Evolutionary stability and efficiency

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Abstract

‘One of the advantages of moral philosophy over game theory is that moralists give sensible advice to moral agents while game theory can give stupid advice to game theorists’ — Ian Hacking.

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    ∗

    I prepared this paper for the session ‘Recent Advances in Evolutionary Economics’ held at the January 1993 meetings of the American Economic Association. Special thanks to Eric Maskin, who presented the paper in my absence. I also thank Andreas Blume, Antonio Cabrales, Vincent Crawford, Eddie Dekel-Tabak, Yong-Gwan Kim, Matthew Rabin, and Larry Samuelson for many useful conversations about evolution and communication in games. They are not responsible for the shortcomings of this paper. I am grateful to the NSF for supporting this research.

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    Copyright © 1993 Published by Elsevier B.V.