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  • Articles  (1,186)
  • Elsevier  (1,186)
  • Blackwell Publishing Ltd
  • International Union of Crystallography
  • Taylor & Francis
  • 2020-2024  (16)
  • 2015-2019  (587)
  • 2010-2014  (311)
  • 2000-2004  (272)
  • 1960-1964
  • Journal of Environmental Economics and Management  (171)
  • Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. 2000; 39(1): 1-38. Published 2000 Jan 01. doi: 10.1006/jeem.1999.1089.  (1)
  • Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. 2000; 39(1): 117-119. Published 2000 Jan 01. doi: 10.1006/jeem.1999.1106.  (1)
  • Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. 2000; 39(1): 39-66. Published 2000 Jan 01. doi: 10.1006/jeem.1999.1090.  (1)
  • Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. 2000; 39(1): 67-96. Published 2000 Jan 01. doi: 10.1006/jeem.1999.1093.  (1)
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  • Economics  (1,186)
  • Natural Sciences in General
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  • Articles  (1,186)
Source
Publisher
  • Elsevier  (1,186)
  • Blackwell Publishing Ltd
  • International Union of Crystallography
  • Taylor & Francis
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  • 1
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    Tying enforcement to prices in emissions markets: An experimental evaluation (2019)
    Elsevier
    Details
    Publication Date: 2019
    Description: 〈p〉Publication date: Available online 9 July 2019〈/p〉 〈p〉〈b〉Source:〈/b〉 Journal of Environmental Economics and Management〈/p〉 〈p〉Author(s): John K. Stranlund, James J. Murphy, John M. Spraggon, Nikolaos Zirogiannis〈/p〉 〈div xml:lang="en"〉 〈h5〉Abstract〈/h5〉 〈div〉〈p〉We present results from laboratory emissions permit markets designed to investigate the transmission of abatement cost risk to firms' compliance behavior and regulatory enforcement strategies. With a fixed expected marginal penalty, abatement cost shocks produced significant violations and emissions volatility as predicted. Tying the monitoring probability to average permit prices effectively eliminated noncompliance, but transmitted abatement cost risk to monitoring effort. Tying the penalty to average prices reduced violations, but did not eliminate them. Some individuals in these treatments sold permits at low prices, presumably in an attempt to weaken enforcement. While tying sanctions directly to prevailing permit prices has theoretical and practical advantages over tying monitoring to prices, our results suggest that tying sanctions to prices may not be as effective as predicted without additional modifications.〈/p〉〈/div〉 〈/div〉
    Print ISSN: 0095-0696
    Electronic ISSN: 1096-0449
    Topics: Energy, Environment Protection, Nuclear Power Engineering , Economics
    Published by Elsevier
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  • 2
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    The real effect of legal institutions: Environmental courts and firm environmental protection expenditure (2019)
    Elsevier
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    Publication Date: 2019
    Description: 〈p〉Publication date: November 2019〈/p〉 〈p〉〈b〉Source:〈/b〉 Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Volume 98〈/p〉 〈p〉Author(s): Qi Zhang, Zhi Yu, Dongmin Kong〈/p〉 〈div xml:lang="en"〉 〈h5〉Abstract〈/h5〉 〈div〉〈p〉This paper evaluates the real effects of environmental justice reform on environmental governance at the firm level. Using the establishment of environmental courts in China as a quasi-natural experiment, our difference-in-differences estimation shows that: (1) environmental courts significantly enhance environmental investment by firms, and this relationship is robust to different specifications and alternative measures; (2) three possible channels are the improved levels of justice and enforcement of environmental protection, and the mitigation of local government intervention; (3) our findings are particularly pronounced in subsamples with severe local protectionism, state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and non-SOEs with political connections; (4) at the city-level, environmental courts significantly increase air quality and promote cities to cross the inflection point of the environmental Kuznets curve earlier. Overall, this paper reveals the micro-mechanisms behind the real effects of environmental justice on firm environmental investment, thus providing timely implications for regulators concerned with environmental protection.〈/p〉〈/div〉 〈/div〉
    Print ISSN: 0095-0696
    Electronic ISSN: 1096-0449
    Topics: Energy, Environment Protection, Nuclear Power Engineering , Economics
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  • 3
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    Estimating the effect of air pollution on road safety using atmospheric temperature inversions (2019)
    Elsevier
    Details
    Publication Date: 2019
    Description: 〈p〉Publication date: November 2019〈/p〉 〈p〉〈b〉Source:〈/b〉 Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Volume 98〈/p〉 〈p〉Author(s): Lutz Sager〈/p〉 〈div xml:lang="en"〉 〈h5〉Abstract〈/h5〉 〈div〉〈p〉Does air quality influence road safety? We estimate the effect of increased air pollution on the number of road traffic accidents in the United Kingdom between 2009 and 2014. To address concerns of spurious correlation we exploit atmospheric temperature inversions as a source of plausibly exogenous variation in daily air pollution levels. We find an increase of 0.3–0.6% in the number of vehicles involved in accidents per day for each additional 1 μg/m〈sup〉3〈/sup〉 of 〈em〉PM〈/em〉〈sub〉2.5〈/sub〉. The finding suggests that less safe roads may present a large and previously overlooked cost of air pollution. The results are robust to a number of specifications and across various sub-samples.〈/p〉〈/div〉 〈/div〉
