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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 17 February 2009
Until the Chinese “volunteers” crossed the Yalu in November 1950, the Chinese involvement in North Korean politics seems to have been minimal. And yet, when the North Korean régime's very life and the Chinese border were threatened by the massive assault of the United Nations forces, the Chinese quickly came to the aid of the North Koreans. What is Chinese policy toward Korea? What are the prospects for Sino-Korean relations? Such questions will concern us for a long time. This article details part of the historical background to them.
1 See Whiting, Allen S., China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War (New York: 1960).Google Scholar
2 See Scalapino, Robert A. and Lee, Chong-Sik, “The Origins of the Korean Communist Movement (I),” Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. XX (No. 1), 11 1960, p. 22.Google Scholar
3 See Thought Section, Prosecutor's Bureau, High Court, Chōsen shisōundō chōsa shiryō (Research Materials on the Korean Thought Movement) (Seoul: 03 1933), No. 2Google Scholar, “Ro Un-kyō jimmon chōsasho” (“Interrogation of Yo Un-hyong”), passim.
4 In 1928, Kim Wong-bong established the Reconstruction League of the Korean Communist Party in Peking and later established the Leninist Political School there. Between April 1929 and February 1931 the school trained nineteen Communist agents who were later sent to Korea. Thought Section, Prosecutor's Bureau, High Court, Shisō ihō (Ideological Report Series), No. 4 (09 1935), pp. 20–32.Google Scholar
5 Shtsō ihō, No. 22 (03 1940), p. 162.Google Scholar
6 Security Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs, Tokkō geppō (Special Policy Monthly Report), 08 1938, p. 88.Google Scholar
7 Security Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs, Shōwa jū-shi chi-nen chu ni okeru shakai undō no jōkyō (The Situation with Respect to Social Movements in 1942) (Tokyo: 1943), p. 942.Google Scholar
8 Shisō ihō, No. 22, p. 162.Google Scholar
9 Pyong-gon, So, “Mu Chang Changgun Ildae Ki” (A Life History of General Mu Chong), Shinch'onji (New Universe) (Seoul: 03 1946), pp. 238–242, 226Google Scholar. Also see O-song, Kim, Chidoja kunsang (Image of the Leaders) (Seoul: 1946), Vol. 1, p. 71.Google Scholar
10 Yeh Chien-ying, Chief of Staff of the Eighteenth Group Army, mentioned Mu in 1944 and said: “The Korean Independence Union ia North China, from Comrade Wu Ting (Chinese pronunciation of Mu Chong) down to his members, have also made in this field an extremely bitter and brave struggle.” Chien-ying, Yeh, Report on the General Military Situation of the Chinese Communist Party in the War of Resistance (Yenan: 09 1944)Google Scholar. (A press release on June 22, 1944, mimeographed, in English.)
11 Shen-kang-ning ts'an-i-hui-wen-chien hui-chi (Documentary Collection on the Shensi, Ningsia, Kansu Border Region Congress), published by the Historical Research Centre of the Chinese Academy of Science (Peking: 1958), p. 169Google Scholar. (The Congress was held January 6–21, 1941. Location of the Congress is not specified.)
12 Ch'ang-sun, Kim, Puk Han sip-o-nyon sa (A History of Fifteen Years of North Korea), (Seoul: 1961), pp. 130–131.Google Scholar
13 So Pyong-gon, , op. cit., pp. 241, 226Google Scholar, no jōkyō, op. cit., p. 983.Google Scholar
14 Shōwa jū-shichi non chū ni okeru shakai undō no jōkyō, op. cit., p. 983.Google Scholar
15 Tokkō gepp¯, 04 1941, p. 96Google Scholar; Pyong-gon, , op. cit., p. 226Google Scholar; Chōsen minzoku ktihō tōsō-shi (A History of the Korean People's Struggle for Emancipation), Japanese translation of the Korean original edited by the Korean History Editorial Committee (Pyongyang: 1949), Kyoto, 1952, p. 327.Google Scholar
16 The declaration and the platforms of the Federation are reprinted in Japanese translation in Tokkō geppō, 04 1941, pp. 97–101.Google Scholar
17 Ibid., July 1941, pp. 119–122. The full text of this article is reprinted here. The date of publication of the first issue of Choson Ch'ongnyon is not specified in this Japanese report.
18 Chih-feng, Ko, Ch'ao-hsien ko-ming chi (The Korean Revolution) (Shanghai: The Commercial Press, 1945), p. 58.Google Scholar
19 Shakai undō no jōkyō, 1942, p. 983Google Scholar. Pak Hyo-sam (age 36 in 1942) is a graduate of Whampoa Academy; Yi Ik-song, age 33, a graduate of Loyang Military Academy; Wang Cha-in, age 30, a graduate of Nanking Central Military Academy. Tokkō geppō, 11 1941, pp. 100–104Google Scholar
20 For example, Yong-in, Chu was sent to Chungking for liaison purposes. Shakai undō no jōkyō, 1942, p. 983.Google Scholar
21 Chōsen minzoku kaihō t¯s¯shi, op. cit., pp. 326–327. Emphasis added.Google Scholar
22 O-song, Kim, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 63Google Scholar. Also see Pyong-gon, So, op. cit., p. 226.Google Scholar
23 It might be noted in passing, however, that Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik was accused of being a spy-sectarian by a later Communist author, Yi Na-yong. See preface to the Japanese edition, Chōsen minzoku kaihō tōsōshi (History of the Korean People's Struggle for Emancipation), Japanese translation of the Korean original (Pyongyang: 1959)Google Scholar, by the Korean Problem Study Center (Tokyo: Shin Nihon Shuppansha, 1960), p. 6Google Scholar. In contrast to Ch'oe, who treated the development in north China along with the activities of the Kim Il-song group in North Manchuria, Yi Na-Yong totally omitted the KVC from his 529-page volume. Yi's work is a reprint of his previous newspaper articles in Minju Choson (Democratic Korea), the organ of the North Korean régime, and hence his work is the official and the “correct” version today.
24 Ma-lu, Ssu, Tou-cheng shih-pa-nien (Eighteen Years of Struggle) (Hongkong: The Asia Press, 1952), pp. 173–174.Google Scholar
25 ibid., pp. 174–176.
26 Ibid., p. 176.
27 Ibid., p. 176.
28 Ibid., p. 178.
29 Ibid., pp. 178–179.
30 Ibid., pp. 179–180. Ssu continued that Kim was very much perplexed. Although he was tricked, he was not able to complain. Ssu understood him and sympathised with him. They were very good personal friends, and Ssu helped him whenever it was possible. But Ssu said, “I was a member of the Communist Party. I was to carry out the duties of the Party. At our Party cell meeting, we talked about Kim Won-bong; the conclusion of the Party toward him was that he was a ‘petty-bourgeois opportunist and individual heroist who can never be politically trusted.’”
