Special Issue ArticleEvolutionary Stability in Games of Communication
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Communication, renegotiation and coordination with private values
2024, Games and Economic BehaviorEndogenous ambiguity and rational miscommunication
2023, Journal of Economic TheoryThe evolution of taking roles
2020, Journal of Economic Behavior and OrganizationCitation Excerpt :Farrell allows only for a specific type of communication that corresponds to our hierarchical structure in anti-coordination games and analyzes the corresponding Nash equilibria. Most of this related cheap-talk literature, including Robson (1990), Sobel (1993), Blume et al. (1993), Schlag (1993), Wärneryd (1993), Schlag (1995), Kim and Sobel (1995), Bhaskar (1998), Banerjee and Weibull (2000), and Hurkens and Schlag (2003), focusses on coordination games and investigates how far cheap talk does – or does not – support selection against inefficient equilibria. The most closely related formal setup to our work is that described in Hurkens and Schlag (2003) and Banerjee and Weibull (2000).
Communication structure and coalition-proofness – Experimental evidence
2017, European Economic ReviewA note on pre-play communication
2017, Games and Economic BehaviorEquilibrium selection in experimental cheap talk games
2015, Games and Economic BehaviorCitation Excerpt :Unfortunately, both Farrell's neologism proofness and Matthews et al.'s (strong) announcement proofness criteria eliminate all equilibria in many games, including the original Crawford–Sobel game.4 Several other types of concepts have been proposed that distinguish between stable and unstable equilibria (or profiles), such as Partial Common Interest (PCI) (Blume et al., 1993), the recurrent mop (Rabin and Sobel, 1996) and No Incentive To Separate (NITS) (Chen et al., 2008). These criteria often select a plausible equilibrium in specific settings, but fail to discriminate successfully across a wider range of cheap talk games.