    Print ISSN: 0095-0696
    Electronic ISSN: 1096-0449
    Topics: Energy, Environment Protection, Nuclear Power Engineering , Economics
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  • 4
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    The price of innovation: An analysis of the marginal cost of green buildings (2019)
    Elsevier
    Details
    Publication Date: 2019
    Description: 〈p〉Publication date: November 2019〈/p〉 〈p〉〈b〉Source:〈/b〉 Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Volume 98〈/p〉 〈p〉Author(s): Andrea Chegut, Piet Eichholtz, Nils Kok〈/p〉 〈div xml:lang="en"〉 〈h5〉Abstract〈/h5〉 〈div〉〈p〉Energy efficiency plays an important role in reducing the carbon externality from buildings, but economic analyses of more efficient, green building have thus far ignored input costs. This paper finds that the average marginal cost of green-labeled construction projects is smaller than the value premiums documented in the literature. However, design fees, representing just a fraction of development costs but paid largely up-front, are significantly higher for green construction projects. These projects also take longer to complete. The results provide some insight into the market barriers and market failures that may explain the relatively slow adoption of otherwise economically rational green construction practices.〈/p〉〈/div〉 〈/div〉
    Print ISSN: 0095-0696
    Electronic ISSN: 1096-0449
    Topics: Energy, Environment Protection, Nuclear Power Engineering , Economics
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  • 5
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    The ecological insurance trap (2019)
    Elsevier
    Details
    Publication Date: 2019
    Description: 〈p〉Publication date: November 2019〈/p〉 〈p〉〈b〉Source:〈/b〉 Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Volume 98〈/p〉 〈p〉Author(s): Kevin Berry, Eli P. Fenichel, Brian E. Robinson〈/p〉 〈div xml:lang="en"〉 〈h5〉Abstract〈/h5〉 〈div〉〈p〉Common pool resources often insure individual livelihoods against the collapse of private endeavors. When endeavors based on private and common pool resources are interconnected, investment in one can put the other at risk. We model Senegalese pastoralists who choose whether to grow crops, a private activity, or raise livestock on common pool pastureland. Livestock can increase the likelihood of locust outbreaks via ecological processes related to grassland degradation. Locust outbreaks damage crops, but not livestock, which are used for savings and insurance. We show the incentive to self-protect (reduce grazing pressure) or self-insure (increase livestock levels) changes with various property rights schemes and levels of ecological detail. If the common pool nature of insurance exacerbates the ecological externality even fully-informed individuals may make risk management decisions that increase the probability of catastrophe, creating an “insurance trap.”〈/p〉〈/div〉 〈/div〉
    Print ISSN: 0095-0696
    Electronic ISSN: 1096-0449
    Topics: Energy, Environment Protection, Nuclear Power Engineering , Economics
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  • 6
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    Partnerships to prevent deforestation in the Amazon (2018)
    Elsevier
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    Publication Date: 2018
    Description: 〈p〉Publication date: November 2018〈/p〉 〈p〉〈b〉Source:〈/b〉 Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Volume 92〈/p〉 〈p〉Author(s): Suhyun Jung, Stephen Polasky〈/p〉 〈div xml:lang="en"〉 〈h5〉Abstract〈/h5〉 〈div〉〈p〉Environmental protection, even with strong environmental laws on the books, often fails in developing countries because of limited government ability to monitor and enforce environmental laws. An alternative route to government monitoring and enforcement involves partnerships with private firms and non-governmental organizations. In this paper, we evaluate the performance of the Responsible Soy Project, a partnership between Cargill and The Nature Conservancy, to curb deforestation following the opening of a new soybean export facility in the Brazilian Amazon. We find that the project significantly decreased deforestation rates in properties enrolled in the project, despite its late arrival two years after the opening of the export facility. Theoretical predictions and empirical results show that the impacts of the project were greater on smaller properties that are more likely to be credit-constrained, and on properties initially not in compliance with Brazil's Forest Code that faced binding constraints on deforestation.〈/p〉〈/div〉 〈/div〉
    Print ISSN: 0095-0696
    Electronic ISSN: 1096-0449
    Topics: Energy, Environment Protection, Nuclear Power Engineering , Economics
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  • 7
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    Environmental policy when consumers value conformity (2018)
    Elsevier
    Details
    Publication Date: 2018
    Description: 〈p〉Publication date: Available online 20 September 2018〈/p〉 〈p〉〈b〉Source:〈/b〉 Journal of Environmental Economics and Management〈/p〉 〈p〉Author(s): Alistair Ulph, David Ulph〈/p〉 〈div xml:lang="en"〉 〈h5〉Abstract〈/h5〉 〈div〉〈p〉We present a model of consumer behaviour when consumers value conformity and examine the implications for environmental policy. The model shares a feature set out in Dasgupta et al. (2016) of having a structure of preferences for conformity which induces a mass of consumers to adhere exactly to a norm level of consumption (clumping). However we extend our previous analysis by analysing the conditions for the existence and potential uniqueness of consumption norms. In doing so we introduce threshold effects whereby individuals adhere to a norm only if sufficiently many others do so. Taken together these have striking implications for environmental policy in the case where the norm good generates pollution emissions. Clumping means many individuals will not change behaviour unless the norm changes while threshold effects plus clumping means that it may be hard to change a norm. We show that the use of Pigovian taxes to control behaviour may be either ineffective or welfare reducing, and that the optimal Pigovian tax will work only if it is above some threshold level. There are parameter values for which quantity-based injunctive policies raise welfare relative to no intervention while optimal Pigovian taxes would lower welfare.〈/p〉〈/div〉 〈/div〉
