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  • Articles  (510,114)
  • Economics  (510,114)
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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    A comparison between the core and the monopoly solutions in a mixed exchange economy (1997)
    Springer
    Economic theory 10 (1997), S. 559-563 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: JEL Classification Numbers: C71 ; D42 ; D51.
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. Using a mixed market model for analyzing imperfectly competitive economies, we maximize the oligopolists' Welfare Function, given individual rationality and feasibility constraints. We prove that solutions belong to the core for a large class of economies. This class includes, in particular, every monopoly having a single type of small traders. Note that all such solutions yield the large trader, utility-wise, strictly more than at any monopoly solution, where the monopolist plays strategically, and the ocean of small traders act as being as price-takers.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001990050175
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    On capital accumulation paths in a neoclassical stochastic growth model (1998)
    Springer
    Economic theory 11 (1998), S. 457-464 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: JEL Classification Numbers: D90 ; C61.
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. Boldrin and Montrucchio [2] showed that any twice continuously differentiable function could be obtained as the optimal policy function for some value of the discount parameter in a deterministic neoclassical growth model. I extend their result to the stochastic growth model with non-degenerate shocks to preferences or technology. This indicates that one can obtain complex dynamics endogenously in a wide variety of economic models, both under certainty and uncertainty. Further, this result motivates the analysis of convergence of adaptive learning mechanisms to rational expectations in economic models with (potentially) complicated dynamics.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001990050197
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Pareto improving financial innovation in incomplete markets (1998)
    Springer
    Economic theory 11 (1998), S. 467-494 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: JEL Classification Numbers: C60 ; D60 ; G10 ; D52.
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. In this paper we develop a differential technique for investigating the welfare effects of financial innovation in incomplete markets. Utilizing this technique, and after parametrizing the standard competitive, pure-exchange economy by both endowments and utility functions, we establish the following (weakly) generic property: Let S be the number of states, I be the number of assets and H be the number of households, and consider a particular financial equilibrium. Then, provided that the degree of market incompleteness is sufficiently larger than the extent of household heterogeneity, S−I≥2H−1 [resp. S−I≥H+1], there is an open set of single assets [resp. pairs of assets] whose introduction can make every household better off (and, symmetrically, an open set of single assets [resp. pairs of assets] whose introduction can make them all worse off ). We also devise a very simple nonparametric procedure for reducing extensive household heterogeneity to manageable size, a procedure which not only makes our restrictions on market incompleteness more palatable, but could also prove to be quite useful in other applications involving smooth analysis.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001990050198
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Cooperative interim contract and re-contract: Chandler's M-form firm (1998)
    Springer
    Economic theory 11 (1998), S. 523-543 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: JEL Classification Numbers: D2 ; D8 ; L2.
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. At an interim stage players possessing only their private information freely communicate with each other to coordinate their strategies. This results in a core strategy, which is interpreted as an equilibrium set of players' alternative type-contingent contract offers to their fellows. From this set of offers each player then chooses an optimal one and engages in some subsequent action, thus possibly revealing some private information to the others. Now with new information thus obtained from each other, the players play a new game to re-write their contract. In all of the optimization and gaming just described, Bayesian incentive compatibility plays a central role. These ideas are formulated within a model of a profit-center game with incomplete information which formally describes interaction of the asymmetrically informed profit-centers in Chandler's multidivisional firm.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001990050200
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Constrained suboptimality in incomplete markets: a general approach and two applications (1998)
    Springer
    Economic theory 11 (1998), S. 495-521 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: JEL Classification Numbers: C60 ; D60 ; D52.
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. In this paper we re-examine generic constrained suboptimality of equilibrium allocations with incomplete numeraire asset markets. We provide a general framework which is capable of resolving some issues left open by the previous literature, and encompasses many kinds of intervention in partially controlled market economies. In particular, we establish generic constrained suboptimality, as studied by Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis, even without an upper bound on the number of households. Moreover, we consider the case where asset markets are left open, and the planner can make lump-sum transfers in a limited number of goods. We show that such a perfectly anticipated wealth redistribution policy, though consistent with the assumed incomplete financial structure, is typically effective.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001990050199
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  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The optimality of nominal contracts (1998)
    Springer
    Economic theory 11 (1998), S. 545-562 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: JEL Classification Numbers: E43 ; E44 ; D91.
