ISSN:
1573-322X
Schlagwort(e):
utilitarianism
;
the replaceability argument
;
prior existence view
;
total view
;
rights
Quelle:
Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
Thema:
Energietechnik
,
Land- und Forstwirtschaft, Gartenbau, Fischereiwirtschaft, Hauswirtschaft
,
Philosophie
Notizen:
Abstract The ethical theory underlying much of our treatment of animals in agriculture and research is the moral agency view. It is assumed that only moral agents, or persons, are worthy of maximal moral significance, and that farm and laboratory animals are not moral agents. However, this view also excludes human non-persons from the moral community. Utilitarianism, which bids us maximize the amount of good (utility) in the world, is an alternative ethical theory. Although it has many merits, including impartiality and the extension of moral concern to all sentient beings, it also appears to have many morally unacceptable implications. In particular, it appears to sanction the killing of innocents when utility would be maximized, including cases in which we would deliberately kill and replace a being, as we typically do to animals on farms and in laboratories. I consider a number of ingenious recent attempts by utilitarians to defeat the killing and replaceability arguments, including the attempt to make a place for genuine moral rights within a utilitarian framework. I conclude that utilitarians cannot escape the killing and replaceability objections. Those who reject the restrictive moral agency view and find they cannot accept utilitarianism's unsavory implications must look to a different ethical theory to guide their treatment of humans and non-humans.
Materialart:
Digitale Medien
URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02014611
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