341 Haines Hall, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1553, USA Journal Biology and Philosophy Online ISSN 1572-8404 Print ISSN 0169-3867 Journal Volume Volume 27 Journal Issue Volume 27, Number 1
Print ISSN:
0169-3867
Electronic ISSN:
1572-8404
Topics:
Biology
,
Philosophy
Permalink