Abstract
The jointness efficiency of large jurisdictions and the distributional efficiency of small jurisdictions present a dilemma in the organization of a governmental system. Working from the point of view that governments exist to provide services, the two types of efficiency are integrated through Lagrangian methodology. The result is an optimal provision of public goods, an equitable taxing structure, and an efficient distribution system.
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Honey, R., Strathman, J. Jurisdictional consequences of optimizing public goods. Ann Reg Sci 12, 32–40 (1978). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01286108
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01286108