ALBERT

Description: The objectives of the Space Shuttle PRA (Probabilistic Risk Assessment) are to: (1) evaluate mission risks; (2) evaluate uncertainties and sensitivities; (3) prioritize contributors; (4) evaluate upgrades; (5) track risks; and (6) provide decision tools. This report discusses the significance of a Space Shuttle PRA and its participants. The elements and type of losses to be included are discussed. The program and probabilistic approaches are then discussed.

Description: Formaldehyde presents a significant challenge to maintaining cabin air quality on board crewed spacecraft. Generation sources include offgassing from a variety of non-metallic materials as well as human metabolism. Because generation sources are pervasive and human health can be affected by continual exposure to low concentrations, toxicology and air quality control engineering experts jointly identified formaldehyde as a key compound to be monitored as part the International Space Station's (ISS) environmental health monitoring and maintenance program. Data acquired from in-flight air quality monitoring methods are the basis for assessing the cabin environment's suitability for long-term habitation and monitoring the performance of passive and active controls that are in place to minimize crew exposure. Formaldehyde concentration trends and dynamics served in the ISS cabin atmosphere are reviewed implications to present and future flight operations discussed.

Description: We articulated the safety hierarchy a little over two years ago, as part of our quest to be the nation s leader in safety and occupational health, and in the safety of the products and services we provide. The safety hierarchy stresses that we are all accountable for assuring that our programs, projects, and operations do not impact safety or health for the public, astronauts and pilots, employees on the ground, and high-value equipment and property. When people are thinking about doing things safely, they re also thinking about doing things right. And for the past couple of years, we ve had some pretty good results. In the time since the failures of the Mars 98 missions that occurred in late 1999, every NASA spacecraft launch has met the success objectives, and every Space Shuttle mission has safely and successfully met all mission objectives. Now I can t say that NASA s safety program is solely responsible for these achievements, but, as we like to say, "mission success starts with safety." In the future, looking forward, we will continue to make spaceflight even safer. That is NASA s vision. That is NASA s duty to both those who will travel into space and the American people who will make the journey possible.

Description: It has been 29 months since Columbia was lost over East Texas in February 2003. Seven months after the accident, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) released the first volume of its final report, citing a variety of technical, managerial, and cultural issues within NASA and the Space Shuttle Program. To their credit, NASA offered few excuses, embraced the report, and set about correcting the deficiencies noted by the accident board. Of the 29 recommendations issued by the CAIB, 15 were deemed critical enough that the accident board believed they should be implemented prior to returning the Space Shuttle to flight. Some of these recommendations were relatively easy, most were straightforward, a few bordered on the impossible, and others were largely overcome by events, particularly the decision by the President to retire the Space Shuttle by 2010. The Return to Flight Task Group (RTF TG, or simply, the Task Group) was chartered by the NASA Administrator in July 2003 to provide an independent assessment of the implementation of the 15 CAIB return-to-flight recommendations. An important observation must be stated up-front: neither the CAIB nor the RTF TG believes that all risk can be eliminated from Space Shuttle operations; nor do we believe that the Space Shuttle is inherently unsafe. What the CAIB and RTF TG do believe, however, is that NASA and the American public need to understand the risks associated with space travel, and that NASA must make every reasonable effort to minimize such risk. Since the release of the CAIB report, NASA and the Space Shuttle Program expended enormous effort and resources toward correcting the causes of the accident and preparing to fly again. Relative to the 15 specific recommendations that the CAIB indicated should be implemented prior to returning to flight, NASA has met or exceeded most of them the Task Group believes that NASA met the intent of the CAIB for 12 of these recommendations. The remaining three recommendations were so challenging that NASA could not comply completely with the intent of the CAIB.

