Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Information efficiency and majority decisions

  • Published:
Social Choice and Welfare Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

The analysis is concerned with the characterization of equilibria of a two-stage voting game involving private information acquisition. Rational ignorance and information efficiency are identified. It turns out that information efficiency is not always desirable. By restricting the payoff domain, we are able to characterize completely the set of equilibria. In this case, information acquisition by few voters benefits a majority, or even the whole community. Economic Literature Classification Number D70, D71, D80.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Bernholz P (1974) On the reasons of the influence of interest groups on political decision-making. Z Wirtschafts- and Sozialwissenschaften 94: 45–63

    Google Scholar 

  • Austen-Smith D (1990) Information transmission in debate. Amer J Polit Science 34: 124–152

    Google Scholar 

  • Austen-Smith D, Riker WH (1987) Asymmetric Information and the Coherence of Legislation. Amer Polit Science Rev 81: 897–918

    Google Scholar 

  • Cohen L (1979) Cyclic sets in multidimensional voting models. J Econ Theory 20: 1–12

    Google Scholar 

  • Downs A (1957) An Economic Theory of Democracy. Harper and Row, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Gersbach H (1992) Allocation of information by majority decisions. J Public Econ 48: 259–268

    Google Scholar 

  • Gersbach H (1991) The value of public information in majority decisions. Econ Lett 35: 239–242

    Google Scholar 

  • Gilligan TW, Krehbiel K (1989) Asymmetric information and legislative rules with a heterogeneous committee. Amer J Polit Sci 33: 459–490

    Google Scholar 

  • Gould JP (1974) Risk, stochastic preference and the value of information. J Econ Theory 8: 64–84

    Google Scholar 

  • Lohmann S (1994) Information aggregation through costly political action. Amer Econ Rev 84: 518–530

    Google Scholar 

  • Marshak J, Radner R (1972) Economic Theory of Teams. Yale University Press, New Haven

    Google Scholar 

  • McKelvey R (1979) General conditions for global intransitivities in formal voting models. Econometrica 47: 1085–1112

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institut für Volkswirtschaft, Universität Basel, Petersgraben 51, 4003, Basel, Switzerland

    Hans Gersbach

Authors
  1. Hans Gersbach
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Additional information

The author would like to thank Peter Bernholz, MartinHellwig, Tilman Börgers, Harald Nedwed and a referee for helpful comments and suggestions.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Gersbach, H. Information efficiency and majority decisions. Soc Choice Welfare 12, 363–370 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00186280

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00186280

Keywords

Search

Navigation