Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Flexible Integration, EMU and Relative Voting Power in the EU

  • Published:
Public Choice Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

This paper studies the implications offlexible integration in the European Union. Itanalyses the voting power of member states in theCouncil of Ministers when differently sized subgroupsof the EU are set up. European Monetary Union isreferred to as the most important example of flexibleintegration. The Banzhaf-Index is calculated to studythe distribution of voting power in the decisionmaking process according to the stability and growthpact. The results show considerable fluctuations,especially for smaller countries, in relative votingpower, the latter being defined as the relationbetween voting power and relative voting weight.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Artis, M.J. and Winkler, B. (1998). The stability pact: Safeguarding the credibility of the European Central Bank. National Institute Economic Review 163: 87–98.

    Google Scholar 

  • Artis, M.J. and Zhang, W. (1997). On identifying the core of EMU: An exploration of some empirical criteria. CEPR Discussion Paper 1689, August.

  • Banzhaf, J. (1965). Weighted voting doesn't work: A mathematical analysis. Rutgers Law Review 19: 317–343.

    Google Scholar 

  • Beetsma, R.M.W.J. and Uhlig, H. (1997). An analysis of the Stability Pact. CentER for Economic Research Discussion Paper 97–59. Tilburg University.

  • Berg, S. and Perlinger, T. (1998). Pólya sequences, connected coalitions and voting power indices. Paper presented at the EPCS meeting, Göteborg, Sweden, 29 April-3 May 1998.

  • Bindseil, U. and Hantke, C. (1997). The power distribution in decision making among EU member states. European Journal of Political Economy 13: 171–185.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Brams, S.J. and Affuso, P.J. (1976). Power and size: A new paradox. Theory and Decision 7: 29–56.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Brams, S.J. and Affuso, P. (1985). New paradoxes of voting power in the EC Council of Ministers. Electoral Studies 4: 135–139.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Brückner, M. and Peters, T. (1996). Further evidence on EU voting power. Journal of Theoretical Politics 8: 415–419.

    Google Scholar 

  • Centre of Economic Policy Research [CEPR] (1995). Flexible integration - Towards a more effective and democratic Europe. Monitoring European Integration No. 6. London.

  • Colomer, J.M. and Hosli, M.O. (1997). Decision-making in the European Union: The power of political parties. Aussenwirtschaft 52: 255–280.

    Google Scholar 

  • European Council Regulation on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure (1997). Council Regulation (EC) No. 1467/97.

  • European Council Resolution on the Stability and Growth Pact (1997). Council Resolution 97/C 236/01.

  • Felsenthal, D.S. and Machover, M. (1995). Postulates and paradoxes of relative voting power - A critical re-appraisal. Theory and Decision 38: 195–229.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Felsenthal, D.S. and Machover, M. (1997). The weighted voting rule in the EU's Council of Ministers, 1958-95: Intentions and outcomes. Electoral Studies 16: 33–47.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Felsenthal, D.S., Machover, M. and Zwicker, W. (1998). The bicameral postulates and indices of a priori voting power. Theory and Decision 44: 83–116.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Garrett, G. and Tsebelis, G. (1996). An institutional critique of intergovernmentalism. International Organization 50: 269–299.

    Google Scholar 

  • Holler, M.J. and Illing, G. (1996). Einführung in die Spieltheorie. Berlin: Springer Verlag, 3. edition.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hosli, M.O. (1993). Admission of European Free Trade Association States to the European Community: Effects on voting power in the European Community Council of Ministers. International Organization 47: 629–643.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hosli, M.O. (1996). Coalitions and power: Effects of qualified majority voting in the Council of the European Union. Journal of Common Market Studies 34: 255–273.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kirman, A. and Widgren, M. (1995). Voting in the European Union. European economic decision-making policy: Progress or paralysis. Economic Policy 21: 421–460.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lane, J.-E., Berg, S. and Mæland, R. (1997). The power index method and the European Union. Comment to Josep M. Colomer and Madeleine O. Hosli. Aussenwirtschaft 52: 281–286.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lane, J.-E. and Mæland, R. (1995). Voting power under the EU constitution. Journal of Theoretical Politics 7: 223–230.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lane, J.-E., Mæland, R. and Berg, S. (1995). The EU parliament: Seats, states and political parties. Journal of Theoretical Politics 7: 395–400.

    Google Scholar 

  • Leech, D. (1990). Power indices and probabilistic voting assumptions. Public Choice 66: 293–299.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Leibfried, S. (1994). The social dimension of the European Union. En route to positively joint sovereignty? Journal of European Social Policy 4: 239–262.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nurmi, H. (1980). Game theory and power indices. Journal of Economics 40: 35–58.

    Google Scholar 

  • Penrose, L.S. (1946). The elementary statistics of majority voting. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 109: 53–57.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Shapley, L.S. and Shubik, M. (1954). A method for evaluating the distribution of power in a committee system. American Political Science Review 48: 787–792.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Straffin, P.D. (1977). Homogeneity, independence, and power indices. Public Choice 30: 107–119.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Thun-Hohenstein, C. (1997). Der Vertrag von Amsterdam. Die neue Verfassung der EU. Wien: Manz Verlag.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tsebelis, G. and Garrett, G. (1996). Agenda setting power, power indices and decision making in the European Union. International Review of Law and Economics 16: 345–361.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Turnovec, F. (1997a). Monotonicity of power indices. Institut für Höhere Studien (Institute for Advanced Studies), Wien. East European Series No. 41. 62

    Google Scholar 

  • Turnovec, F. (1997b). The double majority principle and decision making games in extending european union. Institut für Höhere Studien (Institute for Advanced Studies), Wien. East European Series No. 48.

    Google Scholar 

  • Widgren, M. (1994). Voting power in the EC decision making and the consequences of two different enlargements. European Economic Review 38: 1153–1170.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Widgren, M. (1995). Probabilistic voting power in the EU Council: The cases of trade policy and social regulation. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 97: 345–356.

    Google Scholar 

  • Winkler, G.M. (1993). Die Verteilung der Abstimmungsmacht im Rat der Europäischen Gemeinschaften. In R. Neck and F. Schneider (Eds.), Österreich und Europa 1993. Herausforderungen der europäischen Integration für eine kleine offene Volkswirtschaft, 121–152 Wien: Manz Verlag.

    Google Scholar 

  • Winkler, G.M. (1998). Coalition sensitive voting power in the Council of Ministers of the European Union: The case of eastern enlargement. Journal of Common Market Studies (forthcoming).

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Public Finance, University of Innsbruck, Austria

    Matthias Sutter

Authors
  1. Matthias Sutter
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Sutter, M. Flexible Integration, EMU and Relative Voting Power in the EU. Public Choice 104, 41–62 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005054731693

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005054731693

Keywords

Search

Navigation