Abstract
This overview focuses on lexicographic choice under conditions of uncertainty. First, lexicographic versions of traditional (von Neumann-Morgenstern) expected utility theory are described where the usual Archimedean axiom is weakened. The role of these lexicographic variants in explaining some well-known “paradoxes” of choice theory is reviewed. Next, the significance of lexicographic choice for game theory is discussed. Finally, some lexicographic extensions of the classical maximin decision rule are described.
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The authors wish to acknowledge financial support from NSF Grant IRI-8608964, Harvard Business School Division of Research, and the Miller Institute for Basic Research in Science. We are grateful to Irving LaValle and Peter Fishburn for encouragement and helpful comments.
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Blume, L., Brandenburger, A. & Dekel, E. An overview of lexicographic choice under uncertainty. Ann Oper Res 19, 229–246 (1989). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02283523
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02283523