Description: The first NASA experiments reached ISS in September 2000, a very modest beginning to what later became a more robust, diverse and overall highly successful research program, continuing essentially uninterrupted since March 2001. Along the way, several major challenges had to be overcome. First, there were delays in the initial construction of the station. Second, maintenance of the station exceeded earlier assumptions resulting in less crew time being available for research. Third, the lengthy interruption of Shuttle flights after the Columbia accident significantly, but temporarily, reduced the research traffic to and from ISS. And fourth, the Vision of Space Exploration as caused a refocusing of NASA's research efforts on ISS from a multi-disciplinary basic and applied science program to one dedicated to solving the critical questions to enable exploration missions. The principal factors that allowed these challenges to be overcome have been flexibility and cooperation. Flexibility on the part of the ISS Program to minimize impacts to research from delays and resource bottlenecks, flexibility on the part of researchers to adapt their research to changing environments, and flexibility to be able to use existing and planned facilities not only for their original basic science purpose but also for new applications. And cooperation not only between the ISS Program and the research community, but also among NASA and its International Partners to continually strive to optimize the research conducted aboard ISS. Once the challenges were overcome, the research program has been remarkably successful, with an expanding on-orbit capability. Over 80 investigations have been completed, many resulting in publications.

Description: The International Space Station (ISS) Program initially implemented safety requirements in a series of bilateral agreements between NASA and each International Partner. As the program matured and multilateral processes began to be developed, the differences between these bilaterally agreed requirement sets became more significant. Efforts to develop multilateral safety requirements were hampered for many reasons including assessment of national standards used in the bilateral agreements, requirements baselines for existing contracts, and resource limitations to address requirements changes late in the development and operations phases. To avoid similar requirements issues in the future, international safety requirements need to be developed for human spaceflight. This paper will provide the background of the ISS bilateral Safety and Mission Assurance requirements and processes, describe the activities to develop multilateral safety requirements and processes, and give examples of issues that were encountered. Further, the paper will make recommendations regarding the development of international safety requirements for human spaceflight and the safety topics to be addressed.

Description: Repairing damaged thermal protection system tile requires the Space Shuttle to be oriented such that repair platform access from the International Space Station (ISS) is possible. To do this, the Space Shuttle uses the Orbiter Repair Maneuver (ORM), which utilizes the Shuttle Remote Manipulator System (SRMS) to rotate the Space Shuttle in relation to the ISS, for extended periods of time. These positions cause difficulties and challenges to performing a safe separation (no collision or thruster plume damage to sensitive ISS structures) should an inadvertent release occur or a contingency procedure require it. To help protect for an SRMS failure or other failures, a method for separating without collision and the ability to redock to ISS from the ORM configuration was needed. The contingency ORM separation solution elegantly takes advantage of orbital mechanics between ISS and the separating Space Shuttle. By pitching the ISS down approximately 45 degrees, in a majority of the ORM repair positions, the altitude difference between the ISS and Space Shuttle center of gravity is maximized. This altitude difference results in different orbital energies (orbital periods) causing objects to separate from each other without requiring translational firings. Using this method, a safe contingency ORM separation is made possible in many odd positions even though some separation positions point high powered thrusters directly at fragile ISS and Soyuz solar arrays. Documented in this paper are the development simulations and procedures of the contingency ORM separation and the challenges encountered with large constraints to work around. Lastly, a method of returning to redock with the ISS to pick up the stranded crew members (or transfer the final crew members) is explained as well as the thruster and ISS loads analysis.

Description: USA-SRB Element is responsible for the assembly and refurbishment of the non-motor components of the SRB as part of Space Shuttle. Thrust Vector Control (TVC) frames structurally support components of the TVC system located in the aft skirt of the SRB. TVC frames are exposed to the seacoast environment after refurbishment and, also, to seawater immersion after splashdown, and during tow-back to CCAFS-Hangar AF refurbishment facilities. During refurbishment operations it was found that numerous TVC frames were experiencing internal corrosion and coating failures, both from salt air and seawater intrusions. Inspectors using borescopes would visually examine the internal cavities of the complicated aluminum alloy welded tubular structure. It was very difficult for inspectors to examine cavity corners and tubing intersections and particularly, to determine the extent of the corrosion and coating anomalies. Physical access to TVC frame internal cavities for corrosion removal and coating repair was virtually impossible, and an improved method using a Liquid (water based) Vapor-phase Corrosion Inhibitor (LVCI) for preventing initiation of new corrosion, and mitigating and/or stopping existing corrosion growth was recommended in lieu of hazardous paint solvents and high VOC/solvent based corrosion inhibitors. In addition, the borescopic inspection method used to detect corrosion, and/or coating anomalies had severe limitations because of part geometry, and an improved non-destructive inspection (NDI) method using Neutron Radiography (N-Ray) was also recommended.

