ALBERT

Notes: The paper is the 1980 - Bohm-Bawerk - lecture given at the University of Innsbruck. Starting from Bohm-Bawerk's book Rights and Relations from the Point of View of the Economic Theory of Goods the paper tries to evaluate rights and phenomena like goodwill from the perspective of innovation. A framework of three levels of economic activity is developed. The three levels are consumption (the lowest level), production and innovation (the highest level). Rights are interpreted as instruments of protection of higher level activity from lower level activity. Focus of attention are industries with very high rates of technical progress and innovation. There the most important positive externality of innovation is the increased potential for even more innovations. It is argued that competition policy, as a rule of thumb, must foster competition by innovation and must discourage competition by imitation.

Notes: Allen, Polly Reynolds and Kenen, Peter B.: Asset Markets, Exchange Rates, and Economic Integration.Duwendag, Dieter und Siebert, Horst (Hrsg.): Politik und Markt.Eger, Thomas: Das regionale Entwicklungsgefälle in Jugoslawien.El-Agraa, Ali Mohammed and Jones, Anthony John: Theory of Customs Unions.Forster, Edgar und Vaassen, Bernd : Der Wettbewerb zwischen privater und gesetzlicher Krankenversicherung.Gehrig, Bruno: Geldpolitik unter alternativen institutionellen Voraus-setz. ungen.Hughes, Barry B.: World Modeling.Issawi, Charles : The Economic History of TurkeyJantsch, Erich: Die Selbstorganisation des Universums.Kakwani, Nanak C.: Income Inequality and Poverty.Kotte, Detlef J.: Wirkungen zwischenstaatlicher Finanztransfers in der EG auf Konjunktur und ZahlungsbilanzKÖtzle, Alfred : Die Eignung von Subventionen für die UmweltpolitikLaitinen, Kenneth : A Theory of the Multiproduct Firm.Lehment, Harmen: Devisenmarktinterventionen bei flexiblen Wechselkursen.Leroy, Dominique: Economie des arts du spectacle vivant.McKinnon, Ronald I.: Money in International Exchange.Noll, Werner: Finanzwissenschqft.Ohlsson, Lennart A.: Engineering Trade Specialization of Sweden and other Industrial Countries.Porschen, D.:Währungskooperation in West und Ost - Ein Systemvergleich auf der Grundlage der neuen politischen Ökonomie.Rohde, Wolfgang: Ein spieltheoretisches Modell eines Terminmarktes.Schmid, GÜnther: Strukturierte Arbeitslosigkeit und Arbeitsmarktpolitik.Shah, A. B. and Bhan, Susheela (Eds.): Non-Formal Education and the NAEP.Vallender, Dorle E.: Einführung in die Finanzwissenschaft.

Notes: This paper summarizes the conclusions of a number of studies prepared in recent years by the German Development Institute (Berlin) on the structural implications of the Southern enlargement of the European Community for the acceeding countries as well as for the whole EEC. Reference is made to the problems arising generally from the internal and external impact of the changes in the structural equilibrium of the Community, defined in terms of increasing structural disparities within the EEC and growing inflexibility vis-à-vis the rest of the world. The implications for the Common Agricultural Policy and the industry are then discussed with special reference to the problem of the ‘sensitive’ industries. Arguments are presented in favour of the thesis that a new structural equilibrium can only be achieved through the improvement of production structures in the weaker regions of the Community and so through the gradual elimination of the intra-Community development gap.

Notes: Bizien, Yves: Population and Economic Development.Black, John and Hindley, Brian (Eds.): Current Issues in Commercial Policy and Diplomacy.Brams, S. J.; Scmotter, A. and SchwÖdiauer, G. (Eds.): Applied Game Theory.Bruder, Wolfgang: Sozialwissenschaften und Politikberatung — Zur Nutzung sozialwissenschafthcher Informationen in der Ministerialorganisation.Clarkson, Kenneth W. and Martin, Donald L. (Eds.): The Economics of Nonproprietary Organizations.Dixon, P. B.; Bowles, S. and Kendrick, D.: Notes and Problems in Microeconomic Theory.Dobias, Peter: Wirtschaftspolitik.El Mallakh, Ragaei and Dorothea H. (Eds.): New Policy Imperatives for Energy Producers.Frey, RenÉ L.: Wachstumspolitik.Gollnick, Heinz und Thiel, Norbert : Ökonometrie.Gordon, Wendell: Institutional Economics.Gram, Harvey and Walsh, Vivian : Classical and Neoclassical Theories of General Equilibrium.Hacche, Graham: The Theory of Economic Growth. An Introduction.Hesse, Helmut (Hrsg.): Arbeitsbuch Angewandte Mikroökonomik.Hirsch, Werner Z.: Law And Economics: An Introductory Analysis.Kanemoto, Yoshitsugu: Theories of Urban Externalities.Klein, Lawrence R. and Young, Richard M.: An Introduction to Econometric Forecasting and Forecasting Models.Lavigne, Marie : Stratégies des pays socialistes dans l'echange international.Lindbeck, Assar (Ed.): Inflation and Employment in Open Economies.Lippman, S. A. and McCall, J. J. (Eds.): Studies in the Economics of Search.Lowe, Julian and Lewis, David : The Economics of Environmental Management.Peacock, Alan: The Economic Analysis of Government.Rao, C. H. Hanumantha and Joshi, P. C. (Eds.): Reflections on Economic Development and Social Change.Rossier, Edouard:.Economie structurale.Siebert, Horst and Antal, Ariane Berthoin : The Political Economy of Environmental Protection.Smith, Vernon L. (Ed.): Research in Experimental Economics. A Research Annual. Vol. 1.Uhlir, Helmut: Überprüfung der Random-Walk-Hypothese auf dem österreichischen Aktienmarkt.United Nations Industrial Development Organization: Industrial Priorities in Developing Countries.

Notes: The paper develops and renders plausible the hypothesis that modern man is developing an ever greater tolerance and desire for excitement and violence, because scientific and economic progress has so greatly diminished the hardships and hazards of everyday work and existence and of the fight for survival that most people are left with a stimulus deficit, which they try to eliminate. The various sources of deliberately sought-for stimulation, ranging from dangerous sports and gambling to violence, crime and participation in collective hazardous action, are listed and discussed, and the available statistics of their use or incidence compared and analyzed.

