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A nonasymptotic Condorcet jury theorem

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Abstract.

This paper provides first the condition under which the majority of an odd number of jurists is more likely to choose the better of two alternatives than a single jurist selected at random from the jurists, given that each jurist has a probability larger than one half of choosing correctly, and second that the same inequality holds for a subset of an odd number of jurists chosen at random from the original group.

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Received: 16 November 1998/Accepted: 8 January 1999

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Ben-Yashar, R., Paroush, J. A nonasymptotic Condorcet jury theorem. Soc Choice Welfare 17, 189–199 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050014

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050014

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