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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 17 February 2009
In the course of establishing an interpretative chronology of the post-1949 political and economic development of China, scholars have often assumed that in the early and mid-1950s there was a continuum in terms of the progressive application of Soviet organizational methods and strategic perspectives in China. In other words, the Chinese Communist leadership in the early 1950s not only “leaned to one s side” in international terms, it endorsed and implemented an essentially Stalinist strategy with its consequent implications of rigid hierarchical management and lop-sided investment patterns in favour of rapid heavy industrialization at the expense of agricultural production in the countryside.
1 The official versions of Mao's mid-1950s speeches in the new Volume V of the Selected Works are much more explicit as to Soviet failings than the earlier extant Red Guard texts. The above remark might be seen as an ex post facto revision, calculated to enhance Mao's infallibility, but it is consistent with the implicit emphases set forth in the Red Guard texts. Refer to Schram, Stuart R., “Chairman Hua edits Mao's literary heritage: ‘On the 10 great relationships’,” The China Quarterly (CQ), No. 69, 126–35CrossRefGoogle Scholar for further discussion. For the original reference, see “On the ten major relationships,” Selected Works (SW) (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1977), Vol. V, p. 285Google Scholar.
2 In Chinese Communist historiography, the period of “economic reconstruction” (ching-chi hui-fu) is differentiated on the basis of a primary policy emphasis on re-establishing and surpassing pre-war peaks in industrial and agricultural production. With the declaration of the transition to socialism and the beginning of the First Five-Year Plan in 1953, China passed into a new period of “large-scale capital construction” (ta-kuei-mo ti chien-she).
3 See Selden, Mark, The Yenan Way in Revolutionary China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), passimGoogle Scholar.
4 Tse-tung, Mao, Selected Works, Vol. II, p. 380Google Scholar.
5 See Mao's discussion of “abstract” and “concrete” Marxism and his criticism of the “writing of eight-legged essays on the foreign models.” “On the new stage,” Schram, Stuart R. (ed.), The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung (New York; Frederick Praeger, 1969), revised ed., p. 172Google Scholar.
6 Shao-ch'i, Liu, “On the Party,” in Union Research Institute (ed.), Collected Works of Liu Shao-ch'i (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1969), Vol. I, p. 27Google Scholar.
7 “The opening speech at the Asian and Australian Trade Union Delegates meeting,” ibid. Vol. I, p. 178.
8 See Bridgham, Philip et al. , “Mao Tse-tung's road of development and the Sino-Soviet split, 1953,” CQ, No. 52 (1972), pp. 670–98CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
9 Po-ta, Ch'en, “Mao Tse-tung's theory of the Chinese Revolution is the combination of Marxism-Leninism with the Chinese Revolution,” Current Background (Hong Kong: U.S. Consulate General), No. 126, 15 10 1951, p. 40Google Scholar.
10 In 1953 Mao noted that the CCP adopted this informal regulation out of “true modesty” in order to observe the proper relationship between pupil and teacher. Tse-tung, Mao, “Combat bourgeois ideas in the Party,” SW, Vol. V, p. 111Google Scholar.
11 Refer to Brugger, William, Democracy and Organization in Chinese Industrial Enterprise 1948–53 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 55Google Scholar.
12 Schurmann, Franz, Ideology and Organization in Communist China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 2nd edit., p. 14Google Scholar and also pp. 166, 213, 300.
13 Mao insisted that a reduction of the war apparatus was necessary to ensure the strength of the communist movement at a time when the CCP was facing “grave material difficulties” as a result of the Japanese army's “three-alls.” “A most important policy,” SW, Vol. III (1967), p. 101Google Scholar.
14 In the first instance this principle relates to Sun Yat-sen's “land to the tillers.” However it has a general connotation ensuring the daily needs of the peasant population, and the CCP was alive to this general connotation as a basic legitimizing factor of government.
15 Tse-tung, Mao, “Economic and financial problems in the anti-Japanese War,” SW, Vol. III, p. 111Google Scholar.
16 For an extended discussion on border region economy, see Schran, Peter, Guerilla Economy (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1976), especially pp. 94–95Google Scholar.
17 Tse-tung, Mao, Ching-chi wen-t'i yü ts'ai-cheng wen-t'i (Economic and Financial Problems), 1949 Hong Kong edition, p. 102Google Scholar.
18 Tse-tung, Mao, Ching-chi wen-t'i yü ts'ai-cheng wen-t'i, p. 103Google Scholar.
19 “Central Committee resolution on the unification of leadership in the antiJapanese war bases,” 1 September 1942, in Compton, Boyd, Mao's China (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1966), pp. 171–72Google Scholar.
