ALBERT

Description: This report presents the results of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) activities during 2002. The format of the report has been modified to capture a long-term perspective. Section II is new and highlights the Panel's view of NASA's safety progress during the year. Section III contains the pivotal safety issues facing NASA in the coming year. Section IV includes the program area findings and recommendations. The Panel has been asked by the Administrator to perform several special studies this year, and the resulting white papers appear in Appendix C. The year has been filled with significant achievements for NASA in both successful Space Shuttle operations and International Space Station (ISS) construction. Throughout the year, safety has been first and foremost in spite of many changes throughout the Agency. The relocation of the Orbiter Major Modifications (OMMs) from California to Kennedy Space Center (KSC) appears very successful. The transition of responsibilities for program management of the Space Shuttle and ISS programs from Johnson Space Center (JSC) to NASA Headquarters went smoothly. The decision to extend the life of the Space Shuttle as the primary NASA vehicle for access to space is viewed by the Panel as a prudent one. With the appropriate investments in safety improvements, in maintenance, in preserving appropriate inventories of spare parts, and in infrastructure, the Space Shuttle can provide safe and reliable support for the ISS for the foreseeable future. Indications of an aging Space Shuttle fleet occurred on more than one occasion this year. Several flaws went undetected in the early prelaunch tests and inspections. In all but one case, the problems were found prior to launch. These incidents were all handled properly and with safety as the guiding principle. Indeed, launches were postponed until the problems were fully understood and mitigating action could be taken. These incidents do, however, indicate the need to analyze the Space Shuttle certification criteria closely. Based on this analysis, NASA can determine the need to receritfy the vehicles and to incorporate more stringent inspections throughout the process to minimize launch schedule impact. A highly skilled and experience workforce will be increasingly important for safe and reliable operations as the Space Shuttle vehicles and infrastructure continue to age.

Description: A two dimensional graphical event sequence of the time history of relevant sensor information located in the left wing and wheel well areas of the Space Shuttle Columbia Orbiter is presented. Information contained in this graphical event sequence include: 1) Sensor location on orbiter and its associated wire bindle in X-Y plane; 2) Wire bundle routing; 3) Description of each anomalous sensor event; 4) Time annotation by (a) GMT, (b) time relative to LOS, (c) time history bar, and (d) ground track; and 5) Graphical display of temperature rise (based on delta temperature from point it is determined to be anomalous).

Description: The Columbia Accident Investigation Board's independent investigation into the February 1, 2003, loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia and its seven-member crew lasted nearly seven months. A staff of more than 120, along with some 400 NASA engineers, supported the Board's 13 members. Investigators examined more than 30,000 documents, conducted more than 200 formal interviews, heard testimony from dozens of expert witnesses, and reviewed more than 3,000 inputs from the general public. In addition, more than 25,000 searchers combed vast stretches of the Western United States to retrieve the spacecraft's debris. In the process, Columbia's tragedy was compounded when two debris searchers with the U.S. Forest Service perished in a helicopter accident. This report concludes with recommendations, some of which are specifically identified and prefaced as 'before return to flight.' These recommendations are largely related to the physical cause of the accident, and include preventing the loss of foam, improved imaging of the Space Shuttle stack from liftoff through separation of the External Tank, and on-orbit inspection and repair of the Thermal Protection System. The remaining recommendations, for the most part, stem from the Board's findings on organizational cause factors. While they are not 'before return to flight' recommendations, they can be viewed as 'continuing to fly' recommendations, as they capture the Board's thinking on what changes are necessary to operate the Shuttle and future spacecraft safely in the mid- to long-term. These recommendations reflect both the Board's strong support for return to flight at the earliest date consistent with the overriding objective of safety, and the Board's conviction that operation of the Space Shuttle, and all human space-flight, is a developmental activity with high inherent risks.

Description: The objectives of the Space Shuttle PRA (Probabilistic Risk Assessment) are to: (1) evaluate mission risks; (2) evaluate uncertainties and sensitivities; (3) prioritize contributors; (4) evaluate upgrades; (5) track risks; and (6) provide decision tools. This report discusses the significance of a Space Shuttle PRA and its participants. The elements and type of losses to be included are discussed. The program and probabilistic approaches are then discussed.

Description: The Shuttle program is one of the most complex engineering activities undertaken anywhere in the world at the present time. The Space Shuttle Independent Assessment Team (SIAT) was chartered in September 1999 by NASA to provide an independent review of the Space Shuttle sub-systems and maintenance practices. During the period from October through December 1999, the team led by Dr. McDonald and comprised of NASA, contractor, and DOD experts reviewed NASA practices, Space Shuffle anomalies, as well as civilian and military aerospace experience. In performing the review, much of a very positive nature was observed by the SIAT, not the least of which was the skill and dedication of the workforce. It is in the unfortunate nature of this type of review that the very positive elements are either not mentioned or dwelt upon. This very complex program has undergone a massive change in structure in the last few years with the transition to a slimmed down, contractor-run operation, the Shuttle Flight Operations Contract (SFOC). This has been accomplished with significant cost savings and without a major incident. This report has identified significant problems that must be addressed to maintain an effective program. These problems are described in each of the Issues, Findings or Observations summarized, and unless noted, appear to be systemic in nature and not confined to any one Shuttle sub-system or element. Specifics are given in the body of the report, along with recommendations to improve the present systems.

Description: The Space Shuttle Challenger and Columbia accidents resulted in tragic loss of life and national assets, and investigations into both accidents produced important lessons to prevent future accidents

Description: This is a map of the debris scattering from the Columbia accident over parts of Texas and Louisiana. It depicts the location of recovered debris, and identifies regional facilities important to the recovery effort.

Description: The-Genesis mission to collect solar-wind samples and return them to Earth for detailed analysis proceeded successfully for 3.5 years. During reentry on September 8, 2004, a failure in the entry, descent and landing sequence resulted in a crash landing of the Genesis sample return capsule. This document describes the findings of the avionics sub-team that supported the accident investigation of the JPL Failure Review Board.

Description: Reports are presented from volume 2 of the conference titled Strategic Research to Enable NASA's Exploration Missions, poster session. Topics included spacecraft fire suppression and fire extinguishing agents,materials flammability, various topics on the effects of microgravity including crystal growth, fluid mechanics, electric particulate suspension, melting and solidification, bubble formation, the sloshing of liquid fuels, biological studies, separation of carbon dioxide and carbon monoxide for Mars ISRU.

Description: Owing to the absence of past work involving flames similar to the Mir fire namely oxygen-enhanced, inverse gas-jet diffusion flames in microgravity the objectives of this work are as follows: 1. Observe the effects of enhanced oxygen conditions on laminar jet diffusion flames with ethane fuel. 2. Consider both earth gravity and microgravity. 3. Examine both normal and inverse flames. 4. Compare the measured flame lengths and widths with calibrated predictions of several flame shape models. This study expands on the work of Hwang and Gore which emphasized radiative emissions from oxygen-enhanced inverse flames in earth gravity, and Sunderland et al. which emphasized the shapes of normal and inverse oxygen-enhanced gas-jet diffusion flames in microgravity.