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  • Articles  (706,093)
  • Articles: DFG German National Licenses  (706,093)
  • Mechanical Engineering, Materials Science, Production Engineering, Mining and Metallurgy, Traffic Engineering, Precision Mechanics  (361,788)
  • Economics  (292,975)
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  • Articles  (706,093)
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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The Effect of Organizational form on Information Flow and Decision Quality: Informational Cascades in Group Decision Making (2000)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 9 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper identifies a disadvantage to decision making in a team. We show that in some cases available information is lost due to sequential communication that results in informational cascades. Although incentive contracts exist that prevent cascades, in some cases these contracts do not maximize shareholders' expected residual value and cascades are tolerated in equilibrium. Cascades never occur in hierarchies that exogenously prevent communication. However, when the firm is organized as a hierarchy (and the agents are given the optimal hierarchical contract), in some cases agents will collude and sequentially communicate, admitting the possibility of cascades. In these cases, the principals must monitor and enforce the hierarchical process. When monitoring costs exceed the cost of cascades, the team is the optimal organizational form.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00115.x
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Differentiation-Induced Switching Costs and Poaching (2004)
    350 Main Street , Malden , MA 02148 , USA , and PO Box 1354, 9600 Garsington Road , Oxford OX4 2XG , UK . : Blackwell Publishing, Inc.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 13 (2004), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We show that the presence of sufficiently significant switching costs, which are increasing in the degree of product differentiation, generates an equilibrium configuration with maximal differentiation within the framework of a Hotelling model with linear transportation costs. The equilibrium with maximal differentiation offers a formalization of the idea that competing firms have noncooperative incentives to establish maximal switching cost barriers. The equilibrium incentives for commitments to high switching costs can be explained with poaching profits, which are increasing in the switching costs. Ex ante competition for market shares in period 1 is unable to eliminate these poaching profits.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2004.00026.x
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Programming and Advertising Competition in the Broadcasting Industry (2004)
    350 Main Street , Malden , MA 02148 , USA , and PO Box 1354, 9600 Garsington Road , Oxford OX4 2XG , UK . : Blackwell Publishing, Inc.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 13 (2004), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We analyze competition between two private television channels that derive their profits from advertising receipts. These profits are shown to be proportional to total population advertising attendance. The channels play a sequential game in which they first select their profiles (program mixes) and then their advertising ratios. We show that these ratios play the same role as prices in usual horizontal differentiation models. We prove that whenever ads' interruptions are costly for viewers the program mixes of the channels never converge but that the niche strategies are less effective and that the channel “profiles” are closer as advertising aversion becomes stronger.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2004.00027.x
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    A Practitioner's Guide to Estimation of Random-Coefficients Logit Models of Demand (2000)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 9 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Estimation of demand is at the heart of many recent studies that examine questions of market power, mergers, innovation, and valuation of new brands in differentiated-products markets. This paper focuses on one of the main methods for estimating demand for differentiated products: random-coefficients logit models. The paper carefully discusses the latest innovations in these methods with the hope of increasing the understanding, and therefore the trust among researchers who have never used them, and reducing the difficulty of their use, thereby aiding in realizing their full potential.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00513.x
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Incumbency and R&D Incentives: Licensing the Gale of Creative Destruction (2000)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 9 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper analyzes the relationship between incumbency and R&D incentives in the context of a model of technological competition in which technologically successful entrants are able to license their innovation to (or be acquired by) an incumbent. That such a sale should take place is natural, since postinnovation monopoly profits are greater than the sum of duopoly profits. We identify three key findings about how innovative activity is shaped by licensing. First, since an incumbent's threat to engage in imitative R&D during negotiations increases its bargaining power, there is a purely strategic incentive for incumbents to develop an R&D capability. Second, incumbents research more intensively than entrants as long as (and only if) their willingness to pay for the innovation exceeds that of the entrant, a condition that depends critically on the expected licensing fee. Third, when the expected licensing fee is sufficiently low, the incumbent considers entrant R&D a strategic substitute for in-house research. This prediction about the market for ideas stands in contrast to predictions of strategic complementarity in patent races where licensing is not allowed.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00485.x