Notes: 25 Jahre kaldorianische Verteilungstheorie ist das Generalthema von Fasc.4, Kyklos 1981. Diese Abhandlung führt in die Rezeption des kaldorianischen Ver-teilungsmodells im deutschsprachigen Raum ein.Hauptgegenstand ist die Resonanz, die die am Kreislaufmodell orientierte Verteilungstheorie bei den lohn- und verteilungspolitischen Auseinandersetzun-gen in der Bundesrepublik gefunden hat. Die Voraussetzungen, auf denen KALDORS Ansatz beruht, stimmen recht gut mit der wirtschaftlichen Situation der Bundesrepublik und der Schweiz in den 50er und bis Mitte der 60er Jahre überein. Auf das Modell gestützt, wurde die These vertreten, dass eine ausschliesslich am Nominallohn orientierte Lohnpolitik ungeeignet ist, verteilungspolitische Ziele zu erreichen. Viele Pläne, die deshalb die Einkommensverwendung einbezogen, waren primär auf eine gleichmassigere Vermögensverteilung als ein gesellschaftspolitisches Ziel ausgerichtet.Schliesslich wird dargelegt, weshalb heute nur noch geringe Chancen für urnfassende vermögenspolitische Pläne bestehen. Die kaldorianischen Modellvoraus-setzungen sind seit den 70er Jahren nicht mehr erfüllt. In der Schweiz hat sich überdies die Vermögensbildung mit Schwerpunkt auf das institutionelle Sparen (allgemeine Altersversicherung und private Pensionskassen) verlagert, das in das kaldorianische Modell noch zu integrieren bleibt.〈section xml:id="abs1-2"〉〈title type="main"〉SUMMARY‘25 years of KALDOR'S distribution theory’ is the subject of fasc. 4, Kyklos 1981. The essay describes the model's echo in the German speaking area and especially emphasizes the influence on the discussion of wage and distribution policy in Germany. In that discussion, and referring to KALDOR'S model, it was argued that a wage policy which focuses on nominal wages is inappropriate for distribution purposes.While during the 1950's and 1960's, the conditions for KALDOR'S model were fulfilled in Germany and Switzerland, this was no longer the case during the last decade. Additionally, the formation of wealth in Switzerland has become to be centered on institutional saving, a fact that remains to be integrated into the KALDOR model.〈section xml:id="abs1-3"〉〈title type="main"〉RÉSUMÉDepuis 25 ans la théorie de la répartition des revenus de KALDOR est discutéc: e'est le thème général du fasc. 4, Kyklos 1981. Lc présent exposé analyse les répercussions que le modèle kaldorien a entraǐnées dans le monde scientifique de langue allemande. L’ echo a été considérable; le modèle de base a été prolongé et élargi de différentes manières.L'article se concentre cependant sur L'‘influence que la théorie de la répartition des revenus basée sur le modèle D'équilibrc macroéconomique keynésien a exercé sur les discussions et débats concernant les salaires et la répartition en RFA. Les suppositions et hypothèses, sur lesquelles la théorie de KALDOR est fondéc, coïncident assez bien avec la situation économique en RFA et en Suisse dans les années 50 à 65 environ. Se référant au modèle on admettait L’‘hypothèse qu'une politique salarialc qui s'oriente uniquement au taux de salaire nominal n'était guére appropriée à atteindre des buts ayant trait à la répartition des revenus. Par la suite, beaucoup de projets, incorporant L’ aspect de la dépense imputée du produit national, aspiraient en premier lieu à une répartition plus égalitaire des biens (de la propriété) en tant que but D’ ordre soeiopolitique.Finalcment L’ exposé montre pour quelle raison aujourd'hui des projets visant à une politique de redistribution de la propriété n'ont plus guère de chance de succes. Les hypothèses de base du modèle kaldorien ne sont plus valables depuis les années soixante-dix. En outre, L’ aceumulation de la propriété en Suisse se fait de plus en plus sous forme D’ epargne institutionnelle (assurance-vieillesse générale et caisses de pension privées), cc qu'il faudrait intégrer dans le modèle kaldorien.

Notes: KALDOR hat seine Verteilungstheorie deshalb als keynesianisch bezeichnet, weil sic die Einkommensverteilung aus Nachfragebedingungen erklärt und sich dadurch von den klassisch-marxistischen und neoklassischen Verteilungstheorien, die Theorien der Produktion und damit des Angebots sind, abgrenzt. Es mtissen jcdoch methodische Bedenken dagegen angemeldet werden, eine nachfrage-orientierte produktionsorientierten Theorien gegentiberzustellen. Verteilungstheorien sind an ein langfristiges Gleichgewicht gebunden, bei dem temporare Einkommen verschwunden sind; das impliziert jedoch, dass sich die Verwen-dungsstruktur den knappheitstheoretisch fundierten Produktionsbedingungen an-passt, die damit die Einkommensverteilung bestimmen. Eine keynesianische Verteilungstheorie kann daher nur dadurch einen genuinen Stellenwert erhalten, dass sie auf einer spezifischen Theorie der Produktion basiert. Die preistheoreti-schc Grundlage einer derartigen Produktionstheorie liefert dabei eine monetäre Zinsbestimmung und die Ableitung von Produktionspreisen, ein System, dessen formale Grundlage SRAFFA gelegt hat. Seine makroökonomische Version zeigt dabei, dass die Lohnquote durch den Zinssatz, die Arbeits- und Kapitalproduk-tivitat bestimmt wird. KALDORS Verteilungstheorie erweist sich dabei als eine kurzfristige Theorie, die Abweichungen der Profitrate vom Gleichgewichtszins-satz ausdrückt.〈section xml:id="abs1-2"〉〈title type="main"〉summaryKALDOR indicates his distribution theory as keynesian, explaining the distribution of income demand-related, and distinguishing so his theory from the classical, marxian and neoclassical versions, who are production- and supply-related. On methodical reasons it is, however, doubtful to confront demand-related and supply-related theories. Theories of distribution are founded on a long-period equilibrium, since temporary income effects are disappearing. In such an equilibrium the structure of demand depends on the scarcities, i.e. on the conditions of production determining in this way the distribution of income. Therefore a keynesian theory of distribution has to be founded on a specific theory of production. The price theory of such a keynesian production theory is based on a monetary determination of interest and the derivation of production prices, a system, constructed by SRAFFA. His macroeconomic version demonstrates that the share of wages is determined by the interest rate and the productivity of labour and capital. KALDORS theory of distribution is therefore a short-period theory expressing deviations of the rate of profit from the interest rate.〈section xml:id="abs1-3"〉〈title type="main"〉RÉSUMÉKALDOR qualifie sa théorie de distribution comme keynésienne parce qu'elle explique la distribution du revenu par les conditions de demande. Elle se distingue ainsi nettement des theories de distribution classiques-marxistes et néoclassiques qui sont des théories de production et d’ offre. Pour des raisons méthodiques il est pourtant délicat de confronter une théorie orientée vers la demande avec une autre orientée vers la production. Les théories de distributions sont liées à un équilibre de long terme où les revenus temporaires ont disparu. Dans un tel équilibre la structure de la demande d́epend des conditions de rareté, c'est-à-dire des conditions de production qui déterminent ainsi la distribution du revenu. Par conséquent une theorie de distribution keynésienne doit se fonder sur une théorie de production spécifique. La théorie des prix d'; une telle théorie de production keynésienne est basée sur une détermination monétaire des intérěsts et sur la dérivation des prix de production - un système formellement construit par SRAFFA. Sa version macro-économique demontre que la quote-part des salaires est déterminée par le taux d';interet et par la productivityé de travail et de capital. C'est pourquoi la théorie de distribution de KALDOR est une théorie à court terme, exprimant des déviations du taux de profit du taux d'; interet.

