Abstract
THE simple solution to philosophical problems, which those philosophers who describe themselves as logical positivists have propounded in the last ten years, are to-day coming under attack. In the issue of Mind of October 1943, Mr. John R. Reid, who, like many American philosophers, uses a rather elaborate and top-heavy nomenclature, in his article "Analytic Statements in Semiosis" strikes hard at the root of logical positivism by attacking its account of the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements. Briefly, according to the logical positivists, an analytical statement, for example, "Red is a colour", asserts no matter of fact, cannot be denied without self-contradiction, and needs no verification; whereas a synthetic statement, such as "What I see now is red", states matter of fact, can be denied without self-contradiction, and needs to be verified.
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An Attack on Logical Positivism. Nature 153, 191–192 (1944). https://doi.org/10.1038/153191c0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/153191c0