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  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Weak Property Rights and Holdup in R&D (2000)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 9 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We study how the sequence of financing of R&D varies according to the ease with which property rights over knowledge can be defined. There are two financiers: a venture capitalist (VC) and a corporation. The knowledge acquired in costly research becomes embodied in the researcher's human capital, and she may hold up the financier and walk away with the project to develop it elsewhere. The main results are: (1) When property rights are strong, research is always funded by the VC, development is performed efficiently, and breakaways from the VC to the corporation are observed in equilibrium. (2) When property rights are weak, projects may be financed by the VC or the corporation, or may remain unfunded. (3) When property rights are weak, no breakaways occur in equilibrium; local spillovers and strong product market competition increase the likelihood that research projects will get funding. (4) The equilibrium sequence of R&D finance need not be first-best efficient. (5) In equilibrium, and controlling for the strength of property rights, VCs finance projects that are more profitable on average.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00615.x
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  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    External Liberalization and Foreign Presence: Cross-Industry Evidence From Poland and Hungary (2000)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 9 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: External liberalization—the relaxation of restrictions on cross-border trade and inbound direct investment—has played an important role in the programs of economic transition in central Europe. While liberalization is widely heralded, there has been little empirical analysis of the links between liberalization and industry structure. This analysis examines changes in foreign presence following external liberalization in Poland and Hungary. I show that the presence of proprietary and intangible assets explains much of the cross-industry variation in patterns of foreign presence and, for a given level of foreign presence, whether this will occur via trade or inbound direct investment.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00211.x-i1
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  • 8
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    All-Units Discounts in Retail Contracts (2004)
    350 Main Street , Malden , MA 02148 , USA , and PO Box 1354, 9600 Garsington Road , Oxford OX4 2XG , UK . : Blackwell Publishing
    Journal of economics & management strategy 13 (2004), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: All-units discounts in retail contracts refer to discounts that lower a retailer's wholesale price on every unit purchased when the retailer's purchases equal or exceed some quantity threshold. These discounts pose a challenge to economic theory because it is difficult to understand why a manufacturer ever would charge less for a larger order if its intentions were benign. In this paper, we show that all-units discounts may profitably arise absent any exclusionary motive. All-units discounts eliminate double marginalization in a complete information setting, and they extract more profit than would a menu of two-part tariffs in the standard incomplete information setting with two types of buyers. All-units discounts may improve or may reduce welfare (relative to menus of two-part tariffs) depending on demand parameters.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2004.00018.x
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  • 9
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Organizational Languages (2004)
    350 Main Street , Malden , MA 02148 , USA , and PO Box 1354, 9600 Garsington Road , Oxford OX4 2XG , UK . : Blackwell Publishing
    Journal of economics & management strategy 13 (2004), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper is concerned with communication within a team of players trying to coordinate in response to information dispersed among them. The problem is nontrivial because they cannot communicate all information instantaneously but have to send longer or shorter sequences of messages, using coarse codes. We focus on the design of these codes and show that members may gain compatibility advantages by using identical codes and that this can support the existence of several, more or less efficient, symmetric equilibria. Asymmetric equilibria may exist only if coordination across different sets of members is of sufficiently different importance. The results are consistent with the stylized fact that firms differ even within industries and that coordination between divisions is harder than coordination inside divisions.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2004.00019.x
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  • 10
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Patents, Secrets, and the First-Inventor Defense (2004)
    350 Main Street , Malden , MA 02148 , USA , and PO Box 1354, 9600 Garsington Road , Oxford OX4 2XG , UK . : Blackwell Publishing
    Journal of economics & management strategy 13 (2004), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We analyze optimal patent design when innovators can rely on secrecy to protect their innovations. Secrecy has no fixed term but does not preclude accidental disclosure nor independent creation by other inventors. We derive the optimal scope of the rights conferred to such second inventors, showing that if the patent life is set optimally, second inventors should be allowed to patent and to exclude first inventors who have relied on secrecy. We then identify conditions under which it is socially desirable to increase patent life as much as is necessary to induce first inventors to patent. The circumstances in which it is preferable that they rely on secrecy seem rather limited.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2004.00021.x
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