Notes: The KALDOR model of economic growth and distribution has been subjected to two different strands of criticism: in 1962, PASINETTI claimed that KALDOR had slipped over the simple truism that people who save accumulate capital; subsequently, MANESCHI, GUPTA, and MÜCKL pointed out that, allowing the workers to own capital, and assuming that both workers and capitalists coexist, the KALDOR model would only be satisfied by assuming a ‘classical’ saving function. The purpose of this paper is to show that, by dropping the unnecessary assumption that the rate of interest received by the workers on their loans to the capitalists is equal to the rate of profit which the capitalists get from their investments, both criticisms are unfounded, and the KALDOR model is perfectly consistent. In a neo-Kcynesian model, there is no need to assume that in the long-run the rate of profit equals the rate of interest, as would obviously be the case in a neoclassical model. The paper also shows that the assumption made by most authors, and by KALDOR himself, that the capital-output ratio be constant is unnecessary; it is argued that any technological relationship between the capital-output ratio and the rate of profit is consistent with the KALDOR model. Finally, the paper shows that in KALDOR'S model there is no ‘dual’ of the kind found in PASINETTI-like models by MEADE, SAMUELSON and MODIGLIANI.〈section xml:id="abs1-2"〉〈title type="main"〉ZUSAMMENFASSUNGKALDORS Wachstums- und Verteilungsmodell war von zwei Seiten der Kritik ausgesetzt: PASINETTI behauptete 1962, KALDOR sei über den einfachen Gemein-platz gcstolpert, dass Leute die sparen auch Kapital akkumulieren; spater zeigten MANESCHI, GUPTA und MÜCKL, indem sie den Arbeitern die Möglichkeit des Kapitalbesitzes einräumten und Arbeiter sowie Unternehmer als gleichzeitig vorhanden annahmen, dass das KALDOR-Modell nur unter Annahme einer “klassischen” Sparfunktion haltbar ist. Der Zweck dieses Aufsatzes ist aufzuzeigen, dass beide Kritiken ungerechtfertigt sind, wenn die unnötige Annahme fallengelassen wild, dass der Zinssatz, den die Arbeiter für ihre Darlehen erhalten, gleich der Profitratc der Unternehmer ist, die diese aus ihren Invcstitionen erhalten. In diesem Falle ist das KALDOR-Modell durchaus konsistent. In einem neo-keynesianischen Modell besteht keine Notwendigkeit anzunchmen, dass die Profitrate dem Zinssatz entspricht, anch nicht auf lange Frist, wie dies in einem neoklassischen Modell offensichtlich der Fall wäre. Die Arbeit zeigt auch die Überflüssigkeit der Annahme (die von den mcisten Autorcn, inklusivc KALDOR selbst, getroffen wurde), dass die “capital-out put ration konstant zu sein hat. Es wild argumentiert, dass jede tcchnologische Beziehung zwischen der “capital-output ration und der Profitrate mit dem KALDOR-Modell vereinbar ist. Der Beitrag legt schliesslich dar, dass das KALDOR-Modell kein “Dual” der Art der PASINETTI-ähnlichcn Modelle von MEADE, SAMUELSON und MODIGLIANI aufweist.〈section xml:id="abs1-3"〉〈title type="main"〉RÉSUMÉLe modèle de KALDOR sur la croissance et la distribution économique a étć l'‘object de critiques émanant de deux sources principales: en 1962, PASINETTI déclara que le simple fait que les gens qui souscrivent à l'éparque se constituent par la un capital avait échappéà KALDOR; par la suite MANESCHI, GUPTA, et MÜCKL firent ressortir que měme si Ton procurait aux travailleurs la possibilityé de posséder un capital et en supposant que travailleurs et capitalistes continuent à coexistir, le modèle de KALDOR ne serait exact que dans le contexte d’ une fonction d’éparque dite “classique”. Le but de cet article est de montrer que ces deux écoles de critiques sont sans fondement et que le modèle de KALDOR est parfaitement logique si on écarte l'hypothèse, pas nécessaire, que le taux d’ intérět perçu par les travailleurs sur leurs prěts aux capitalistes est le měme que le taux de profit que les capitalistes obtiennent de leurs investissements. Dans un modèle néo-keynésien, il n'est pas besoin d’ assumer qu‘à long terme le taux de profit soit égal au taux d'intérět comme eut évidemment été le cas dans un modèle néo-classique. Cet article démontre aussi que le concept d’ invariabilityé du rapport capital-production cher à la plupart des auteurs, dont KALDOR, n'est pas nécessaire; car il est soutenu que toute relation technologique entre le rapport capital-production et le taux de profit est compatible avec le modèle de KALDOR. Enfin cet article veut prouver que dans le modèle de KALDOR il n'y a pas de “dualité” semblable à celle que l’ on trouve dans les modèles du genre PASINETTI, de MEADE, SAMUELSON et MODIGLIANI.

Notes: This paper examines KALDOR'S theoretical justification for his saving function and relates KALDOR'S hypothesis to neoclassical theory. KALDOR'S reasoning is most fully developed in the famous ‘Neo-PASINETTI Theorem’. The Neo-PASINETTI model adopts very stringent assumptions but these assumptions can be relaxed leaving the basic Kaldorian saving hypothesis intact: In a corporate economy where households and firms are independent decision makers and where the wealth of households takes the form of ownership rights in firms and other financial assets, the share of saving in output will depend on the share of retained profits in output. BLISS has criticized KALDOR'S saving hypothesis from a ncoclassical/Walrasian perspective. According to Buss the retention of profits by firms will - at least in the long run - be fully offset by reduced household saving out of distributed incomes. As a statement about equilibrium configurations in a Walrasian intertemporal model this is correct. It is not however a criticism of KALDOR'S saving hypothesis; if anything it is a criticism of KALDOR'S investment theory. The real issue separating BLISS (Walrasian theory) from KALDOR (Keynesian theory) concerns the determinants of company behaviour - in a Walrasian world firms possess perfect knowledge and maximise present values whereas Kaldorian firms operate under uncertainty in imperfect markets.〈section xml:id="abs1-2"〉〈title type="main"〉ZUSAMMENFASSUNGDieser Artikel untersucht KALDORS theoretische Rechtfertigung seiner Theorie des Sparens und verbindet seine Hypothesen mit der neoklassischen Theorie. Am weitesten ist KALDORS Beweisfuhrung in seinem beruhmten “Neo-PASINETTI Theorem” entwickelt. Das NCO-PASINETTI Modell macht sich sehr stringente Voraussetzungen zu eigen, die aber gelockert werden können und dabei KALDORS grundsätzliche Hypothese des Sparens intakt lassen: In einer von grossen Kapital-gesellschaften geprägten Wirtschaft (“corporate economy”), in der Haushaltc und Betriebe unabhängig voneinander Entscheidungen treffen, und in der das Vermögen der Haushalte die Form von Eigentumsrechten an Betrieben und sonstigen Finanzguthaben annimmt, wird der Anteil der Ersparnisse vom Ertrag abhängig sein vom Anteil der einbehaltenen Gewinne aus dem Ertrag. BLISS hat KALDORS Hypothese des Sparens von einer neoklassisch-WALRAs'schen Per-spektive aus kritisiert. Nach BLISS wird die Einbehaltung des Profits durch die Betriebe - wenigstens auf lange Sicht - voll durch die reduzierten Haushaltsersparnisse aus dem verteilten Einkommen ausgeglichen. Als Feststellung fiber Gleichgewichts-Konfigurationen in einem WALRAS'schen intertemporalen Modell ist dies korrekt. Dennoch ist dies keine Kritik an KALDORS Theorie des Sparens; wenn überhaupt, so ist es eine Kritik an KALDORS Theorie der Investition. Die wirkliche Frage, die BLISS (WALRAs'sche Theorie) von KALDOR (Keynes'sche Theorie) trennt, betrifft die Determinanten des Firmenverhaltens - in einer WALRAS'schen Welt besitzen die Betriebe vollkommenes Wissen und maximieren gegenwärtige Werte, wohingegen die Betriebe bei KALDOR unter Unsicherheit in unvollkommenen Markten operieren.〈section xml:id="abs1-3"〉〈title type="main"〉RÉSUMÉCet essai examine la justification théorique de KALDOR en vue de sa fonction d’ epargne et associe l'hypothese Kaldorienne a la theorie neoclassique. Le rai-sonnement de KALDOR est plus amplement développé dans le fameux “Théorème Néo-PASINETTI”. Le modèle NéO-PASINETTIétablit des suppositions très restreintes mais ces suppositions peuvent ětre généralisées tout en laissant l’‘hypothese Kaldorienne de la fonction d'epargne intacte: Dans une économie de sociétes (corporate economy?) où les individus et les compagnies font des décisions de manière indépendante et où les richesses individuelles sont sous forme de droits de propriété et autres valeurs financeères, la part d'épargne sur les revenus dépendra de la part des profits sur les revenus. BLISS a critiqueé l'hypothese d'épargne de KALDOR dans une perspective néoclassique/Walrasienne. Selon BLISS la retention des profits d’ une firme sera - du moins à long terme - pleinement compensée par la diminution de l’épargne sur les revenus distribués des individus. En tant qu'exposé des configurations de l’équilibre dans un modèle Walrasien intertemporal ceci est correct. Néanmoins ce n'est pas une critique de la théorie Kaldorienne de l'épargne; c'est, tout au plus, une critique de la théorie Kaldorienne des investissements. Le vrai problème que sépare BLISS (theorie Walrasienne) et KALDOR (théorie Keynesienne) réside dans les causes déterminantes du comportement des compagnies: dans un monde Walrasien les firmes ont une connaissance parfaite et maximisent les valeurs présentées alors que dans un monde Kaldorien les firmes agissent dans l’ incertitude et dans des marchés imparfaits.