20 For discussion of the problems of “shifting” see the directive of the North-east Bureau of the CCP in the Shihchiachuang edition of the Jen-min jih-pao, 21 June 1948 and refer to Chung-kuo jen-min chieh-fang chün ju-ch'eng cheng-ts'e (Policy Regarding the People's Liberation Army Entering the Cities), shu-tien, Hsin-hua, c. 1949Google Scholar, 1969 reprint, passim.
21 See Po-ta, Ch'en et al. , Chung-kuo ching-chi kai-tsao (The Transformation of China's Economy), Vol. 1, 05 1949, Hong Kong, pp. 100, 103–104Google Scholar.
22 Tzu-hui, Teng, “Chung-yüan lin-shih jen-min cheng-fu chin-i nien lai ti shih-cheng kung-tso” (“Administrative activities of the Central Plains Provisional People's Government over the past year”), Hsin-hua yueh-pao (New China Monthly), Vol. I, No. 5 (1950), section 3, pp. 1127–28Google Scholar.
23 See Po, Yang, “Kuan-yü ch'üan-kuo mao-i kung-tso t'ung-i wen-t'i ti shangchiao” (“A discussion of problems relating to the unification of national trade work”), Jen-min jih-pao, 2 02 1950, p. 5Google Scholar and also “Shang-yeh chung ti kung-tzu kuan-hsi wen-t'i” (“Problems of public-private relations in commerce”), Hsin-hua yüeh pao, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 602–603Google Scholar.
24 I-ching, Li, “Kuan-yü chung-nan ts'ai-cheng ching-chi wei-yüan hui kung-tso ti pao-kao” (“Report on the work of the Central-South Economic and Finance Committee”), 10 04 1950Google Scholar, Chung-yang ts'ai-ching cheng-ts'e fa-ling hui-pien (Compendium of Laws Relating to Central Government Economic and Financial Policies), Series I–III (Peking: Hsin-hua shu-tien), Vol. 8 (1952), p. 50Google Scholar.
25 See Jen-min shou-ts'e (People's Handbook) (Peking, 1950), Section 3, p. 8Google Scholar.
26 Common Programme in Jen-min shou-ts'e (1950), Section 3, p. 10.
27 Professor Schurmann, discusses this concept in his classic conceptualization of “dual” and “vertical rule” in Ideology and Organization in Communist China, 2nd ed., pp. 188–94Google Scholar.
28 Article 11, “Ch'üan-kuo shui-cheng shih-shih yao-ts'e” (“Principles of national taxation”), Chung-yang shui-wu fa-ling hui-pien chi (Compendium of Central Government Tax Regulations (Peking: Chung-yang shui-wu kung-pao), Vol. 1, p. 5Google Scholar.
29 The Government Administrative Council of the early 1950s was positioned at the apex of state administration and functioned much like the present day State Council.
30 Agricultural production was cited as an example. The Ministry of Agriculture would draft an overall plan for production, but local governments were to exercise substantive responsibilities in adjusting principles to concrete conditions. “Wei-shemma yao t'ung-i kuo-chia ts'ai-cheng ching-chi kung-tso” (“Why do we want to unify national economic and financial work”), Jen-min jih-pao (People's Daily), 10 March 1950.
31 “Kuan-yü t'ung-i kuo-chia ts'ai-cheng ching-chi kung-tso ti chüeh-ting” (“Decision on the unification of financial and economic work”) in Hua-tung ch'ü ts'ai-cheng ching-chi fa-ling hui-pien (Compendium of East China Economic and Financial Regulations) (Shanghai: Hua-tung jen-min ch'u-pan she), Vol. 1 (1951), p. 12Google Scholar.
32 In December 1942, Mao argued that “from economics to finance” was no excuse for “reckless or ill-founded expansion.” Tse-tung, Mao, “Economic and financial problems in the anti-Japanese War,” SW, Vol. III, p. 113Google Scholar.
33 See Chih-ta, Ko, Kuo-tu shih-ch'i ti chung-kuo yü-suan (Chinese Budgets in the Transition Period) (Peking: Ts'ai-cheng ch'u pan-she, 1957), p. 40Google Scholar.
34 Chiang, Chang, “Ts'ai-ching kung-tso ti hsin shih-ch'i” (“The new stage in economic and finance work”), Jen-min jih-pao, 10 03 1950Google Scholar.
35 See “Chin-i pu k'o-fu ling-tao chi-kuan ti p'ing-chiin chu-i tso-feng ch'iianli tso hao t'u-kai chung-hsin kung-tso” (“Advance overcoming the egalitarian work-style of leadership organs exerting all effort to take agrarian reform as the centre of work”), Chang-chiang jih-pao (Yangtse Daily), Hankow, 16 12 1950Google Scholar.
