Elsevier

Economics Letters

Volume 44, Issue 4, April 1994, Pages 377-380
Economics Letters

Strongly consistent two-player game forms

https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(94)90106-6Get rights and content

Abstract

A two-player game form is Nash-consistent if and only if it is tight. Nash-consistency therefore depends only on the effectivity function associated with the game form. This fact is no longer true for strong consistency. We introduce the joint exact effectivity set which is a proper refinement of the effectivity function and prove that a two-player game form is strongly consistent if and only if it is tight and jointly exact. Joint exactness states that the new set coincides basically with the effectivity function.

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Cited by (0)

I wish to thank Professor V.A. Gurvich for helpful comments.

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