Notes: Le but de cet article est d'étudier les conséquences de l'introduction de l’ hypothese des cycles vitaux dans un modèle de croissance avec deux classes d’épargnants (percepteurs de profits et percepteurs de salaires). Notre analyse montre que dans un tel contexte la détermination du taux d’ intérět d’équilibre (et par conséquent la distribution du revenu) est plus flexible que dans un modèle avec propensions àépargner constantes; toutefois les résultats obtenus tendent à confirmer la validité de l’ analyse des auteurs néokeynesiens KALDOR et PASINETTI. En effet le taux d’ intérět d’équilibre dans notre cas est (a) supérieur au taux de croissance de la population, (b) déterminé uniquement par le comportement des percepteurs de profits, et (c) indépendant de la fonction de production. Quant aux propriétés à long terme du modèle, nous montrons que l’ incertitude relative au taux d’ interet peut ětre un élément stabilisateur pour la croissance équilibrée du modèle.〈section xml:id="abs1-2"〉〈title type="main"〉SUMMARYThis paper explores the consequences of the introduction of the life-cycle hypothesis into an economic growth model with two classes of savers (profits earners and wage earners). Our analysis shows that the determination of the equilibrium interest rate is more flexible than in the corresponding model with constant propensities to save; the results obtained are however basically similar to those obtained in the traditional KALDOR/PASINETTI model. As a matter of fact, the rate of interest turns out to be (a) higher than the natural rate of growth, (b) determined by the behavioural parameters of the profits earners only, and (c) independent of the form of the production function. Looking at the long term properties of the model we show that interest uncertainty may have a stabilizing effect on the equilibrium growth rate of the model.〈section xml:id="abs1-3"〉〈title type="main"〉ZUSAMMENFASSUNGIn diesem Aufsatz wird untersucht, wie sich die Berücksichtigung der Lebenszyklus-Hypothese in einem Zwei-Klassen-Wachstumsmodell auswirkt (die beiden Klassen sindjene der Lohn- und Profitbezieher). Unsere Analyse zeigt, dass unter diesen Umständen die Bestimmung der Gleichgewichtsrate des Zinssatzes viel flexibler und umfassender ist, als in einem Wachstumsmodell mit konstanten Sparneigungen. Spezifisch ergibt sich, dass (a) der Zinssatz die natürliche Wachstums-rate übersteigt, dass (b) der Zinssatz nur durch die Verhaltensparameter der Profitbezieher bestimmt ist und dass (c) dieser unabhängig von der Form der Produk-tionsfunktion ist. Die Untersuchung der langfristigen Eigenschaften unseres Modells zeigt, dass Unsicherheit in bezug auf den Zinssatz eincn stabilisierenden Effekt auf die Gleichgewichtswachstumsrate des Modells haben kann.

Notes: The purpose of this paper is to use KALDOR'S alternative theories of distribution to derive a trade-off curve between unemployment and inflation. In the absence of capital accumulation, it is shown that this trade-off curve depends on the monopoly power of firms, the strength of the labor union and the price expectation of the workers. An interesting result is that there is a range of employment levels associated with price stability and for all other employment levels, inflation occurs. The effect of capital accumulation on the trade-off curve is also investigated. In particular, it is shown that capital accumulation is a vehicle to achieve high employment and price stability if accompanied by appropriate demand-manipulating government policy.〈section xml:id="abs1-2"〉〈title type="main"〉ZUSAMMENFASSUNGDer Zweck dieses Artikels ist es, anhand der Yerteilungstheorien von KAEDOR cine Transformationskurve zwischen Bcschäftigung mid Inflation abzuleiten. Bci Abwesenheit von Kapitalbildung ist diese Transformationskurve von der Mono-polmacht der Untcrnehmungen. der Stärke der Gewcrkschaften und den Prcis-ervvartungen der Arbeiter abhängig. Eine interessante Schlussfolgcrung ist, dass cin bestimmter Bereich der Beschäftigungsratc mil Preisstabilität vcrbunden ist, und alle andcren Beschäftigungsebenen inflationär sind. Anch die Wirkung der Kapitalbildung auf die Transformationskurve vvird untersucht. Insbesondcre zeigt sich, dass Kapitalbildung, begleitet von einer geeignctcn, staatlichen Politik der Nachfrage-Manipulation, Vollbeschäftigung zur Folge haben kann.〈section xml:id="abs1-3"〉〈title type="main"〉RËSUMÉD'après les théories alternatives dc repartition de KALDOR, cette étude vise a tirer une courbe d’ alternance entre le chǒmage et l'‘inflation. En absence de l'accumulation de capital, il indique que la courbe d'‘alternance est une fonc-tion du pouvoir de monopole des firms, dc la puissance du syndicat et de la prévision de prix des ouvriers. II est intéressant qu'un rayon spécifique des niveaux d'emploi se lie avec la stabilityé de prix, et pour tons les autres niveaux d'emploi, l'inflation se produit. L'‘effet de l'‘accumulation de capital sur la courbe d’ alternance est aussi examiné en détail. En particulier, il indique que l’ accumulation de capital est un véhicule menant à un haut niveau d’ emploi et a une stabilityé de prix, au cas qu'elle soit accompagnée par une politique gouvernementale de revendication-manceuvrant appropriée.