36 “Centralized leadership and divided responsibility is the correct policy of financial work,” Survey of China Mainland Press (SCMP) (Hong Kong: U.S. Consulate General), No. 91, p. 17Google Scholar from Jen-min jih-pao, Peking, 5 April 1951.
37 “Three-grade government financial system instituted by the GAC to consolidate centralization of finance,” SCMP, No. 91, p. 12Google Scholar, Jen-min jih-pao, 5 April 1951.
38 “Centralized leadership and divided responsibility …,” SCMP, No. 91, p. 18Google Scholar.
39 Ibid. pp. 17–18.
40 “GAC decision on division of functions and powers between central and local governments in managing financial and economic work,” ibid., No. 108, p. 22, from Jen-min jih-pao, 26 May 1951.
41 For further discussion of patterns of administration and the restoration of urban-rural trade interflow, see Keith, Ronald C., “The pattern of national political integration in China, 1949–54: the role of the greater administrative regions,” Ph.D. dissertation (University of London, 1977), pp. 201–221Google Scholar.
42 “Centralized leadership and divided responsibility is correct policy of financial work,” SCMP, No. 91, p. 18Google Scholar.
43 Ministry of North China Affairs, “Kuan-yii hua-pei ch'ii i-chiu-wu-i nien chi-hsiang chu-yao kung-tso jen-wu ti piao-shih” (“Directive regarding important items of work in North China for 1951”), Chung-yang ts'ai-ching cheng-ts'e fa-ling hui-pien, Series I–III, Vol. 8 (Peking, 1952), p. 11Google Scholar.
44 “Kuan-yu i-chiu-wu-i nien kuo-ying kung-yeh sheng-chan chien-she ti chüeh-ting” (“Decision relating to production and construction of state industry in 1951”), Hua-tung ch'ü ching-chi ts'ai-cheng fa-ling hui-pien, Vol. 1 (Shanghai, 1951), p. 1033Google Scholar. Also refer to Riskin's, Carl analysis, “Small industry and the Chinese model of development,” CQ, No. 46 (04–06 1971), p. 247Google Scholar.
45 I-po, Po, “Strengthen the Party's political work in the countryside,” Current Background, No. 161 (20 02 1952), p. 18Google Scholar. Ironically, Red Guard historiography has linked Po with Liu's alleged conspiracy to consolidate new democracy at the expense of the advance of socialism. For Mao's, repudiation of Po's speech, see “Combat bourgeois ideas in the Party” (12 08 1953), SW, Vol. V, p. 106Google Scholar.
46 NCNA, Peking, 27 July 1951 in SCMP, No. 147 (1–2 08 1951), p. 18Google Scholar.
47 Ibid. p. 19.
48 The Chinese text is in Chieh-fang jih-pao (Liberation Daily), Shanghai, 19 01 1952, p. 2Google Scholar. For a complete translation refer to SCMP, No. 469, 10 12 1952, pp. 18–34Google Scholar; here the reference is to p. 18.
49 First Five-Year Plan for the Development of the National Economy of the People's Republic of China in 1953–1957 (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1956)Google Scholar.
50 “On the ten major relationships” (25 04 1956), SW, Vol. V, p. 292Google Scholar. Refer to Professor Schram's cogent analysis of Mao's understanding of the Leninist concept, democratic centralism. Schram, Stuart (ed.), Authority, Participation and Cultural Change in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 27–32Google Scholar.
51 “Speech at expanded meeting of the CCP Politburo,” in Joint Publications Research Service, The Miscellany of Mao Tse-tung Thought, Vol. I, p. 31Google Scholar. Original text in Mao Tse-tung ssu-hsiang wan-sui (Taipei: Institute of International Affairs, 1969), p. 36Google Scholar.
52 The countryside had been taxed excessively in March and April 1950. See Tze-ho, Jung, “Summary of 1950 financial work and policy tasks for 1951,” Current Background, No. 93, 12 07 1951Google Scholar. Chou En-lai in his proposals for the Second Five-Year Plan revealed that the state under its new supply and purchase programme had purchased too much grain, thereby contributing to peasant hardship. En-lai, Chou, “Report on the proposals …,” Supplement to People's China (Peking), No. 21 (1 11 1956), p. 5Google Scholar.
53 “Strengthen Party unity and carry forward Party traditions,” SW, Vol. V, p. 317.
54 “Speech at the second plenary session of the Eighth Central Committee of the CCP,” ibid. p. 333.
55 Tse-tung's, Mao 10 March 1958 talk at the Chengtu conference in Schram, Stuart R. (ed.), Mao Tse-tung, Unrehearsed (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1974), p. 98Google Scholar.
