Abstract
In this paper we investigate the effects of heterogeneity in common pool resource (CPR) problems. We examine whether heterogeneity impedes or facilitates coordination on an efficient use of a CPR by proposing and voting on allocation schemes. In a full information design we compare extractions and voting behavior in heterogeneous and homogeneous groups. If the CPR is extracted individually, we find no difference in efficiency between heterogeneous and homogeneous groups. However, when groups can vote on allocation schemes, homogeneous groups are more likely to reach an efficient agreement than heterogeneous groups.
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Margreiter, M., Sutter, M. & Dittrich, D. Individual and Collective Choice and Voting in Common Pool Resource Problem with Heterogeneous Actors. Environ Resource Econ 32, 241–271 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-005-3359-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-005-3359-9