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. This paper presents a model in which agents choose to use money as a medium of exchange, a means of payment, and a unit of account. The paper defines conditions under which nominal contracts, promising future payment of a fixed number of units of fiat money, prove to be the optimal contract form in the presence of either relative or aggregate price risk. When relative prices are random, nominal contracts are optimal if individuals have ex ante similar preferences over future consumption. When the aggregate price level is random, whether from shocks to the money supply or aggregate output, nominal contracts (perhaps coupled with equity contracts) lead to optimal risk-sharing if individuals have the same degree of relative risk aversion. Finally, nominal contracts may be optimal if the repayment of contracts is subject to a binding cash-in-advance constraint. In this case, a contingent contract increases the risk of holding excessive cash balances.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001990050201
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  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    A two-stage core with applications to asset market and differential information economies (1998)
    Springer
    Economic theory 11 (1998), S. 563-584 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: JEL Classification Number: D5.
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. We introduce a new core concept, called the two-stage core, which is appropriate for economies with sequential trade. We prove a general existence theorem and present two applications of the two-stage core: (i) In asset markets economies where we extend our existence proof to the case of consumption sets with no lower bound, in order to capture the case of arbitrary short sales of assets. Further, we show that the two-stage core is non empty in the Hart (1975) example where a rational expectations equilibrium fails to exist. (ii) In differential information economies where we provide sufficient conditions for the incentive compatibility of trades. Namely, that no coalition of agents can misreport the true state and provide improvements to all its members, even by redistributing the benefits from misreporting.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001990050202
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  • 8
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Coalitional stability under perfect foresight (1998)
    Springer
    Economic theory 11 (1998), S. 603-627 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: JEL Classification Numbers: C70 ; C71 ; C72.
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. We analyze strategic social environments where coalitions can form through binding or nonbinding agreements and actions of a coalition may impose externalities upon the welfare of the rest of the players. We define a solution concept that (1) captures the perfect foresight of the players that has been overlooked in the literature (e.g., Harsanyi [10] and Chwe [6]) and (2) identifies the coalitions that are likely to form and the “stable” outcomes that will not be replaced by any coalition of rational (and hence farsighted) players. The proposed solution concept thereby offers a notion of agreements and coalition formation in complex social environments.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001990050204
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  • 9
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The least core, kernel and bargaining sets of large games (1998)
    Springer
    Economic theory 11 (1998), S. 585-601 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: JEL Classification Number: C71.
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. We study the least core, the kernel and bargaining sets of coalitional games with a countable set of players. We show that the least core of a continuous superadditive game with a countable set of players is a non-empty (norm-compact) subset of the space of all countably additive measures. Then we show that in such games the intersection of the prekernel and the least core is non-empty. Finally, we show that the Aumann-Maschler and the Mas-Colell bargaining sets contain the set of all countably additive payoff measures in the prekernel.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001990050203
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  • 10
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Translation homotheticity (1998)
    Springer
    Economic theory 11 (1998), S. 629-641 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: JEL Classification Numbers: D20 ; D60 ; D81 ; D71.
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. The concept of translation homotheticity is introduced and defined. It is demonstrated that translation homotheticity is necessary and sufficient for: disposable surplus to be independent of the reference utility, Luenberger's compensating and equivalent benefits to be independent of the reference utility and always equal to one another, the risk premium to be independent of reference-level utility, absolute indexes of income inequality to be reference free, and social-welfare functionals to satisfy invariance with respect to the choice of a common origin. Translation homotheticity is also sufficient for Hicks' many-market consumer surplus measure to be a second-order approximation to disposable surplus, compensating benefit, and equivalent benefit. If preferences are translation homothetic and appropriately quadratic, Hicks, many-market consumer surplus measure is exact for these welfare measures.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001990050205
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