Notes: Economic theory is often criticized for the lack of ‘realism’ of its assumptions. Milton Friedman rebutted such criticism with the famous dictum ‘the more significant the theory, the more unrealistic the assumptions’. Friedman's position, often called the ‘F-twist’, stems from his failure to distinguish three different types of assumption. Negligibility assumptions state that some factor has a negligible effect upon the phenomenon under investigation. Domain assumptions specify the domain of applicability of the theory. Heuristic assumptions are a means of simplifying the logical development of the theory. It is argued that Friedman's dictum is false of all three types of assumption. Finally, it is conjectured that what began as a negligibility assumption may be changed under the impact of criticism first into a domain assumption, then into a mere heuristic assumption; and that these important changes will go unnoticed if the different types of assumption are not clearly distinguished from one another.

Notes: BERGMANN, BARBARA; ELIASSON, GUNNAR and ORCUTT, GUY (Eds.): Micro Simulation - Models, Methods and Applications. Proceedings of a Symposium on Micro Simulation Methods in Stockholm, September 19-22, 1977. Stockholm 1980. Industrial Institute for Economic and Social Research. 409 pp. Skr. 150.-BLANKART, CHARLES BEAT: Ökonomie cier öffenilichen Unternehmen. Eine institutioncllc Analyse dcr Staatswirtschaft. WiSo-Kurzlehrbiicher: Rcihc Volkswirtschaft, München 1980. Vahlcn. 205 S. SFr. 29.80BRAEUER, WALTER: Urahnen der Ökonomie. Von dcr Volkswirtschaftslehre dcs Altertums und des Mittelalters. München 1981. Ölschlager Verlag. 216 S. DM 39.-, SFr. 44.-, öS 320.- (P/b)BRAHMANANDA, P. R.: Growthless Inflation by Means of Stockless Money. A New Classical Treatise on Rising Prices. Bombay 1980. Himalaya Publishing House. 471 pp. Rs. 95.-BURKOLTER-TRACHSEL, VERENA: Zur Theorie sozialer Macht. (Res publica helvetica, 14.) Bern/Stuttgart 1981. Paul Haupt. 258 S. Fr. 34.-, DM 38.50DEUTSCH, KARL W. und FRITSCH, BRUNO: Zur Theorie der Verein-fachung: Reduktion von Komplexitat in der Datenverarbeitung für Weltmodelle. (Sozialwissenschaft und Praxis, Buchreihe des Wissenschafts-zentrum Berlin, Band 8.) Königstein 1980. Athenäum. 72 S. DM 19.80FOSTER, CD.; JAGKMAN, R. and PERLMAN, M.: Local Government Finance in a Unitary State. London 1980. George Allen & Unwin. 643 pp. £27.50GRAVELLE, HUGH and REES, RAY: Microeconomics. (Modern economics.) London/New York 1981. Longman. 620 pp. £9.95HIRSCHHAUSER, KARL-FRIEDRICH : Konjunktur analyse mit Hilfe von System Dynamics-Simulationsmodellen. Gottingen 1981. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. 284 S. DM 68.- (kart.)INTERFUTURES : Facing the Future, Mastering the probable and managing the unpredictable. OECD. Paris 1979. 425 S.JHA, PREM SHANKAR: India: A Political Economy of Stagnation. Bombay 1980. Oxford University Press. 311 pp. £6.75KARRENBERG, M.; FRITSCHE, B.; KITTERER, W. u.a. (Hrsg.): Die Umverteilungswirkungen der Staatstätigkeit bei den wichtigsten Haushaltstypen. (Schriftcnreihe des Rheinisch-Westfälischen Instituts fur Wirt-schaftsforschung, N.F., Heft 43.) Berlin/München 1980. Duncker & Humblot. 215 S. DM 76.-KELLER, WOUTER J.: Tax Incidence. A General Equilibrium Approach. (Contributions to Economic Analysis, 134.) Amsterdam/ New York/Oxford 1980. North-Holland Publishing Company. 348 pp. $53.75, Dfl. 110.-KRAUS, WILLY: Wirtschaftsentwicklung undsorjaler Wandel in der Volks-republik China. Bcrlin/Hcidclbcrg/Ncw York 1979. Springer. 738 S. DM 148.-KUIPERS, S.K. and LANJOUW, G.J. (Eds.): Prospects of Economic Growth. Amsterdam/New York/Oxford 1980. North-Holland. 287 pp. 5546.25, Dfl. 95.00LANGHAMMER, ROLF J. und STECHER, BERND: Der Nord-Sud-Konflikt. Die Spiclrcgcln dcr Wcltwirtschaft im Brennpunkt. Wiirzburg/Wien 1980. Physika-Verlag. 156 S. DM 17.80VON LOEFFELHOLZ, HANS DIETRICH : Die personale Inzidenz des Sozialhaushalts. Eine theoretische und empirische Studie. Gottingen 1979 Ynndrnhoerk & Rimnrecht. 373 S.VAN MEERHAEGHE, M.A.G.: A Handbook of International Economic Institutions. The Hague Boston London 1980. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 441 pp. Dfl. 145.-MEIER, GERALD M.: International Economics. The Theory of Policy. (Oxford Student Edition.) New York/Oxford 1980. Oxford University Press. 371 pp. £6.95 (paper, also available in hardback)NELL, EDWARD J.: Growth, Profits, and Property. Essays in the Revival of Political Economy. Cambridge 1980. Cambridge University Press. 304 pp. £19.50OSERS, JAN : Sozinalistischr Wirtschaftsmodelle Frankfurt. York 1980. Campus. 205 S.PASINETTI, LUIGI L. (Ed.): Essays on the Theory of Joint Production. London/Basingstoke 1980. Macmillan. 243 pp. £20.00ROBINSON, JOAN: Aspects of Development and Underdevelopment. New Delhi 1980. Vikas. 146 pp. Rs. 75.00SEIDEL, HANS und KRAMER, HELMUT (Hrsg.): Die österreichische Wirtschqft in den achtziger Jahren. Überlegungen zu den Entwicklungstendenzen. (Österreichisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung.) Stuttgart 1980. Gustav Fischer. 252 S. DM 45.- (kart.)Diesc Leserschar mi In- unci Ausland sci dcm Unci) inständig gewünscht.SHINZAWA, YUICHI : The Generalized Reproduction Scheme. A Theoretical Analysis. Tokyo 1980. Waseda University Press. 300 pp. $25.00TAYLOR, LANCE: Macro Models for Developing Countries. New York 1979. MacGraw-Hill: Economics Handbook Series. XII+271 pp.TOLLISON, ROGER D. (Ed.): The Political Economy of Antitrust. Principal Paper by WILLIAM BAXTER. Lexington, Mass. 1980. D. C. Heath. IX, 160 pp. £11.00, $25.50TURBAN, MANFRED : Alarxsche Reproduktionsschemata und Wirtschafts-theorie. Die Diskussion ihres analytischen Gehalts in verschiecienen wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Forschungstraditionen. (Osteuropa-Institut an der Freien Universität Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaft-liche Veröffentlichungen, Band 40.) Berlin 1980. Duncker & Hum-blot. 554 S. DM 112.30VERNON, RAYMOND and AHARONI, YAIR (Eds.): State-Owned Enterprise in the Western Economies. London 1981. Croom Helm. 203 pp. £11.95WUST, HERBERT F.: Föderalismus. Grundlage für Effizienz in der Staatswirtschaft. (Abhandlungen zu den Wirtschaftlichen Staats-wisscnschaftcn, Bd.20.) Göttingen 1981. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. XX, 281 S. DM 76.- (kart.)

