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  • 1
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Springer
    Minds and machines 1 (1991), S. 167-184 
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Schlagwort(e): Connectionism ; eliminativism ; propositional attitudes ; representation ; symbols
    Quelle: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Thema: Informatik , Philosophie
    Notizen: Abstract Ramsey, Stich and Garon's recent paper ‘Connectionism, Eliminativism, and the Future of Folk Psychology’ claims a certain style of connectionism to be the final nail in the coffin of folk psychology. I argue that their paper fails to show this, and that the style of connectionism they illustrate can in fact supplement, rather than compete with, the claims of a theory of cognition based in folk psychology's ontology. Ramsey, Stich and Garon's argument relies on the lack of easily identifiable symbols inside the connectionist network they discuss, and they suggest that the existence of a system which behaves in a cognitively interesting way, but which cannot be explained by appeal to internal symbol processing, falsifies central assumptions of folk psychology. My claim is that this argument is flawed, and that the theorist need not discard folk psychology in order to accept that the network illustrated exhibits cognitively interesting behaviour, even if it is conceded that symbols cannot be readily identified within the network.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    Standort Signatur Erwartet Verfügbarkeit
    BibTip Andere fanden auch interessant ...
  • 2
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Springer
    Journal for general philosophy of science 22 (1991), S. 321-336 
    ISSN: 1572-8587
    Schlagwort(e): functionalism ; intentionality ; simulation ; mental state
    Quelle: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Thema: Philosophie , Wissenschaftskunde und Wissenschaftsorganisation, Hochschul- und Universitätswesen, Museumswissenschaft
    Notizen: Summary Searle claims that for a machine to have intentional states it is not sufficient that a formal programme be instantiated. Various types of objections to this claim have been brought up by Searle's critics. Searle's replies to some of these objections are analysed. It turns out that it is more to these objections than Searle wants to make us believe. What is crucial, however, is that Searle's „Gedankenexperiment“ results in a dilemma. At the outset of the dilemma there are two ways of not understanding. According to one of these ways a person (Searle's homunculus) does not understand something without knowing that s/he does not understand. While in the other mode the person knows that s/he doesn't understand. In the first case the inference from facts about the homunculus to facts about the computer is not valid whereas in the second case one would attribute mental states to the computer. Thereby Searle's claim turns out to be unfounded.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    Standort Signatur Erwartet Verfügbarkeit
    BibTip Andere fanden auch interessant ...
  • 3
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Springer
    Minds and machines 1 (1991), S. 321-341 
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Schlagwort(e): Cognitive architecture ; computationalism ; Connectionism ; implementation ; inference to the best explanation ; Language of Thought
    Quelle: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Thema: Informatik , Philosophie
    Notizen: Abstract Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988) have argued that the cognitive architecture is not Connectionist. Their argument takes the following form: (1) the cognitive architecture is Classical; (2) Classicalism and Connectionism are incompatible; (3) therefore the cognitive architecture is not Connectionist. In this essay I argue that Fodor and Pylyshyn's defenses of (1) and (2) are inadequate. Their argument for (1), based on their claim that Classicalism best explains the systematicity of cognitive capacities, is an invalid instance of inference to the best explanation. And their argument for (2) turns out to be question-begging. The upshot is that, while Fodor and Pylyshyn have presented Connectionists with the important empirical challenge of explaining systematicity, they have failed to provide sufficient reason for inferring that the cognitive architecture is Classical and not Connectionist.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    Standort Signatur Erwartet Verfügbarkeit
    BibTip Andere fanden auch interessant ...
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