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The Times They Are A-Changing: Experimenting with Dynamic Adverse Selection (2021)

Araujo, Felipe A. ; Wang, Stephanie W. ; Wilson, Alistair J.

American Economic Association

In: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 2021; 13(4): 1-22. Published 2021 Nov 01. doi: 10.1257/mic.20190088.

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Publikationsdatum: 2021-11-01

Beschreibung: We examine a common value dynamic matching environment where adverse selection accrues slowly over time. Theoretical best responses are therefore time varying, and the prior experimental literature suggests that sequential environments might lead to greater understanding of adverse selection in this dynamic setting. However, while a sophisticated minority in our experiment do condition on time and are close to a best response, the majority use a stationary response, even after extended experience. In an environment with persistent uncertainty, our results indicate that sequentiality is insufficient for the large majority of participants to recognize the effects of adverse selection. (JEL C78, C92, D82, D91)

Print ISSN: 1945-7669

Digitale ISSN: 1945-7685

Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften

Publiziert von American Economic Association

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Voter Turnout and Preference Aggregation (2021)

Kawai, Kei ; Toyama, Yuta ; Watanabe, Yasutora

American Economic Association

In: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 2021; 13(4): 548-586. Published 2021 Nov 01. doi: 10.1257/mic.20190063.

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Publikationsdatum: 2021-11-01

Beschreibung: We study how voter turnout affects the aggregation of preferences in elections. Under voluntary voting, election outcomes disproportionately aggregate the preferences of voters with low voting cost and high preference intensity. We show identification of the correlation structure among preferences, costs, and perceptions of voting efficacy, and explore how the correlation affects preference aggregation. Using 2004 US presidential election data, we find that young, low-income, less-educated, and minority voters are underrepresented. All of these groups tend to prefer Democrats, except for the less educated. Democrats would have won the majority of the electoral votes if all eligible voters had turned out. (JEL D12, D72)

Print ISSN: 1945-7669

Digitale ISSN: 1945-7685

Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften

Publiziert von American Economic Association

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An Empirical Dynamic Model of Trade with Consumer Accumulation (2021)

Piveteau, Paul

American Economic Association

In: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 2021; 13(4): 23-63. Published 2021 Nov 01. doi: 10.1257/mic.20190051.

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Publikationsdatum: 2021-11-01

Beschreibung: This paper develops a dynamic structural model of trade in which firms slowly accumulate consumers in foreign markets. Estimating the model using export data from individual firms and a particle Markov chain Monte Carlo estimator, the model predicts lower survival rates for new exporters and estimates low entry costs of exporting—less than half of those estimated in the absence of consumer accumulation. Using simulations and out-of-sample predictions, I show that the introduction of such frictions and the reduction in estimated entry costs allow the model to match important facts regarding the aggregate response of international trade to shocks. (JEL D22, F12, F14, L66)

Print ISSN: 1945-7669

Digitale ISSN: 1945-7685

Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften

Publiziert von American Economic Association

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Venting Out: Exports during a Domestic Slump (2021)

Almunia, Miguel ; Antràs, Pol ; Lopez-Rodriguez, David ; [weitere]

American Economic Association

In: American Economic Review. 2021; 111(11): 3611-3662. Published 2021 Nov 01. doi: 10.1257/aer.20181853.

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Publikationsdatum: 2021-11-01

Beschreibung: We study the relationship between domestic-demand shocks and exports using data for Spanish manufacturing firms in 2002–2013. Exploiting plausibly exogenous geographical variation caused by the Great Recession, we find that firms whose domestic sales declined by more experienced a larger increase in export flows, controlling for firms’ supply determinants. This result illustrates the capacity of export markets to counteract the negative impact of local demand shocks. By structurally estimating a heterogeneous-firm model of exporting with nonconstant marginal costs of production, we conclude that these firm-level responses accounted for half of the spectacular increase in Spanish goods exports over the period 2009–2013. (JEL D22, E32, F14, L60)

Print ISSN: 0002-8282

Digitale ISSN: 1944-7981

Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften

Publiziert von American Economic Association

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Naïve Learning with Uninformed Agents (2021)

Banerjee, Abhijit ; Breza, Emily ; Chandrasekhar, Arun G. ; [weitere]

American Economic Association

In: American Economic Review. 2021; 111(11): 3540-3574. Published 2021 Nov 01. doi: 10.1257/aer.20181151.

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Publikationsdatum: 2021-11-01

Beschreibung: The DeGroot model has emerged as a credible alternative to the standard Bayesian model for studying learning on networks, offering a natural way to model naïve learning in a complex setting. One unattractive aspect of this model is the assumption that the process starts with every node in the network having a signal. We study a natural extension of the DeGroot model that can deal with sparse initial signals. We show that an agent’s social influence in this generalized DeGroot model is essentially proportional to the degree-weighted share of uninformed nodes who will hear about an event for the first time via this agent. This characterization result then allows us to relate network geometry to information aggregation. We show information aggregation preserves “wisdom” in the sense that initial signals are weighed approximately equally in a model of network formation that captures the sparsity, clustering, and small-world properties of real-world networks. We also identify an example of a network structure where essentially only the signal of a single agent is aggregated, which helps us pinpoint a condition on the network structure necessary for almost full aggregation. Simulating the modeled learning process on a set of real-world networks, we find that there is on average 22.4 percent information loss in these networks. We also explore how correlation in the location of seeds can exacerbate aggregation failure. Simulations with real-world network data show that with clustered seeding, information loss climbs to 34.4 percent. (JEL D83, D85, Z13)

Print ISSN: 0002-8282

Digitale ISSN: 1944-7981

Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften

Publiziert von American Economic Association

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Optimal Financial Exclusion (2021)

Monnet, Cyril ; Quintin, Erwan

American Economic Association

In: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 2021; 13(4): 101-134. Published 2021 Nov 01. doi: 10.1257/mic.20190005.