    Print ISSN: 0095-0696
    Electronic ISSN: 1096-0449
    Topics: Energy, Environment Protection, Nuclear Power Engineering , Economics
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  • 8
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    Strategic decentralization and the provision of global public goods (2018)
    Elsevier
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    Publication Date: 2018
    Description: 〈p〉Publication date: November 2018〈/p〉 〈p〉〈b〉Source:〈/b〉 Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Volume 92〈/p〉 〈p〉Author(s): Renaud Foucart, Cheng Wan〈/p〉 〈h5〉Abstract〈/h5〉 〈div〉〈p〉We study strategic decentralization in the provision of a global public good. A federation, with the aim of maximizing the aggregate utility of its members, may find it advantageous to decentralize the decision-making, so that its members act autonomously to maximize their own utility. If utility is fully transferable within a federation, the larger a federation is or the more sensitive it is to the public good, the more it has incentives to remain centralized. If an overall increase in the sensitivity to the public good induces some federation(s) to decentralize, it may lead to a decrease in the aggregate provision. With non-transferable utility within a federation, those members that are smaller or less sensitive to the public good are more likely to prefer decentralization. Some members within a federation becoming more sensitive to the public good may thus lead to a lower aggregate provision, because the increased heterogeneity of the federation makes it more inclined to decentralize.〈/p〉〈/div〉
    Print ISSN: 0095-0696
    Electronic ISSN: 1096-0449
    Topics: Energy, Environment Protection, Nuclear Power Engineering , Economics
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  • 9
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    Spatial effects and strategic behavior in a multiregional transboundary pollution dynamic game (2018)
    Elsevier
    Details
    Publication Date: 2018
    Description: 〈p〉Publication date: Available online 12 August 2017〈/p〉 〈p〉〈b〉Source:〈/b〉 Journal of Environmental Economics and Management〈/p〉 〈p〉Author(s): Javier de Frutos, Guiomar Martín-Herrán〈/p〉 〈h5〉Abstract〈/h5〉 〈div〉〈p〉We analyze a transboundary pollution differential game where pollution control is spatially distributed among a number of agents with predetermined spatial relationships. The analysis emphasizes, first, the effects of the different geographical relationships among decision makers; and second, the strategic behaviour of the agents. The dynamic game considers a pollution stock (the state variable) distributed among one large region divided in subregions which control their own emissions of pollutants. The emissions are also represented as distributed variables. The dynamics of the pollution stock is defined by a parabolic partial differential equation. We numerically characterize the feedback Nash equilibrium of a discrete-space model that still captures the spatial interactions among agents. We evaluate the impact of the strategic and spatially dynamic behaviour of the agents on the design of equilibrium environmental policies.〈/p〉〈/div〉
    Print ISSN: 0095-0696
    Electronic ISSN: 1096-0449
    Topics: Energy, Environment Protection, Nuclear Power Engineering , Economics
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  • 10
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    Optimal geoengineering experiments (2018)
    Elsevier
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    Publication Date: 2018
    Description: 〈p〉Publication date: November 2018〈/p〉 〈p〉〈b〉Source:〈/b〉 Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Volume 92〈/p〉 〈p〉Author(s): Lassi Ahlvik, Antti Iho〈/p〉 〈div xml:lang="en"〉 〈h5〉Abstract〈/h5〉 〈div〉〈p〉We characterize optimal investment in pollution control measures with uncertain effects that can be learned by experimentation. The anticipation of learning through experimentation introduces two effects. The Inquisitive Effect appears because the planner wants to invest in geoengineering to gather socially valuable information on its effects. This effect encourages investments in geoengineering and may justify field tests even where the expected benefits fall short of the costs. The Flexibility Effect stems from the planner optimally preparing for the post-learning stage, where the field test is either ramped up or scaled down, depending on the outcome of the experiment. This effect can encourage or discourage investments in geoengineering. We demonstrate this set-up through an economic analysis of an artificial oxygenation scheme designed to mitigate eutrophication in the Baltic Sea and find that while the expected marginal benefit falls short of costs, a field test representing some 10 percent of full deployment would be optimal.〈/p〉〈/div〉 〈/div〉
    Print ISSN: 0095-0696
    Electronic ISSN: 1096-0449
    Topics: Energy, Environment Protection, Nuclear Power Engineering , Economics
    Published by Elsevier
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