Notes: The paper contains incentive mechanisms for the control of natural monopoly. They are based on the observation that government lacks information on industry costs and market demands which the managers of natural monopoly firms hold. Thus, all mechanisms only make use of publicly accessable information. They are all adjustment processes derived from the common principle to share the benefits of quantity weighted price reductions between the firm and the public. Differences between the mechanisms relate to their welfare objective and the institutional environment. Our findings show that the institutional environment does matter both as regards distributional consequences and the possibilities to reach efficient solutions.

Notes: This paper examines the contribution of monetary policy to the development of inflation and real growth in the Federal Republic of Germany since 1973. The investigation is based on a macro-model for the shorter run, taking into account rational expectations of permanent impulses. Reduced form estimates for the period 1973-1980, based on semi-annual data, permit to explain about 80 percent of the variances of the inflation rate and of output growth. The estimates are used to demonstrate (i) that the severe recession of 1974/75 was initiated by unanticipated contractionary impulses from monetary policy and from relative import prices, (ii) that monetary policy did not reduce the variance of output growth, resulting from unanticipated impulses of relative import prices and real export demand, (iii) that monetary policy supported inflation by providing too large permanent impulses.

Notes: A new microeconomic approach to the otherwise intractable problems of stagflation is developed. If social security contributions were proportional to hours worked, and if unemployment insurance were primarily supplied by firms, these will have an incentive to reduce hours rather than number of employees during recession, when long spells of unemployment are to be expected, with consequent high insurance costs to the firm. Such work-sharing would encourage wage and price restraint as all workers gain from returning to normal hours when the utility of extra leisure begins to decline. Reduction of the work force would take place when new jobs can be found quickly and social costs are minimized.

Notes: This article points out that the egalitarian ideals adopted by many Less Developed Countries (LDC's) often lead to an inefficient allocation of resources because productive and unproductive agents are given equal access to public facilities. Productive agents then find it worthwhile to bribe their way into obtaining differential access to such public facilities —e.g., the telephone system. As long as bureaucrats look upon such bribes as windfall gains, the efficiency of the economic system can be improved. In practice, however, LDC bureaucracies often come to look upon such incomes as a systematic part of their remuneration and this leads them to pursue bribes rather than carry out their appointed duties; as a result, the system as a whole becomes increasingly inefficient.

Notes: Economics tries to explain unique chains of historical events. Economic doctrines, however, are mostly pieces of logics with few references to testable propositions. However, to criticize this lack of ‘testable hypotheses’ is a misapplication of Popper's ideas. History being unique, empirical propositions in economics have to be tailored to individual cases. Economic doctrines, like a chess handbook, are a collection of prefabricated elements promising to be helpful in this task. Economic science is a process of continuous discovery and thus, like all scientific discovery, to large extent an art.

Notes: Some analysts have argued that the burden of public debt is passed on to the future because public debt competes for funds in private capital markets, which lowers capital accumulation. Others argue that using debt finance rather than taxation will have no real effects because an increase in debt will be offset by an equal increase in savings, in anticipation of the higher future taxes that will be needed to service the debt. An empirical test finds that savings changes are only about 20 percent of debt changes, ceteris paribus, implying that most of the burden of the debt is passed on to the future through reduced capital accumulation.

Notes: In the first portion of this paper, marginal-balance theorems are introduced for linear Keynesian models. The Haavelmo balanced-budget multiplier is the best-known example of such theorems. We also introduce the concept of ‘impact differential’ between the initial expenditure-taxation (or investment-saving, or export-import) increments required for the marginal balance to hold. (In the balanced-budget multiplier case with dY = dG = dT in the usual symbols, the impact differential is |MdY/|MdG0—dY/|MdT0, where G0, G0, T0 are constants.) In the second part of the paper, the American tax revolt of the 1970s is introduced in its macro-economic aspect, i.e. as assuming inter-relations between G and T in both directions. (The expansive effects of higher public expenditures are reduced by consequent or anticipated increases in taxation; the contractive effects of higher taxes are reduced by consequent or anticipated increases in expenditures.) In both these cases the balanced-budget multiplier theorem continues to hold, but its impact differential may move in either direction. It will fall (as one might expect) if the dominant relationship (G, T) is from dG to dT, but it will rise if the dominant relationship is in the opposite direction.

Notes: The criticism that the Mundellian policy-mix approach results merely in the financing of external imbalances without effecting their adjustment is reexamined within the context of an aggregative stock adjustment model and found to be suspect. The analysis emphasizes the strategic importance of the desired stock of financial wealth and its susceptibility to monetary and credit policies. In an open economy the aggregate stock of financial wealth can be altered only through the balance of non-financial transactions with the rest of the world. To the extent that, e.g., credit tightening precipitates an increase in the desired stock of financial wealth, domestic transactors will on balance seek to increase their receipts from/sales to overseas relative to their payments to/purchases from overseas. Thus the consistent pursuit of monetary policy for external balance will induce real adjustments that do contribute to the adjustment of the current account imbalance.

Notes: The paper argues that shortcomings with respect to regional allocation are often due to misconstructions of fiscal adjustment and therefore must not be looked upon as market failures. The main argument is based on Buchanan's principle of fiscal equity as a guide to fiscal adjustment, which usually is not applied in existing fiscal systems. It is argued, that the common interpretation of Buchanan's principle in terms of benefits is misleading. Thus an interpretation in terms of costs is presented the essence of which is to provide a ‘right to generate public costs’ which is equal for ‘equals’ in any of a state's regions. Finally it is shown that on certain conditions a system of fiscal decentralization will generate exactly those results to be desired with respect to efficient regional adjustment. It is concluded therefore, that there is no general trade off concerning regional efficiency and fiscal federalism respectively; rather the opposite seems to be the case.

Notes: The authors investigate the question whether there exist ‘convergence’ or ‘divergence’ tendencies with regard to sectoral input output-structures. They apply the model of two-factor analysis of variance with one factor referring to the influence of economic systems the other to intertemporal changes; the interaction between these factors is interpreted as the dynamic system effect. The data base are input output-tables from thirteen Western and five Eastern countries for years around 1959 and 1965. Significant influences of the economic system can be found only in very few sectors. As to the dynamic system effect many sectors show converging and diverging patterns. An interesting fact is that system-specific influences are obviously far more significant in output structures, where the relations can be influenced more easily by administrative procedures than in the input structures which are mainly determined technologically.

