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  • Articles  (6)
  • Articles: DFG German National Licenses  (6)
  • realism  (6)
  • Springer  (6)
  • 1995-1999  (4)
  • 1990-1994  (2)
  • 1960-1964
  • Nature of Science, Research, Systems of Higher Education, Museum Science  (6)
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  • Articles  (6)
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  • Articles: DFG German National Licenses  (6)
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  • Springer  (6)
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  • 1995-1999  (4)
  • 1990-1994  (2)
  • 1960-1964
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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Journal for general philosophy of science 29 (1998), S. 71-122 
    ISSN: 1572-8587
    Keywords: science ; philosophy of science ; methodology ; realism ; naturalism ; empiricism ; cognitive science ; feminism ; experiment ; scientific practice
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Philosophy , Nature of Science, Research, Systems of Higher Education, Museum Science
    Notes: Abstract This survey of major developments in North American philosophy of science begins with the mid-1960s consolidation of the disciplinary synthesis of internalist history and philosophy of science (HPS) as a response to criticisms of logical empiricism. These developments are grouped for discussion under the following headings: historical metamethodologies, scientific realisms, philosophies of the special sciences, revivals of empiricism, cognitivist naturalisms, social epistemologies, feminist theories of science, studies of experiment and the disunity of science, and studies of science as practice and culture. A unifying theme of the survey is the relation between historical metamethodologists and scientific realists, which dominated philosophical work in the late 1970s. I argue that many of the alternative cognitive naturalisms, social epistemologies, and feminist theories that have been proposed can be understood as analogues to the differences between metamethodological theories of scientific rationality and realist accounts of successful reference to real causal processes. Recent work on experiment, scientific practice, and the culture of science may, however, challenge the underlying conception of the field according to which realism and historical rationalism (or their descendants) are the important alternatives available, and thus may take philosophy of science in new directions.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Journal for general philosophy of science 27 (1996), S. 307-323 
    ISSN: 1572-8587
    Keywords: Continuity ; natural classification ; history ; aims of science ; realism ; Pierre Dulem
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Philosophy , Nature of Science, Research, Systems of Higher Education, Museum Science
    Description / Table of Contents: Zusammenfassung Wer nur einen kurzen Blick auf die Wellen, die einen Strand zu erobern versuchen, wirft, bemerkt nicht das Ansteigen der Flut. Er sieht, wie eine Woge sich erhebt, näher kommt, sich schäumend bricht, er sieht wie sie einen schmalen streifen Sand bedeckt und sich dann wieddr zurückzieht, wobei der Boden, der erobet schien, wieder trocken wird. eine neue Wogen folgt ihr, welche manchmal ein wenig weiter geht als die vorherige, manchmal dagegen nicht einmal jenen Kiesel erreicht, den diese benetzt hatte. Aber unter dieseer oberflächlichen Hin- und Herbewegung entsteht eine andere, tiefergehende, langsamere, dem kurzen Beobachter unmerkliche Bewegung, die stets im Selben Sinne fortschreitet, der zufolge das Meer unaufhörlich steigt.
    Notes: Summary Duhem is commonly held to have founded his view of history of science as continuous on the ‘metaphsical assertion’ of natural classification. With the help of a strict distinction between formal and material characterization of natural classification I try to show that this imputation is problematic, if not simply incorrect. My analysis opens alternative perspectives on Duhem's talk of continuity, the ideal form of theories, and the rôle of ‘bon sens’; moreover it emphasizes some aspects of Duhem's realism that play an important part in his philosophy of science.
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Journal for general philosophy of science 27 (1996), S. 203-213 
    ISSN: 1572-8587
    Keywords: Duhem ; empiricism ; realism ; success of science ; laws of nature ; observation
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Philosophy , Nature of Science, Research, Systems of Higher Education, Museum Science
    Notes: Summary Pierre Duhem is an outstanding exponent of empiricism. According to the empiricist view scientific laws and theories merely describe formal relations between observable phenomena. Duhems' important notion of natural classification is intended to explain the predictive success of science. I shall argue that it can only be interpreted realistically. Besides the success of science, two further arguments are put forward in favor of realism: (i) the fact that laws of nature are necessary, and (ii) the extension of observation by using instruments.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Journal for general philosophy of science 26 (1995), S. 25-34 
    ISSN: 1572-8587
    Keywords: Positivism ; Carnap ; realism ; instrumentalism ; strict empiricism ; Vienna Circle
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Philosophy , Nature of Science, Research, Systems of Higher Education, Museum Science
    Notes: Summary Several lines of argument support the notion that the legacy of positivism (if cast in terms of the realist/instrumentalist debate) is more realist than not. Work by Joia Lewis and Alberto Coffa on both Schlick and Carnap is cited, and contemporary work from Van Fraassen and Boyd briefly alluded to. Note is made of the differences within contemporary realist theory, and it is included that Carnap's essay “Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology” is crucial for resolution of the debate. In closing it is noted that the spirit of much of the original positivist work reinforced the contention than those who work within the framework of science do in fact accept the reality of key scientific entities.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Journal for general philosophy of science 23 (1992), S. 323-352 
    ISSN: 1572-8587
    Keywords: constructivism ; naturalism ; epistemology ; realism ; idealism
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Philosophy , Nature of Science, Research, Systems of Higher Education, Museum Science
    Notes: Summary Both radical constructivism and constructionism are naturalized approaches to epistemology. They try to fertilize results from biology and psychology for epistemological aims. They both refuse epistemological realism as unsustainable metaphysics. This raises the problem of the range of the naturalistic approach to epistemology. Constructivism, in both forms, turns out to be untenable because it runs in an aporia: it must borrow from realism either, or it must qualify its own position as a metaphysical one. But therewith, constructivism would be blamed to be metaphysical itself.
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  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Journal for general philosophy of science 22 (1991), S. 245-261 
    ISSN: 1572-8587
    Keywords: realism ; interpretation ; meaning ; object of knowledge ; explanation ; indeterminacy
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Philosophy , Nature of Science, Research, Systems of Higher Education, Museum Science
    Notes: Summary This paper tries to show how the irreducible indeterminacy of textual meanings can be reconciled with epistemological realism which normally presupposes independently existing but determinate objects of knowledge. E.D. Hirsch's project of objective interpretation, including his most recent attempts to show that meanings, in spite of their openness to future modifications, are historically determined objects of knowledge, is being criticized. The paper argues that his use of the semantics and the reference theories of Kripke, Putnam, and others forces him to give up, against his own intention, his methodologically important distinction between meaning and significance. Within such theories a strict separation of linguistic knowledge of meaning and world knowledge can no longer be upheld. Since the application of individually and historically variable world knowledge is unavoidable in the process of understanding texts, the textual meanings reconstructed by readers will always remain indeterminate. However, this state of affairs does not force us to abandon epistemological realism as it can be shown that the meanings of words and texts are not objects of knowledge in the usual sense. Meanings are cognitive capacities which make our knowledge of external objects possible. They are thus not themselves objects of knowledge. Systematic interpretation of texts in the sense of obtaining objective knowledge is therefore impossible. Nonetheless, suitably developed psycholinguistic theories of text comprehension allow us, at least in principle, to explain systematically how interpretations come about.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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