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Publikationsdatum: 2021-11-01

Beschreibung: We study efficient exclusion policies in a canonical credit model that features both exogenous and strategic default along the equilibrium path. Policies that maximize welfare in a stationary equilibrium implement exclusion for a finite and deterministic number of periods following default. Front-loading exclusion makes the mass of socially valuable transactions as high as it can be in steady state. Less intuitively, doing so also maximizes the average welfare of excluded agents in equilibrium conditional on the level of incentives provided by the threat of exclusion. We argue that these results are robust to a host of natural variations on our benchmark model. (JEL C73, D53, D86, G21, G32, G51)

Print ISSN: 1945-7669

Digitale ISSN: 1945-7685

Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften

Publiziert von American Economic Association

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7

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Dynamic Evaluation Design (2021)

Smolin, Alex

American Economic Association

In: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 2021; 13(4): 300-331. Published 2021 Nov 01. doi: 10.1257/mic.20170405.

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Publikationsdatum: 2021-11-01

Beschreibung: A principal owns a firm, hires an agent of uncertain productivity, and designs a dynamic policy for evaluating his performance. The agent observes ongoing evaluations and decides when to quit. When not quitting, the agent is paid a wage that is linear in his expected productivity; the principal claims the residual performance. After quitting, the players secure fixed outside options. I show that equilibrium is Pareto efficient. For a broad class of performance technologies, the equilibrium wage deterministically grows with tenure. My analysis suggests that endogenous performance evaluation plays an important role in shaping careers in organizations. (JEL D21, D82, D83, J24, J31, J41, M51)

Print ISSN: 1945-7669

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Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften

Publiziert von American Economic Association

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Constrained Pseudo-Market Equilibrium (2021)

Echenique, Federico ; Miralles, Antonio ; Zhang, Jun

American Economic Association

In: American Economic Review. 2021; 111(11): 3699-3732. Published 2021 Nov 01. doi: 10.1257/aer.20201769.

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Publikationsdatum: 2021-11-01

Beschreibung: We propose a pseudo-market solution to resource allocation problems subject to constraints. Our treatment of constraints is general: including bihierarchical constraints due to considerations of diversity in school choice, or scheduling in course allocation; and other forms of constraints needed to model, for example, the market for roommates, combinatorial assignment problems, and knapsack constraints. Constraints give rise to pecuniary externalities, which are internalized via prices. Agents pay to the extent that their purchases affect the value the of relevant constraints at equilibrium prices. The result is a constrained-efficient market-equilibrium outcome. The outcome is fair to the extent that constraints treat agents symmetrically. (JEL D47, D61, D63, I11, I21)

Print ISSN: 0002-8282

Digitale ISSN: 1944-7981

Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften

Publiziert von American Economic Association

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9

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Spillover Effects of Institutions on Cooperative Behavior, Preferences, and Beliefs (2021)

Engl, Florian ; Riedl, Arno ; Weber, Roberto

American Economic Association

In: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 2021; 13(4): 261-299. Published 2021 Nov 01. doi: 10.1257/mic.20180336.

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Publikationsdatum: 2021-11-01

Beschreibung: Most institutions are limited in scope. We study experimentally how enforcement institutions affect behavior, preferences, and beliefs beyond their direct influence over the behaviors they control. Groups play two identical public good games, with cooperation institutionally enforced in one game. Institutions generally have economically significant positive spillover effects to the unregulated game. We also observe that institutions enhance conditional cooperation preferences and beliefs about others’ cooperativeness, suggesting that both factors are drivers of observed spillover effects. In additional treatments, we provide evidence for several factors, including characteristics of institutions, that enhance or limit the effectiveness and scope of spillover effects. (JEL C92, D02, D83, D91, H41)

Print ISSN: 1945-7669

Digitale ISSN: 1945-7685

Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften

Publiziert von American Economic Association

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The Market for Online Influence (2021)

Fainmesser, Itay P. ; Galeotti, Andrea

American Economic Association

In: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 2021; 13(4): 332-372. Published 2021 Nov 01. doi: 10.1257/mic.20200050.

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Publikationsdatum: 2021-11-01

Beschreibung: Recent developments in social media have morphed the age-old practice of paying influential individuals for product endorsements into a multibillion dollar industry, extending well beyond celebrity sponsorships. We develop a parsimonious model in which influencers trade off the increased revenue they obtain from paid endorsements with the negative impact that these have on their followers’ engagement and, therefore, on the price influencers receive from marketers. The model provides testable predictions that match suggestive evidence on pricing of paid endorsements, reveals a novel type of inefficiency that emerges in this market, and clarifies the role of search technology and advice transparency in shaping market activity. In particular, we show that recent policies that make paid endorsements more transparent can backfire, whereas an increase in the effectiveness of the search technology that matches followers to influencers has both direct and strategic positive welfare effects. (JEL D83, L82, L86, M31.)

Print ISSN: 1945-7669

Digitale ISSN: 1945-7685

Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften

Publiziert von American Economic Association

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