Notes: Die Arbeit will die weltweite Produktionsverlagerung konzeptionell erfassen und theoretisch erklären. Der traditionelle Erklärungsrahmen in Form der neoklassischen Theorie der Unternehmung beziehungsweise des internationalen Handels erweist sich dabei als wenig geeignet, um die transnationalen Produktionsaktivitäten der modernen Industrie zu deuten. Die Mängel liegen in den Axiomen der Freihandelsdoktrin wie auch der repräsentativen Firma. Die zentralen Elemente der konzeptionellen Synthese sind (1) eine neo-LISTSCHE dynamische Interpretation der Standortvorteile, (2) eine darauf abgestützte Industrialisierungsund Entwicklungsvorstellung für die gegenwärtigen und zukünftigen Aufholländer, sowie (3) einem mit (1) und (2) kompatiblen theorctischen Ansatz der strukturellen Transformation der alten Industrieländer. Dieser Strukturwandel wird im Gegensatz zur Drei-Sektoren-Hypothese oder Wettbewerbsfähigkeitsanalysen ganzer Branchen auf die offensiven und defensiven Strategien von Unternehmungen zurückgeführt. Die Multis bilden dabei ein wichtiges Verbindungsglied zwischen exportorientierter Entwicklung und struktureller Anpassung. Ihre Überlegenheit infolge ihrer organisatorischen Infernalisierung der entscheidenden Transaktionen und ihre markt- oder kostendeterminierte Internationalisierung des gesamten Produktionsprozesses ist zugleich ein Indiz dafür, dass weder eine weltmarktorientierte Industrialisierungsstrategie der Entwicklungsländer noch eine spiegelbildliche De-Industrialisierung der Industrieländer durch das freie Spiel der Marktkräfte allein zu bewältigen ist.

Notes: This paper employs several methods to estimate the trade creation and diversion effects of EC enlargement. Treating the original EEC and EFTA each as one country it compares total and external imports and the ratios of these imports to consumption between 1970/71 and 1977/78. The comparable figures for U. S., Canada and Japan are used as a ‘normalizer’. Based on several approaches, 1978 trade creation is estimated at $28 billion and diversion at $5 billion, with an implied substitution elasticity between European and non-European sources of 3.2. The results are consistent with independent estimates constructed for the period 1959/60 to 1977/78; namely, the two stages of integration combined.

Notes: After briefly examining recent export trends of less developed countries, this paper discusses measures which can be adopted by advanced countries to facilitate Third World manufactured exports. While the provision of tariff preferences are shown to be unwarranted, there is a strong argument for furthering (trade- induced) structural adjustments. Evidence is provided that imports from less developed countries do not significantly displace workers and that an enhancement of manufactured trade with Third World countries would indeed yield the developed countries with sizeable gains.

Notes: In diesem Aufsatz werden Laborexperimente und Feldversuche in der ökonomie mit der Vorstellung von der Geschichte als einer Art Laboratorium von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft in Verbindung gebracht. Diese Verknüpfung ist keineswegs willkürlich. Die Wirtschaftsgeschichte bringt nämlich von Zeit zu Zeit Situationen hervor, die durch die mehr oder weniger isolierte Variation einer Grösse Zusammenhänge wie von selbst transparent machen und damit Experimenten recht ähnlich sehen. Ist auch die Kontrolle der ≪Versuchsbedingungen≫ in wirtschaftshistorischen Quasiexperimenten weniger gut möglich als in der experimentellen Wirtschaftsforschung, so hält demgegenüber die Wirtschafts geschichte die realitätsnäheren Aufschlüsse bereit. Die betrachteten methodischen Ansätze werden jeweils durch empirische Fallstudien illustriert – etwa zum Thema ≪Kollektivgut und Trittbrettfahrerverhalten≫.

Notes: Economists as advisers are often unsuccessful when proposing more Pareto efficient policies. The reason lies mostly in the fact that they disregard the distributive impacts of their proposals. Starting from the model of a rent-seeking society, it is shown what field an economic adviser should concentrate on, in order to increase the effectiveness of his advice. This approach is then found to be relevant for the deregulation issue.

Notes: Allais, Maurice and Hagen, Ole (Eds.): Expected Utility Hypotheses and the Allais Paradox.Auster, Richard D. and Silver, Morris: The State as a Firm.Becker, Jürgen: Die Partnerschaft von Lomé.Brandt, Willy: North-South: A Programm for Survival.Bromley, R. (Ed.): The Urban Informal Sector.Richardson, Harry Ward: Regional Economics.Burrows, Paul: The Economic Theory of Pollution Control.Campbell, Colin D. (Ed.): Financing Social Security.Girtler, Roland: Polizei-Alltag. Strategien, Ziele und Strukturen polizeilichen Handelns.Griliches, Zvi; Krelle, Wilhelm; Krupp, Hans-Jürgen, and Kyn, Oldrich (Eds.): Income Distribution and Economic Inequality.Hoffmeyer, Martin und Neu, Axel D.: Vertikales Diversifizerungspotential der Entwicklungsländer bei der Weiterverarbeitung von RohstoffenHollander, Samuel: The Economics of David Ricardo.Jones, Ronald W.: International Trade: Essays in Theory.Korkman, Sixten: Exchange Rate Policy, Employment and External Balance.Mátyás, A.: History of Modern Non-Marxian Economics. de Meza, David and Osborne, Michael: Problems in Price Theory.Plasschaert, S. R. F.: Les prix de transfrt et les entreprises multinationales.Rose, M.: Finanzwissenschaftliche Makrotheorie.Schönbäck, Wilfried (Hrsg.): Gesundheit im gesellschaftlichen Konflikt.Sijben, J. J.: Rational Expectations and Monetary Poliqy.Tower, Edward: Economics Reading Lists and Course Outlines.Zellner, Arnold (Ed.): Bayesian Analysis in Econometrics and Statistics.

Notes: In 1961, soon after the beginning of the first United Nations Development Decade, a conference of African Ministers of Education was convened by Unesco. The meeting resolved, inter alia, that by the year 1980 primary schooling throughout the continent should be ‘universal, compulsory and free’.1 As we have now reached that date, it is appropriate to review progress. A few countries have achieved the goal, but many others have fallen short. This article will examine the experience of the last two decades, and assess its implications for ultimate objectives and the strategies for achieving them. Despite national policy variations and divergent social and economic conditions, instructive overall patterns may be discerned.

Notes: In the last few years there has been a growing interest in that very considerable and hitherto mostly unrecorded part of the economic life of the Third World which flourishes outside the state and foreign-owned medium and large-scale concerns. This great mass of non-enumerated enterprises and activities is a major source of employment and production. For the purpose of this article, it will be argued that many of those undertaking research in this sector can be regarded as belonging to one or other of two fairly distinct schools of thought formed by (1) a number of officials from the International Labour Organisation, the World Bank, and other international and government agencies, as well as some purely academic writers,1 and (2) the majority of social scientists attached to the British Sociological Association Development Group, some of whom operate to a greater or lesser extent within a Marxian or neo-Marxian perspective.2 For purposes of abbreviation only, these will be referred to as the ‘I.L.O.’ and the ‘Radical’ groups.

