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An expanded approach to analyzing policy-minded candidates

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Abstract

A random pivot model is used to expand the theory of policy-minded candidates. Previous results (Wittman, 1977, 1983; Cox, 1984; Hansson and Stuart, 1984) are derived under weaker assumptions. New results about candidate strategies in multiple elections are also obtained. The thrust of these results supports Calvert's (1985) finding that office-seeking and policy-mindedness are countervailing forces in election contests.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Government, University of Texas at Austin, Burdine Hall 536, 78712-1087, Austin, TX

    James M. Enelow

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  1. James M. Enelow
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Delivered at the 1989 Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, GA, 31 August–3 September 1989. An earlier draft of this paper was delivered at the Public Choice Society Meetings, Orlando, FL, 17–19 March 1989. I would like to thank Chuck Cameron, Don Wittman, and Henry Chappell for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper. I am greatly indebted to Gary Cox for his helpful suggestions in revising this paper. I would also like to thank three anonymous referees.

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Enelow, J.M. An expanded approach to analyzing policy-minded candidates. Public Choice 74, 425–445 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00137688

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