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  • Articles  (6)
  • Defeasible reasoning  (3)
  • Connectionism  (2)
  • functionalism
  • 1990-1994  (6)
  • 1970-1974
  • 1960-1964
  • 1991  (6)
  • Philosophy  (6)
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  • Articles  (6)
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  • 1990-1994  (6)
  • 1970-1974
  • 1960-1964
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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Connectionism isn't magic (1991)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 1 (1991), S. 167-184 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Connectionism ; eliminativism ; propositional attitudes ; representation ; symbols
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Ramsey, Stich and Garon's recent paper ‘Connectionism, Eliminativism, and the Future of Folk Psychology’ claims a certain style of connectionism to be the final nail in the coffin of folk psychology. I argue that their paper fails to show this, and that the style of connectionism they illustrate can in fact supplement, rather than compete with, the claims of a theory of cognition based in folk psychology's ontology. Ramsey, Stich and Garon's argument relies on the lack of easily identifiable symbols inside the connectionist network they discuss, and they suggest that the existence of a system which behaves in a cognitively interesting way, but which cannot be explained by appeal to internal symbol processing, falsifies central assumptions of folk psychology. My claim is that this argument is flawed, and that the theorist need not discard folk psychology in order to accept that the network illustrated exhibits cognitively interesting behaviour, even if it is conceded that symbols cannot be readily identified within the network.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00361035
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    On nonmonotonic reasoning with the method of sweeping presumptions (1991)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 1 (1991), S. 393-416 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Defeasible reasoning ; nonmonotonic reasoning ; default reasoning ; nonmonotonic logic ; logic
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Reasoning almost always occurs in the face of incomplete information. Such reasoning is nonmonotonic in the sense that conclusions drawn may later be withdrawn when additional information is obtained. There is an active literature on the problem of modeling such nonmonotonic reasoning, yet no category of method-let alone a single method-has been broadly accepted as the right approach. This paper introduces a new method, called sweeping presumptions, for modeling nonmonotonic reasoning. The main goal of the paper is to provide an example-driven, nontechnical introduction to the method of sweeping presumptions, and thereby to make it plausible that sweeping presumptions can usefully be applied to the problems of nonmonotonic reasoning. The paper discusses a representative sample of examples that have appeared in the literature on nonmonotonic reasoning, and discusses them from the point of view of sweeping presumptions.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00352917
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Searles Kritik am Funktionalismus — Eine Untersuchung des Chinesischzimmers (1991)
    Springer
    Journal for general philosophy of science 22 (1991), S. 321-336 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8587
    Keywords: functionalism ; intentionality ; simulation ; mental state
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Philosophy , Nature of Science, Research, Systems of Higher Education, Museum Science
    Notes: Summary Searle claims that for a machine to have intentional states it is not sufficient that a formal programme be instantiated. Various types of objections to this claim have been brought up by Searle's critics. Searle's replies to some of these objections are analysed. It turns out that it is more to these objections than Searle wants to make us believe. What is crucial, however, is that Searle's „Gedankenexperiment“ results in a dilemma. At the outset of the dilemma there are two ways of not understanding. According to one of these ways a person (Searle's homunculus) does not understand something without knowing that s/he does not understand. While in the other mode the person knows that s/he doesn't understand. In the first case the inference from facts about the homunculus to facts about the computer is not valid whereas in the second case one would attribute mental states to the computer. Thereby Searle's claim turns out to be unfounded.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01801213
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Defeasible reasoning and logic programming (1991)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 1 (1991), S. 417-436 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Defeasible reasoning ; entailment ; justification ; logic programming
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract The general conditions of epistemic defeat are naturally represented through the interplay of two distinct kinds of entailment, deductive and defeasible. Many of the current approaches to modeling defeasible reasoning seek to define defeasible entailment via model-theoretic notions like truth and satisfiability, which, I argue, fails to capture this fundamental distinction between truthpreserving and justification-preserving entailments. I present an alternative account of defeasible entailment and show how logic programming offers a paradigm in which the distinction can be captured, allowing for the modeling of a larger range of types of defeat. This is possible through a natural extension of the declarative and procedural semantics of Horn clauses.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00352918
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Fodor and Pylyshyn on connectionism (1991)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 1 (1991), S. 321-341 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Cognitive architecture ; computationalism ; Connectionism ; implementation ; inference to the best explanation ; Language of Thought
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988) have argued that the cognitive architecture is not Connectionist. Their argument takes the following form: (1) the cognitive architecture is Classical; (2) Classicalism and Connectionism are incompatible; (3) therefore the cognitive architecture is not Connectionist. In this essay I argue that Fodor and Pylyshyn's defenses of (1) and (2) are inadequate. Their argument for (1), based on their claim that Classicalism best explains the systematicity of cognitive capacities, is an invalid instance of inference to the best explanation. And their argument for (2) turns out to be question-begging. The upshot is that, while Fodor and Pylyshyn have presented Connectionists with the important empirical challenge of explaining systematicity, they have failed to provide sufficient reason for inferring that the cognitive architecture is Classical and not Connectionist.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00351183
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  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The epistemic basis of defeasible reasoning (1991)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 1 (1991), S. 437-458 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Defeasible reasoning ; default reasoning ; nonmonotonic reasoning ; epistemology ; closed world assumption
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract This article argues that: (i) Defeasible reasoning is the use of distinctive procedures for belief revision when new evidence or new authoritative judgment is interpolated into a system of beliefs about an application domain. (ii) These procedures can be explicated and implemented using standard higher-order logic combined with epistemic assumptions about the system of beliefs. The procedures mentioned in (i) depend on the explication in (ii), which is largely described in terms of a Prolog program, EVID, which implements a system for interactive, defeasible reasoning when combined with an application knowledge base. It is shown that defeasible reasoning depends on a meta-level Closed World Assumption applied to the relationship between supporting evidence and a defeasible conclusion based on this evidence. Thesis (i) is then further defended by showing that the EVID explication of defeasible reasoning has sufficient representational power to cover a wide variety of practical applications of defeasible reasoning, especially in the context of decision making.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00352919
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