Description: The NASA Manned Space Program uses an electrocardiograph (ECG) system to monitor astronauts during extravehicular activity (EVA). This ECG system, called the Operational Bioinstrumentation System (OBS), was developed during the Apollo era. Throughout the Shuttle program these electrodes experienced failures during several EVAs performed from the Space Shuttle and International Space Station (ISS) airlocks. An attempt during Shuttle Flight STS-109 to replace the old electrodes with new commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) disposable electrodes proved unsuccessful. One assumption for failure of the STS-109 COTS electrodes was the expansion of trapped gases under the foam electrode pad, causing the electrode to be displaced from the skin. Given that our current electrodes provide insufficient reliability, a number of COTS ECG electrodes were tested at the NASA Altitude Manned Chamber Test Facility. Methods: OBS disposable electrodes were tested on human test subjects in an altitude chamber simulating an Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) operating pressure of 4.3 psia with the following goals: (1) to confirm the root cause of the flight certified, disposable electrode failure during flight STS-109. (2) to identify an adequate COTS replacement electrode and determine if further modifications to the electrodes are required. (3) to evaluate the adhesion of each disposable electrode without preparation of the skin with isopropyl alcohol. Results: There were several electrodes that failed the pressure testing at 4.3psia, including the electrodes used during flight STS-109. Two electrodes functioned well throughout all testing and were selected for further testing in an EMU at altitude. A vent hole placed in all electrodes was also tested as a possible solution to prevent gas expansion from causing electrode failures. Conclusions: Two failure modes were identified: (1) foam-based porous electrodes entrapped air bubbles under the pad (2) poor adhesion caused some electrodes to fail

Description: Medical support of spaceflight missions is composed of complex tasks and decisions that dedicated to maintaining the health and performance of the crew and the completion of mission objectives. Spacecraft represent one of the most complex vehicles built by humans, and are built to very rigorous design specifications. In the course of a Flight Readiness Review (FRR) or a mission itself, the flight surgeon must be able to understand the impact of hazards and risks that may not be completely mitigated by design alone. Some hazards are not mitigated because they are never actually identified. When a hazard is identified, it must be reduced or waivered. Hazards that cannot be designed out of the vehicle or mission, are usually mitigated through other means to bring the residual risk to an acceptable level. This is possible in most engineered systems because failure modes are usually predictable and analysis can include taking these systems to failure. Medical support of space missions is complicated by the inability of flight surgeons to provide "exact" hazard and risk numbers to the NASA engineering community. Taking humans to failure is not an option. Furthermore, medical dogma is mostly comprised of "medical prevention" strategies that mitigate risk by examining the behaviour of a cohort of humans similar to astronauts. Unfortunately, this approach does not lend itself well for predicting the effect of a hazard in the unique environment of space. This presentation will discuss how Medical Operations uses an evidence-based approach to decide if hazard mitigation strategies are adequate to reduce mission risk to acceptable levels. Case studies to be discussed will include: 1. Risk of electrocution risk during EVA 2. Risk of cardiac event risk during long and short duration missions 3. Degraded cabin environmental monitoring on the ISS. Learning Objectives 1.) The audience will understand the challenges of mitigating medical risk caused by nominal and off-nominal mission events. 2.) The audience will understand the process by which medical hazards are identified and mitigated before launch. 3.) The audience will understand the roles and responsibilities of all the other flight control positions in participating in the process of reducing hazards and reducing medical risk to an acceptable level.