Notes: In his classic study of decentralisation and development, Henry Maddick argued that economic growth and social modernisation depend in part on the ability of Third-World govenments to diffuse responsibility for development planning and administration, to expand participation in economic activities, and to promote new centres of creativity within society. Over-concentration of administrative authority stifles development, Maddick insisted; it leads to waste and corruption, delays action, and creates irrational and inefficient management practices, the costs of which developing countries cannot afford.1 To illustrate his point, Maddick cited the effects of the centralised supply system in the Sudan in the late 1950s, through which ‘shoes made in Fasher were sent 400 miles by rail to Khartoum where the whole shoe supply was concentrated. When Fasher wanted shoes for school children and government personnel it had to send to Khartoum for them.’ He also noted that school desks and equipment for the provincial city of Juba had to be ordered from Khartoum, which was 900 miles away and connected only by inefficient river transport, even though the wood from which the furniture was made originally came from Juba.2

Notes: Theories of modernisation and social change have been increasingly challenged during the past decade by events in the Middle East and other areas of the developing world. Leaders of oil-rich nations are choosing to industrialise but not to westernise, and Islamic revivals are shaping new patterns of political and social development. For example, improvements in female status can no longer be regarded as the inevitable concomitants of industrialisation; to the contrary, gender inequality may actually be exacerbated by national resurgences of religious and cultural traditions which often accompany planned social change.1

Notes: Foreign investment in South Africa during the past 20 years has been subject to criticism form several diverse schools of thought, ranging from those who believe it has contributed to country's economic growth without improving the condition of the black workers, to those who maintain that – at best – apartheid has been modernised rather than fundamentally changed.Today the focus of attention has shifted to collective bargaining and trade union rights, to the action that can be taken on their own behalf by the ecomomically underprivileged and the politically dispossessed, and to the assistance which foreign-owned companies have been given in improving the terms and conditions of employment of their own non-white employees by the codes of conduct that have quite recently been adopted by their own governments.

Notes: People of quite diverse social position and perspective have turned to economic growth as a source of political change in South Africa. Contained within the concept of growth, they maintain, are processes — capital accumulation and class formation, business enterprise and markets, changing skill and capital requirements – that, at the very least, allow some blacks a more secure and higher living standard, that may bring greater equality between the races, or more profoundly, confound traditional racial lines and privileges of quite diverse social position and perspective have turned to economic growth as a source of political change in South Africa. Contained within the concept of growth, they maintain, are processes — capital accumulation and class formation, business enterprise and markets, changing skill and capital requirements – that, at the very least, allow some blacks a more secure and higher living standard, that may bring greater equality between the races, or more profoundly, confound traditional racial lines and privileges. Indeed, some argue that growth undermines the foundations of the racial state. Many of those who posit a relationship between economics and politics, take the next logical step: supporting actions, including foreign investment, that foster economic growth and, presumably, political change in South Africa.

Notes: Urban unemployment and underemployment are widespread problems in Africa, perhaps more so than on other continents. It is a truism, apparently accepted by most governments, that capital is scarce, and that the rate of development and employment creation are constrained by the relative scarcity of capital equipment and the slow rate of capital formation. And yet these two observations, challengeable but generally accepted as commonplace and obvious truths, co-exist in much of Africa with a paradoxical third statement: that much of the urban capital stock, particularly in the modern-service sectors – government, education, large-scale commerce, finance, etcetera – is utilised at a very low rate, typically of the order of 25–30 per cent of the potential maximum. This brief note speculates on the reasons for this state of affairs, and explores the consequences of adopting a possible policy designed to produce a significant change.

Notes: Virtually all analyses of Lesotho's political framework have agreed that strong elements of national identity have neither forestalled domestic conflict nor served to promote a unified assault on awesome economic problems. Hence many writers imply that a major asset, rarely found in independent Africa, has been wasted.1 Roger Leys has perceptively applied dependency theories of a ‘labour reserve’ economy to Lesotho,2 and spends considerable effort on historical analysis aimed at demonstrating the duration and pervasiveness of this process of systematic underdevelopment. In his conclusion he suggests that ‘the long and courageous battle of the Basotho to assert their dignity and worth is in fact a resource and political weapon of incomparable significance in the long-term battle for the liberation of southern Africa.’ Leys infers that national and class identities are interrelated, and possibly reinforcing, when he says that ‘the history of the struggle of the Basotho people and the very degree of their integration into the black working class of South Africa is a formidable weapon.’3

Notes: Ethiopia has long been regarded as the only African state, along with Liberia, to have escaped the ravages of European colonialism, the epitome of African independence and self-determination.1 It was also considered a stable, relatively integrated, and viable political community amidst a continent of new states characterised by chronic instability.2 But by 1974, most if not all of these myths were in the process of being broken, as Ethiopia struggled for its very existence against pressures from within and without that threatened to dismember the Empire.

Notes: Mauritius became independent on 12 March 1968, and was then said to be the paradigm of the small isolated, poor, dependent country, only emerging from the colonial era to fall immediately into neocolonialism – the Third World's Third World.

Notes: In 1955 the South African Government began to demolish a black freehold suburb in Johannesburg, and to relocate its inhabitants in a state-controlled township. Resistance to these moves by the leading black political organisation of the time, the African National Congress (A.N.C.), was short-lived and unsuccessful. Despite its abortive nature, the attempt to oppose the destruction of Sophiatown was historically significant for several reasons.

Notes: In the course of several field studies carried out during 1978–9 on behalf of the Working Group on Recurrent Costs established by the Comité Inter-états de Lutte contre la Sécheresse dans le Sahel and the Club du Sahel, it became clear that imperfect functioning of domestic capital markets hampers the efforts of Sahelian governments to raise domestic non-tax resources for budget finance. Inasmuch as the operation and maintenance of development projects compete for a severely limited pool of uncommitted government revenues – that is, revenues not committed to debt service, meeting the civil service payroll, and other inflexible obligations – reforms that augment this pool are of particular interest from the viewpoint of ensuring that these projects function properly once established.

Notes: Legislation in the former British colonial territories exhibited a pair of paradoxes. First, it spoke in legalese, a patois that only judges and lawyers can read easily. Many laws concerning development, however, addressed ordinary citizens. Second, drafters invented and used a specialised style to reduce official and judicial discretion by making legislation more precise, but this frequently endowed officials with discretion as broad as the unbroken sky. In Africa, the uses of legalese seemed to war with the purposes for which it was developed.

Notes: ANCIENT NEAR EAST

Notes: ANCIENT NEAR EAST

Notes: ANCIENT NEAR EAST

Notes: ANCIENT NEAR EAST

Notes: ANCIENT NEAR EAST

Notes: ANCIENT NEAR EAST

Notes: ANCIENT NEAR EAST

Notes: WORLD OF ISLAM

Notes: WORLD OF ISLAM

Notes: WORLD OF ISLAM

Notes: WORLD OF ISLAM

Notes: WORLD OF ISLAM

Notes: WORLD OF ISLAM

Notes: WORLD OF ISLAM

Notes: WORLD OF ISLAM

Notes: WORLD OF ISLAM

Notes: INDIAN SUBCONTINENT

Notes: INDIAN SUBCONTINENT

Notes: INDIAN SUBCONTINENT

Notes: FAR EAST

Notes: FAR EAST

Notes: FAR EAST

Notes: FAR EAST

Notes: Reviews